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Christian tradition speaks mainly of two possible post-mortem human destinies. It holds 
that those human beings who, in their earthly lives, acted according to God’s will and 
accepted God’s love will be reconciled to Him in heaven; whereas those who have acted 
against God’s will and refused His love will be consigned to the everlasting torments of 
hell. The notion that hell is everlasting and also a place of unending suffering inevitably 
gives rise to the following question for theists: how could an omnipotent, all-good and all-
loving God allow anyone to suffer the torments of hell for eternity? The problem of hell is 
arguably the most severe form of the problem of evil because the evil found in hell is 
eternal with no possibility for redemption. Thus, the doctrine of hell gives rise to a specific 
moral problem caused by the apparent incompatibility between God’s goodness and love 
and everlasting torment in hell. There have been several attempts to shore up the doctrine 
of  hell  in  the  face  of  this  problem.  ‘Particularists’  argue  that  the  doctrine  is  morally 
defensible and that some people will experience eternal torment in hell as a result of their 
rejection of God. Others try to evade the problem by claiming that a doctrine of hell is not 
in fact taught in the scriptures (at least in its traditional form), and that Christians are 
therefore able to reject particularism and affirm that all human beings will be saved in the 
end.  Those  who  make  this  optimistic  eschatological  observation  are  known  as 
‘universalists’. 
My thesis focuses on ‘universalists’ and, in particular, on three contemporary Christian 
philosophers  who  defend  universal  salvation,  namely:  John  Hick,  Thomas  Talbott  and 
Marilyn McCord Adams. All three maintain that God’s love for His human creatures is 
inconsistent with the claim that God does not desire to bring about their salvation. Their 
accounts share common roots: they are founded on an understanding of God’s nature as 
omnipotent love, and on an understanding of human freedom, as well as on an account of 
curative post-mortem punishment for sinners. All three philosophers hold that God will 
eventually  succeed  in  reconciling  all  human  beings  to  Himself  and  so  no  one  will  be 
damned in hell.  
In  this  thesis,  I  argue  that  Hick,  Talbott  and  Adams  fail  in  their  attempts  to  make  a 
plausible  case  for  universalism.  One  of  the  main  criticisms  I  consider  is  that  there  is 
significant tension between their universalist accounts and the value of human freedom. 
The necessary correlation that they assume between God’s love and the outcome of this iii 
 
love does not recognize the capacity for each person freely to reject the offer of salvation. 
Another  criticism  I  consider  is  that  their  accounts  of  post-mortem  punishment  do  not 
guarantee either that salvation and reconciliation with God will be the outcome of a free 
choice made out of love, or that all sinners will eventually be saved. In bringing these three 
universalist  accounts  into  question,  I  examine  the  notions  of  freedom  of  choice  and 

























The bells of hell will ring-a-ling-a-ling  
For you, but not for me  
The angels will all sing-a-ling-a-ling  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
No other doctrine in the Christian tradition has captured the human imagination to the 
extent that the doctrine of hell has. It has also sparked one of the most heated debates 
among theists. Hell occupied Christian thought throughout the centuries and its influence 
and significance is reflected not only in numerous theological and philosophical works but 
also in various works of art, literature and poetry. The horrors of hell are vividly described 
in Dante’s Inferno and Milton’s Paradise Lost, and the representations of hell found in 
these classic works are suggestive about why many people feel unease when they think 
about hell.
1 The fate of Mohammed in hell, as it is presented in Dante’s Inferno, gives us a 
gruesome picture of hell: 
No cask stove in by cant or middle ever 
So gaped as one I saw there, from the chin 
Down to the fart-hole split as by a cleaver. 
His tripes hung by his heels; the pluck and spleen 
Showed with the liver and the sordid sack 
That turns to dung the food it swallows in. 
I stood and stared; he saw me and stared back; 
Then with his hands wrenched open his own breast, 
Crying: “See how I rend myself! What rack 
Mangles Mahomet! Weeping without rest 
Ali before me goes, his whole face slit 
By one great stroke upward from chin to crest. 
All these whom thou beholder in the pit 
Were sowers of scandal, sowers of schism abroad 
While they yet lived; therefore they now go split. 
Back yonder stands a fiend, by whom we’re scored 
Thus cruelly; and over and over again 
He puts us to edge of the sharp sword 
As we crawl through our bitter round of pain; 
For ere we come before him to be bruised 
Anew, the gashed flesh reunites its grain...”.
2 
Dante’s description is true to the fact that when many people think about hell the first thing 
that comes to mind is the eternal pains and torment which some will suffer. Hell is widely 
imagined as the place of the wicked—as a place where those who have refused God’s love 
receive  unending  punishment  with  no  possibility  of  escape.  The  notion  that  hell  is 
                                                 
1  Dante  Alighieri,  The  Divine  Comedy.  Hell,  Dorothy  L.  Sayers,  trans.  (Penguin,  1949).  John  Milton’s 
Paradise Lost was originally published by Samuel Simmons in 1667. 
2 Alighieri (1949), Canto XXVIII. 2 
 
everlasting implies that the human race is to be forever divided by a ‘great gulf’.
3 To any 
person who places great value on the human personality or the unity of human race, the 
thought of an eternal division and eternal torment in hell may be an intolerable one. The 
question that inevitably arises for theists is how an all-powerful, all good and all-loving 
God could allow anyone to be eternally punished in hell. Could anyone deserve such fate? 
How  could  any  sin  deserve  an  infinite  punishment?  It  is  hard  to  accept  the  fact  that, 
however terrible hell is, divine justice and love reigns there: but this is what the doctrine of 
hell seems to require theists to believe. 
 
1. The problem of hell 
The doctrine was increasingly criticised and rejected on moral grounds from the late 18
th 
century. Among the better-known criticisms and rejections of the doctrine are those of J. S. 
Mill (1806–1879) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970). Mill writes: 
I  say  nothing  of  the  moral  difficulties  and  perversions  involved  in 
revelation itself; though even in the Christianity of the Gospels, at least 
in its ordinary interpretation, there are some of so flagrant a character as 
almost to outweigh all the beauty and benignity and moral greatness 
which so eminently distinguish the sayings and character of Christ. The 
recognition, for example, of the object of highest worship, in a being 
who could make a Hell; and who could create countless generations of 
human beings with the certain foreknowledge that he was creating them 
for this fate. Is there any moral enormity which might not be justified by 
imitation of such a Deity? And is it possible to adore such a one without 
a frightful distortion of the standard of right and wrong? Any other of 
the outrages to the most ordinary justice and humanity involved in the 
common christian conception of the moral character of God, sinks into 
insignificance beside this dreadful idealization of wickedness.
4 
                                                 
3 The parable of Lazarus and Dives in Luke 16:19–31 illustrates this division. According to the parable: 
Lazarus, a poor man dies and is carried by angels to Abraham’s bosom. A rich man dies as well and goes to 
Hades where he is tormented. In his torment he looks up to heaven, sees Lazarus and Abraham, and makes 
two requests which Abraham denies. Firstly, he requests a drop of water, but Abraham invokes the great gulf 
between the blessed and the wicked. Secondly, he requests Abraham to send Lazarus to earth to warn his 
brothers about the torments of the afterlife they will experience if they continue being bad. But Abraham 
denies this as well because Lazarus and Dives are both dead. For more discussion see Alan E. Bernstein, The 
Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds (UCL Press, 1993), pp. 
239–240. This parable emphasizes not only that hell is inescapable but also that there is no possibility of 
spiritual development in hell. See Michael Wheeler, Heaven, Hell and the Victorians (Cambridge University 
Press, 1990), p. 194. 
4 John Stuart Mill, ‘Utility of Religion’, in Three Essays on Religion (Cosimo Classics, 2008), pp. 113–114. 3 
 
About a century later, Russell argues along similar lines: ‘there is one serious defect to my 
mind in Christ’s moral character, and that is that he believed in hell. I do not myself feel 
that any person who is really profoundly humane can believe in everlasting punishment’.
5 
Both philosophers’ comments point out a serious problem for the Christian doctrine of hell, 
namely that it appears to be morally indefensible.
6 The problem of hell is arguably the 
most severe form of the problem of evil because evil in hell is eternal with no future 
possibility for redemption.
7 Before we continue, in order better to understand the problem 
of hell and the various approaches to it, it is important to look first at the problem of evil.  
The  problem  of  evil  is  one  of  the  most  serious  difficulties  confronting  traditional 
Christianity, and it has been a focus of heated philosophical and theological discussions for 
centuries.  Epicurus  was  the  first  to  formulate  the  problem  of  evil  as  a  philosophical 
dilemma (341–270 B. C.): 
If  God  is  perfectly  good,  He  must  want  to  abolish  all  evil,  if  He  is 
ultimately powerful, He must be able to abolish all evil. But evil exists; 
therefore  either  God  is  not  perfectly  Good  or  He  is  not  ultimately 
powerful.
8  
Later the problem received its classic formulation in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion when Philo says to Demea: 
Epicurus’ old questions are  yet unanswered.  Is he willing to prevent 
evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then 
he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?
9 
The  problem  of  evil,  however,  took  its  contemporary  form  in  1955  in  J.  L.  Mackie’s 
famous article ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ where Mackie argues that the existence of evil is 
logically incompatible with that of an omnipotent and wholly good God.
10 There seems to 
                                                 
5 Bertrand Russell, ‘Why I am not Christian’, in Russell on religion: selections from the writings of Bertrand 
Russell (Louis I. Greenspan and Stefan Anderson, eds., Routledge, 1999), p. 86. 
6 Most opponents of the doctrine of hell, such as those who support universalism or annihilation, claim that 
this is one of the main reasons why the doctrine should be abandoned. 
7  Michael  L.  Peterson  and  Raymond  J.  VanArragon,  eds.,  ‘Is  Eternal  Damnation  Compatible  with  the 
Christian Concept of God?’, in Contemporary debates of Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell Publishing, 
2004), p. 271. 
8 Quoted in John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Macmillan, 1966), p. 5. 
9  David  Hume,  Dialogues  Concerning  Natural  Religion  (Richard  H.  Popkin,  ed.,  Hackett  Publishing 
Company, 1998), Part X, p. 63. 
10 J. L. Mackie, ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, Mind 64, no. 254 (April, 1955), p. 209. The problem of evil which 
Mackie presents is a ‘logical problem’. It is, he says, ‘the problem of clarifying and reconciling a number of 
beliefs’. Reprinted in Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrhew Adams eds., ‘J. L. Mackie: Evil and 
Omnipotence’, in The Problem Of Evil (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 25–37. Also see J. L. Mackie, 4 
 
be, he argues, some contradiction between these propositions: ‘God is omnipotent; God is 
wholly good; and yet evil exists’.
11 However, the contradiction between these propositions 
is not explicit and in order to make it explicit ‘additional premises or quasi-logical rules 
connecting the terms good, evil, and omnipotent’ are needed.
12 These additional premises 
are that a perfectly good being would always eliminate evil as far as it can and that there 
are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. It follows, Mackie argues, that a wholly 
good, omnipotent being eliminates evil completely and that the propositions that a wholly 
good, omnipotent being exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible.
13 So Mackie holds 
that theism is ‘positively irrational’ since ‘parts of the essential theological doctrine are 
inconsistent  with  each  other’.
14  The  theist  cannot  ‘consistently  adhere’  to  all  three 
propositions, but in denying any of them he is, in effect, denying the existence of God; at 
least ‘God’ as traditionally conceived.
 15  
Some philosophers have argued that God’s existence is incompatible with some quantity or 
certain types of evil. The existence of evil in the world, they claim, is evidence against 
God’s existence, or at least the existence of some of these evils minimizes the possibility of 
the existence of the God in which theists believe. William Rowe in his ‘The Problem of 
Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’ argues that there are instances of evil which are 
pointless (unjustifiable) and so constitute good evidence against God’s existence.
16 
Purported  solutions  to  the  problem  of  evil  have  been  proposed  by  various  thinkers 
throughout  the  late  20
th  century.  Perhaps  the  most  important  proposed  solution  to  the 
problem is the claim that evil is not to be ascribed to God but to the actions of human 
                                                                                                                                                    
‘The  Problem  of  Evil’,  in  The  Miracle  of  Theism:  Arguments  for  and  against  the  Existence  of  God 
(Clarendon Press-Oxford, 1982), pp. 150–176. For a detailed discussion of the problem of evil and various 
responses  see:  Charles  Taliaferro,  ed.,  ‘The  Problem  of  Evil  and  the  Prospects  of  Good’,  chap.  9  in 
Contemporary  Philosophy  of  Religion  (Blackwell  Publishers,  1998).  Kenneth  Surin,  Theology  and  the 
Problem of Evil (Basil Blackwell, 1986). Michael L. Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Kelly James Clark ed., ‘God and Human Suffering’, Part Three in 
Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (Broadview Press, 2000). Brian Davies, ed., Philosophy of Religion: 
A Guide and Anthology, part V (Oxford University Press, 2000). Brian Davies, ed., ‘God and Evil’, chap. 10 
in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford University Press, 2004). 
11 Mackie (1955), p. 200. 
12 Ibid., pp. 200–201. 
13 Ibid., p. 201. 
14 Ibid., p. 200. 
15 Ibid., p. 200. 
16 This problem is also known as the evidential problem of evil. Difficulties in the logical problem of evil led 
to the formulation of the evidential problem. William Rowe argues that ‘There exist instances of intense 
suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the 
occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly 
good  being’.  See  William  Rowe,  ‘The  Problem  of  Evil  and  Some  Varieties  of  Atheism’,  American 
Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979), p. 336. Also see Clark (2000), pp. 229–237.  5 
 
beings  which  God  endowed  with  free  will.  Mackie  and  Antony  Flew,  writing 
independently, argued, as Mackie put it, ‘if God has made men such that in their free 
choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not 
have made men such that they always freely choose the good?’.
17 Alvin Plantinga in his 
The Nature of Necessity replies to the charge made by Mackie and Flew by defending 
libertarian free will.
18 I will say more about Plantinga’s argument in chapter two. There I 
explain how libertarian free will assist theists—universalists and non-universalists alike—
to respond to the problem of hell.  
The problem of evil, however, differs from the problem of hell in the following ways. 
Firstly, Christianity gives a clear reason why a doctrine of hell is supported in its tradition 
and explains the purpose of the doctrine, whereas Christianity remains largely silent on 
why evils occur or how they serve God’s divine purposes.
19 Secondly, in defending God’s 
goodness  in  response  to  the  existence  of  evil  many  theists  argue  that  either  evil  is  a 
necessary condition or can serve as means for a greater good or that evil is a consequence 
of a greater good.
20 In other words, God is promoting a greater good for humanity by 
permitting the existence of evil. In contrast, no good can be brought out of the evil of hell 
since hell, according to traditional Christianity, is eternal and the possibility of any future 
                                                 
17Mackie (1955), p. 209. For a more detailed presentation of Flew’s argument see Antony Flew, ‘Divine 
Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, Antony Flew and Alasdair 
MacIntyre, eds. (SCM Press Ltd, 1955), Ch. VIII. 
18 Plantinga, as we will see in chapter two, argues that it is possible for God to create a world with free 
human creatures that always choose to do right and behave well. However, God cannot create genuine free 
agents and then not permit them to bring about moral evils. People must freely decide to act morally and they 
cannot do that if the fact that they act as they do is determined by God. Plantinga has defended this position 
over several decades. The most developed version appears in The Nature of Necessity (Oxford Clarendon 
Press, 1974b). See also Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 
1974). 
19 Jonathan Kvanvig makes a similar point in his book The Problem of Hell (Oxford University Press, 1993), 
p. 9.  
20 Those who attempt to defend God’s goodness usually offer either a defence or a theodicy. Those who offer 
a defence do not search for the reasons why God allows evil to occur but attempt to propose a hypothetical 
scenario according to which the reality of God is compatible with the reality of evil. Most notable defences 
are the Augustinian Free Will Defence. See St Augustine, The City of God (Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald 
G. Walsh, trans., Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1950), XI, XII. St Augustine, On 
Free Choice of the Will, Thomas Williams, trans. (Indianapolis; Cambridge: Hackett Pub. Co., 1993). Saint 
Augustine, The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Thomas Hibbs, ed. (Regnery Publishing, 1961), XII, 
XIII, XXVI, XXV and XI. St Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, F.J. Sheed, trans. Chapter III 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1943). Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence in Alvin Plantinga, 1974a and 1974b. 
On  the  Greater  Good  Defence  see,  Melville  Y.  Stewart,  The  Greater  Good  Defence  (University  of 
Minnesota, 1983) and Keith E. Yandell, ‘The Great Good Defence’, Sophia 13, n. 3 (Oct., 1974), pp. 1–16. 
Those who propose a theodicy, attempt to justify the righteousness and justice of God in the face of fact of 
evil.  It  is  an  attempt  to  resolve  the  problem  of  faith  in  the  face  of  the  existence  of  evil.  Most  notable 
theodicies are Swinburne’s Free Will Theodicy; see Richard Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). St Irenaeus’ theodicy, see Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). John Hick’s ‘soul-making’ theodicy; See John Hick, Evil and the Love of God 
(Palgrave Macmillan and Co Ltd., 1966) and John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (William Collins Sons, 
1976).  6 
 
good is lost. As John Kvanvig observes ‘hell is apparently paradigmatic as an example of 
truly pointless, gratuitous evil’.
21 There is no greater good to promote or to expect. The evil 
that is found in hell is eternal and can never be redeemed. Therefore, the doctrine of hell 
gives  rise  to  specific  moral  problems  caused  by  the  apparent  incompatibility  between 
God’s goodness and love and a doctrine of eternal punishment in hell.
22  
                                                 
21 Kvanvig (1993), pp. 3–4 
22 Libertarians who suppose that God can guarantee various outcomes, even when they depend in some way 
on libertarian choices, commonly take the Molinist view, i.e. they suppose that God has knowledge of the 
relevant counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. For the purposes of the thesis, I am going to set aside this 
account of divine providence but a brief explanation of the accounts of God’s knowledge would be useful.  
The relevance of omniscience to the doctrine of hell is less apparent than the relevance of God’s goodness. 
Theists and atheists are primarily concerned with one aspect of omniscience, that is, divine foreknowledge, 
because the idea of God’s foreknowledge has been thought to intensify the moral problem of hell. See Walls 
(1992), p. 33. The question of God’s knowledge is relevant to the question of salvation and damnation since 
it allows God to know what the outcome of each individual life would be in every set of circumstances. See 
Lindsey (2003), p. 31. It has been argued that if God created the earthly world with full awareness that the 
vast majority of people will be eternally damned in hell this seems to make Him responsible for an appalling 
evil. The criticism gains its force from the particular conception of God’s foreknowledge according to which: 
God has infallible foreknowledge of all events including  human choices. This is the traditional view of 
foreknowledge. The claim that God has such knowledge has been challenged in two different ways. Firstly, it 
has been argued that it is not obvious how God can have knowledge of future events. And secondly it has 
been argued whether foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian freedom (sort of freedom we have if our 
actions are undetermined, and it is ‘up to us’ what choices to make). According to this view, God knows the 
future including future human choices. He determines who will act according to His will and so knows who 
will be saved. However, the main difficulty with this account of God’s knowledge is that it does not preserve 
human  freedom.  If  a  person  has  been  determined  by  God  to  make  certain  choices,  then  he  cannot  do 
otherwise and his choices are not free, at least in the libertarian sense. From this it is obvious that problems 
arise for those who support a doctrine of hell i.e. if God foreknows that some will be damned forever, then he 
looks like ‘the perfect conception of wickedness rather than the exemplification of perfect goodness’. See 
Walls (1992), p. 36. 
Attempts to show that there is a compatibility between God’s knowledge for all future events and human free 
choices led Luis de Molina, a Jesuit Priest in the 16
th century, to develop a theory of foreknowledge based on 
the key idea of God’s ‘Middle Knowledge’. Molina calls it ‘Middle knowledge’ because it is between God’s 
Natural  Knowledge  and  His  Free  Knowledge.  According  to  Molina,  ‘God’s  natural  knowledge  is  of 
metaphysically necessary truths and is known by him prior to his decision to create’. See Walls (1992), p. 37. 
The content of this knowledge is essential to God and it does not depend on the free decisions of His will. 
God  has  knowledge  of  every  contingent  state  of  affairs  which  could  possibly  obtain  and  ‘of  what  the 
exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of 
affairs that should be actual’. See Craig (1989), p. 176. God’s free knowledge is knowledge of all remaining 
propositions that are in fact true in the actual world and it is logically posterior to the decision of the divine 
will to actualize a world. The content of such knowledge is not essential to God, since He could have decreed 
to actualize a different world. See Craig (1989), p. 176. God’s middle knowledge is knowledge of all true 
counterfactual  propositions,  including  counterfactuals  of  creaturely  freedom.  God  knows  what  any  free 
persons would do in any set of circumstances because this is how the person would freely choose. God thus 
knows that ‘were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would 
obtain’.
 See Craig (1989), p. 176. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does 
not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom are true or false. However, unlike natural knowledge, whereas it is essential to God that He have 
middle knowledge, the content of His middle knowledge is not essential to Him. True counterfactuals of 
freedom  are  contingently  true.  So  middle  knowledge  is  like  free  knowledge  in  that  it  pertains  to 
metaphysically contingent truths. The choices which a person makes are free in a very strong sense. A person 
S could freely decide to refrain from A in circumstances C, so that different counterfactuals could be true and 
be known by God than those that are. This suggests that what God knows depends on what choices free 
persons would make on their own account. Molina offering this account of Middle knowledge wishes to 
preserve  libertarian  freedom.  In  order  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  that  God  justly  punishes  or  rewards 
humans for the actions preservation of libertarian freedom is essential. Without libertarian freedom, it seems 
difficult to make sense of the fact that some people are dammed in hell forever even if God wishes to save 7 
 
This problem is reinforced by the fact that in the New Testament there are several passages 
where Christ himself is presented as preaching the fate of the wicked in hell. The later 
Christian tradition came to hold that salvation can be achieved only through Christ. Any 
disbelief of or attempt to remove the doctrine from the Christian dogma would undermine 
the very foundations of Christianity. So the doctrine cannot be so easily abandoned. Peter 
Geach, for example, argues: 
We cannot be Christians, followers of Christ, we cannot even know what 
it is to be a Christian unless the Gospels give at least an approximately 
correct account of Christ’s teaching. And if the Gospel account is even 
approximately  correct,  then  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  according  to  that 
teaching many men are irretrievably lost….It is less clear, I admit, that 
the fate of the lost according to that teaching is to be endless misery 
rather then ultimate destruction. But universalism is not a live option for 
a Christian.
23 
This is one of the main reasons why Christians cannot easily abandoned the doctrine of 
hell. They cannot eliminate the doctrine from their faith and remain Christians. In view of 
                                                                                                                                                    
them all. In embracing Middle Knowledge Molina holds that we can maintain both human freedom and a 
strong view of foreknowledge.  
Nevertheless, Molinism does not provide an immediate solution to the problem of evil and the problem of 
hell. It has been argued that generally the assumption that God has middle knowledge may complicate the 
theists efforts to deal with the problem of evil and consequently with the problem of hell. The main argument 
against this account is that it is plausible that God could have created a world with free creatures who would 
have always freely done right or a world in which fewer are damned. It has been argued that it assumes that 
the  counterfactuals  of  freedom  are  true  and  that  God  knows  them.  Contemporary  critics  of  Middle 
Knowledge such as Robert Adams doubt that any counterfactuals of freedom are true because he does not see 
who or what makes them true. Adams suggests a possible basis for the truth of counterfactuals of freedom 
when those are about actual persons. This suggestion is made in a discussion of one of Molina’s favourite 
theological proof-texts, the story of David in the city of Keilah and Saul’s plans to besiege the city to capture 
David.  See  Robert  Merrihew  Adams,  ‘Middle  Knowledge  and  the  Problem  of  Evil’,  in  American 
Philosophical Quarterly 14, no. 2 (Apr., 1977), p.110. According to the story, David, knowing Saul’s plans 
asked God whether in fact Saul would besiege the city and whether he would be taken to Saul if he did. God 
answered affirmatively to both questions and so David evacuated his men from Keilah and hid out in the 
hills. Molina took this passage to show that God knew propositions like the following to be true: ‘(2) if David 
stayed in Keilah and Soul besieged the city, the men of Keilah would surrender David to Saul’. See Adams 
(1977), p. 110. This action according to Molina, is not only counterfactually true and God knows is infallibly 
by middle knowledge but also it would have been free if it had occurred. Adams doubts that this proposition 
is true and holds that something like (2) might be true by virtue of correspondence with the character and 
desires of the men. See Adams (1977), p. 111. However, Adams holds that neither Saul’s intentions or 
desires and the character of his men necessitated their actions or interfered with their freedom of will. An 
agent, he says, acts freely if he is able to act out of character or against his desires. This means that the 
proposition which is actually true is not (2) but the following: ‘(6) if David staying in Keilah and Saul 
besieged the city, the men of Keilah would probably surrender David to Saul’. See Adams (1977), p. 111. 
However, this attempt is not adequate, Adams says, because ‘God knows infallibly what definitely would 
happen, and not just what would probably happen or what free creatures would be likely to do’. See Adams 
(1977), p. 111. 
Molinism has received a lot of attention in particular through Plantinga’s Free Will Defence. Plantinga in 
several publications on the problem of evil defends the assumption that God has middle knowledge. He 
assumes  that  some  counterfactuals  of  human  freedom  are  true  and  that  God  knows  the  truth  of  these 
counterfactuals even though God has no control over them. See for example, Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of 
Necessity (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1974b). 
23 Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 123–124. 8 
 
the charge of the doctrine being morally indefensible, Christians face a dilemma: either 
accept that the doctrine of hell is morally indefensible or reject the teachings of Christ in 
the New Testament.  
While during the 20
th century the doctrine of hell was widely ignored, there have been 
some  recent  efforts  to  come  into  terms  with  it.  Attempts  to  avoid  undermining  the 
Christian dogma itself led Christian philosophers to respond to the above dilemma in two 
main ways: on the one hand, some have argued that the doctrine is morally defensible, and 
on the other hand, others have argued that Christ did not in fact teach the doctrine of hell at 
least in its traditional form. In order to show that Christ did not teach eternal damnation 
defenders of this position must give a persuasive alternative interpretation of the texts in 
the New Testament; that is they have to explain why the relevant texts which speak of 
eternal damnation in hell do not in fact do so.  
There  are  many  different  views  on  the  doctrine  of  hell  which  are  versions  of  the  two 
approaches to the dilemma outlined above. There is a general agreement among Christian 
philosophers in favour of those more traditional interpretations that acknowledge that the 
New Testament and Christ teach that at least some people will experience unending misery 
in hell as a result of their rejection of salvation.
24 Philosophers holding this view can be 
called  ‘particularists’.  A  minority  of  philosophers  rejects  particularism  and  affirms 
universalism, that is the view that all human beings will be saved in the end. These latter 
can  be  called  ‘universalists’.  My  thesis  focuses  on  universalists:  those  Christian 
philosophers who to defend universal salvation have attempted to show that Christ does 
not in fact teach eternal damnation, at least not as traditionally understood.  
In the following section, I explain the structure of the thesis, outlining the theme of each 
chapter and set the goal of the thesis. This is followed by some definitions and distinctions 
which are important to the argument of the thesis and by means of which I will highlight 
the diversity of opinions about the doctrine.  
 
 
                                                 
24 Jerry Walls makes this observation in his ‘Eternal Hell and the Christian Concept of God’ in Michael L. 
Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon, eds., Contemporary debates of Philosophy of Religion (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004), p. 270. 9 
 
2. Goal of the thesis 
In this thesis, I examine three contemporary universalist views, that of John Hick, Thomas 
Talbott and Marilyn McCord Adams and I argue that none of these three views succeeds in 
defending universalism effectively.  
Chapter two begins by providing some historical background to the doctrine of hell. In 
order to understand why the doctrine has been so fiercely attacked it is necessary to begin 
by tracing the development of Christian eschatology. What will follow is a brief survey of 
contemporary defences of hell that will assist us in understanding the increasing popularity 
of  universalism,  as  well  as  the  consequent  development  of  contemporary  defences  of 
universal salvation. 
The core of the thesis is constituted by chapters three, four and five. There I present and 
criticize the universalistic views of Hick, Talbott and Adams respectively. We shall see 
that all three accounts share a common root: namely, each account develops out of an 
understanding of God’s omnipotent love and of the nature of human freedom. All three 
philosophers argue that if God is omnipotent love then he necessarily desires the salvation 
of all His human creatures. Universalism, then, is a necessary consequence of their views 
on the nature of God.  
Hick argues that God is a God of love and his ultimate purpose for humanity is to save it. 
God’s relation to all His human creatures is such that He is able to fulfil His purpose. 
There are two central themes in Hick’s theodicy: firstly, God’s purpose for humanity is a 
‘soul-making’  one,  and,  secondly,  human  salvation  occurs  when  there  is  real 
transformation of the human being. Humanity’s salvation depends upon its positive and 
voluntary response to God. All ultimately achieve salvation through a gradual, and at times 
painful, curative and purgatorial process  continuing beyond this life in other lives  and 
leading eventually to the transformation of the person into a child of God. Whether in this 
life or a future one, and with God’s continuing salvific work, every human being will 
eventually  achieve  full  consciousness  of  God  and  thus  salvation.  God  will  eventually 
succeed in His purpose of winning all humans to Himself in faith and love.  
Talbott likewise rejects the doctrine of eternal hell in favour of Christian universalism. He 
argues that it is necessarily true that if God is the all-powerful and all-loving being which 10 
 
Christianity affirms, then all human beings will be saved in the end.
25 Talbott not only 
thinks that the doctrine of universal salvation is necessarily true but also claims that any 
form of theism which includes a doctrine of unbearable and unending suffering in hell and 
denies God’s love is logically inconsistent. His account of universal salvation hinges on 
three important ideas: (i) the identification of God’s nature with love; (ii) an understanding 
of what constitutes a ‘fully informed’ and free choice in accepting or rejecting God; and 
(iii) the notion of post-mortem restorative punishment as ‘forcibly imposed punishment’. 
Talbott holds that human creation is a process whereby God firstly, brings all His human 
beings into being as independent and rational agents, and secondly, brings them all to His 
glory. An essential part to the redemptive process whereby God transforms His human 
creatures into children of God is that humans exercise their moral freedom in the earthly 
environment in which they are set. It seems, Talbott argues, epistemically possible that all 
free persons would eventually turn to God in some finite amount of time after becoming 
fully informed about the source of their supreme happiness. Since God is the source of 
supreme human happiness, He will seek to promote of necessity this kind of happiness in 
every single person, and He will bring all human beings to the point where they voluntarily 
submit their wills to Him. 
Adams  also  argues  that  unbearable  and  unending  suffering  in  hell  is  inconsistent  with 
God’s love. Therefore, she holds that we should reject any views that hold that the reality 
of  God  and  the  reality  of  hell  are  logically  compatible.  She  maintains  that  God  loves 
human beings and His love expresses itself in His desire not only to enter into personal 
intimacy with them but also to unite with them. Following the eschatological conviction 
that God’s love can be guaranteed to every person, she argues that every human being will 
eventually achieve union with God and thus salvation. Adams bases her account on two 
distinctive ideas: (i) the category of horrendous evils and (ii) a particular theory of the 
nature  of  God,  the  nature  of  human  beings  and  the  relationship  between  the  two. She 
claims that all human beings are vulnerable to horrendous evils and these evils can be 
defeated  only  by  God’s  love.  Divine  love  can  be  guaranteed  only  if  God  defeats 
horrendous evils, not only within the context of the world as a whole but also within the 
framework of the individual participant’s life.
26 Eternal hell would be a horror that would 
remain undefeated if God were to permit such a fate for the wicked. Since God loves 
humans,  He  would  not  create  persons  within  whose  lives  horrendous  evils  remain 
                                                 
25 Talbott’s use of language suggests that he is about to offer us a logical problem of hell parallel to Mackie’s 
logical problem of hell. However, it turns out that this is not in fact the case. 
26 Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians’, in Reasoned Faith, 
Eleonore Stump, ed. (Cornell University Press, 1993a), p. 304. 11 
 
undefeated,  whether  in  the  earthly  life  or  the  future  life.  Therefore,  God  will  save  all 
human beings in the end, there can be no hell as a place of eternal torment and thus a 
doctrine that defends such a view should be rejected. 
By way of summarizing, all three philosophers maintain that God’s love for His creation is 
inconsistent with the claim that God does not wish to save it. They argue that if God truly 
loves a human being then He desires to save it and if God truly loves all human beings then 
His desire will be to save them all. If God is by His nature love then God must love all 
humans and desire their salvation.
27 A second common aspect of all three accounts is that 
they affirm libertarian freedom.
28 They argue not only that God will succeed in saving all 
humans beings but that each person’s salvation will come about freely. Finally, they hold 
that since the worst of the sinners are not ready to reconcile to God, they will receive post-
mortem curative punishment with the goal of restoration. These positions, however, are not 
problem-free. Universalism in general, and these views in particular, raise questions about 
God’s nature and human nature, human freedom and divine sovereignty, and the character 
of the post-mortem punishment as well as the understanding of God’s victory over evil. 
In  this  thesis,  for  the  most  part  my  concern  will  be  with  the  question  of  whether 
omnipotent love can guarantee universal salvation without violating human freedom, and 
not directly with the question of whether God’s love and/or justice are consistent with 
allowing some to be damned.
29 I argue that Hick, Talbott and Adams fail in their attempt to 
defend universalism efficiently. I argue that it is not clear from their accounts how it is 
possible for God to guarantee the salvation of all human beings. One of the main criticisms 
I consider is that the necessary correlation that their universalist accounts assume between 
God’s love and the outcome of this love does not recognize the capacity of each individual 
to reject the offer of salvation. The problem for Hick, Talbott and Adams and universalism 
in general is that it is not clear whether a person with libertarian freedom would freely 
accept God if God does not determine their choices; this is a problem which leads many to 
reject  universalism.  It  seems  that  universalism  is  successful  only  by  robbing  human 
persons of their freedom and consequently of their autonomy. Moreover, Hick, Talbott and 
Adams hold that all human beings and in particular sinners will freely embrace salvation 
                                                 
27 These claims have been shared by many other Christians who are not universalists and they have prima 
facie biblical support. See A. Robin and Christopher H. Partridge, eds. Universal Salvation? The Current 
Debate (Paternoster Press, 2003).  
28 As I have said in a previous section, those philosophers who attempt to propose a solution to the problem 
of evil and consequently to the problem of hell defend a libertarian view of freedom. 
29 I would like to thank Dr. Mark Wynn and Dr. Chris Lindsay for advising me to make it clear that for the 
most part in the thesis my concern will be with the question of whether omnipotent love can guarantee 
universal salvation without violating human freedom. 12 
 
once they come to understand God and His love. This understanding will emerge from 
restorative punishment. The problem with this claim is that if humans have libertarian 
freedom and the only way of correction available to God is curative punishment it is not 
obvious that all humans will accept God in faith and love instead of out of fear or coercion; 
moreover, there is no guarantee that all will choose to be saved. So the accounts they offer 
on human freedom and nature as well as restorative punishment do not rule out the fact that 
some people will never reconcile to God. Their accounts do not guarantee that all human 
beings will be saved in the end.  
After a detailed examination of these three universalist accounts in chapter three, four and 
five, in the last chapter, I give a summary of what has been argued in the thesis. There I 
suggest some directions a universalist might take to avoid the problems reviewed in this 
thesis. I will not propose definitive answers to these problems but suggest that further 
research is needed for a better understanding of the importance of human freedom and the 
nature of restorative punishment. 
 
3. Some important definitions 
Particularism  
Christian particularism holds that only some human beings will achieve salvation in God. 
A person’s location either in hell or in heaven depends only upon their relationship with 
Christ.  
Exclusivism and Inclusivism 
Exclusivists  tend  to  share  two  basic  premises.  According  to  the  first  premise,  human 
beings  do  not  have  the  power  to  save  themselves  despite  their  best  efforts.  Secondly, 
gratuitously God has disclosed Himself in the person of Christ and it is through Christ 
alone that a person can be reconciled to God. Inclusivists maintain that while Christ brings 
salvation into the world, God’s grace is extended to all His creation. Most inclusivists 13 
 
affirm the revelation which is to be found in the world religions, while still retaining the 
importance of mission and the unique role of Christ.
30 
Hell 
The following classification of the popular views of hell is not exhaustive but will assist us 
in drawing comparisons and contrasts, which will allow us to evaluate the theories which 
we  shall  examine  in  the  following  chapters.  The  traditional  view  of  hell,  which  was 
defended by Augustine shaped western Christian thought; the other view is a variation on 
the main theme of the traditional view.
31 
Traditional view of hell: According to the traditional view of hell, hell is a place in which 
the wicked suffer pain as a punishment from God.
32 Traditionally it is portrayed as the 
resting place of the devil and his followers. Hell is the fate of those who denied salvation in 
Christ during their earthly lives and who therefore died in a state of sin. The punishment 
and suffering which the damned will undergo in hell will be for eternity. Two kinds of 
punishment were traditionally believed to be reserved for the damned: poena damni (pain 
of loss) and poena sensus (pain of sense).
33 The former is the emptiness and frustration that 
results naturally from permanent loss of the vision of God and the latter is sensory pain 
from the fire. Moreover, hell was thought to be the fate of the vast majority of people.  
Arminian view of hell: Another view is what Thomas Talbott calls the Arminian view of 
hell.
34 Arminians hold that a human being’s eternal destiny is not sealed at death but God 
continues to offer grace even after death and so there is no end to the opportunity even for 
the  damned  to  receive  salvation.  Nevertheless,  since  God  has  given  human  beings  the 
freedom of choice, it is possible that some of them will reject God’s grace forever and so 
be separated from Him for eternity. C. S. Lewis in his The Great Divorce and The Problem 
of Pain, for example, does not reject the traditional Christian claim that hell is a place of 
                                                 
30 Alister E. McGrath, The Blackwell encyclopedia of modern Christian thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 
pp. 413–415.  
31 See St Augustine (1950), (1943) and (1961). 
32 Jonathan Kvanvig calls the traditional view of hell, the ‘Strong View of Hell’ and it breaks it into four 
components: ‘(H1) The Anti-Universalism Thesis: Some people are consigned to hell. (H2) The Existence 
Thesis: Hell is a place where people exist, if they are consigned there. (H3) The No Escape Thesis: There is 
no possibility of leaving hell and nothing one can do, change, or become in order to get out of hell, once one 
is consigned there. (H4) The Retribution Thesis: The justification for hell is retributive in nature, hell being 
constituted to mete out punishment to those whose earthly lives and behaviour warrant it’. See Kvanvig 
(1993), p. 19. 
33 Geoffrey Rowell, Hell and the Victorians: A study of the nineteenth-century theological controversies 
concerning eternal punishment and the future life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 23. 
34 Thomas Talbott, The Inescapable Love of God (Universal Publishers, 1999). Jerry Walls calls this view the 
modified orthodox view in his Hell: the Logic of Damnation (University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 13. 14 
 
eternal torment and misery but he denies the claim that God is the tormentor in a direct or 
indirect way.
35 Hell is a positive retributive punishment and at the same time a self-chosen 
condition. Permanent residence in hell is the result of an individual’s free choice to oppose 
God and so the doors of hell are ‘locked from inside’. The punishment which the damned 
undergo is not inflicted by God but it is constituted by being who they are. Their misery in 
hell arises from the nature of their being, what Lewis calls ‘remains’.  
This view has been endorsed by two contemporary philosophers. Jerry Walls argues that 
human freedom is an essential component of human nature, which is the very nature which 
makes it possible for human beings to respond to God with love, trust and obedience or 
reject him. The damned can receive grace in the afterlife. God gives to all humans ‘optimal 
grace’, that is, the fullest opportunity to be saved. Even the damned can receive grace in 
the afterlife but persist in denying God’s grace and are finally lost. Those who reject God’s 
love have made a decisive choice for evil, that is, a settled choice to reject salvation.
36 
Walls argues that ‘the choice of damnation is a deliberate and persistent choice to embrace 
evil and to reject salvation’.
37 William Lane Craig argues that given the nature of the free 
will of human beings some of them are utterly irredeemable in the following sense: despite 
God’s best efforts to save human beings some persons freely and irrevocably reject him. 
God wills all humans salvation, and ‘by the Holy Spirit He supplies sufficient grace for 
their salvation’.
38 While humans are entirely free to embrace this salvation some reject 
God’s every effort to save them. In addition to this claim, he argues that it is also possible 
that in order for God to bring many people to salvation he had to pay the price of seeing 
the vast majority of them in hell.
39 
Universalism  
There are many different forms of universalism but it comes in at least two main forms: 
Pluralistic universalism and Christian universalism. This classification is not exhaustive 
but will nonetheless enable us to draw a comparison within the scope of the thesis and to 
                                                 
35 C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1946) and C. S. Lewis, The Problem 
of Pain (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002). 
36 See Walls, 1992.  
37 Walls in Peterson (2004), p. 274.  
38 William L. Craig, ‘No Other Name: A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation 
through Christ’, Faith and Philosophy 6 (1989), p. 9. This article can be found on www.leaderu.com. The 
original pages are 172–188 but they are not obvious in the online version and so I numerate them in the 
following way pp. 1–14. 
39 Craig holds that those who are lost suffer from what he calls ‘transworld damnation’. See Craig, 1989. 
Alvin Plantinga argues about what he calls ‘transworld depravity’. See Plantinga, 1974a. Thomas Talbott 
argues about what he calls ‘transworld reprobation’. See Thomas Talbott, ‘Providence, Freedom, and Human 
Destiny’, Religious Studies 26, no. 2 (Jun., 1990), p. 234. 15 
 
evaluate  the  theories  which  concern  us.  These  two  forms  of  universalism  are  usually 
classified as ‘strong universalism’ and ‘weak universalism’.
40 According to the former, it is 
not only true but also necessarily true that every human being will end up in heaven: no 
person  can  be  finally  lost.  Clearly,  if  particularism  is  replaced  by  some  version  of 
universalism then a way has to be found of justifying universalism. One strategy is to deny 
Christ  any  saving  power,  thereby  softening  the  exclusivist’s  claims  and  arguing  that 
Christianity is one of the many paths to salvation. Another strategy is to give a different 
understanding of God’s nature and love. Pluralist universalists endorse the first view and 
Christian universalists endorse the second view. 
Pluralistic Universalism: Pluralistic universalism is the view that all human beings are 
eventually saved by whatever religious path is open to them. The different major world 
religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism, are but different 
paths  to  the  same  goal—salvation.  Religious  pluralism  finds  the  traditional  Christian 
doctrine  of  salvation  through  Christ  alone  as  ‘unconscionable’.
41  It  argues  that  the 
existence of a God who is all-loving and omnipotent seems incompatible with the claim 
that those human beings who never hear Christ’s teachings or never accept the gospel of 
salvation through Christ will be damned. It is worth pointing out that universalism is not a 
necessary part of the pluralistic view. Trevor Hart writes that, ‘[c]learly a conviction that 
all must ultimately find salvation is helpfully bolstered by the view that their empirical 
refusal or failure to embrace faith in Jesus Christ makes no necessary difference to their 
eternal destiny’.
 42 Therefore, pluralism and universalism are often allied whether pluralism 
leads to universalism or vice versa. 
The most well-known proponent of pluralistic universalism is John Hick. In his earlier 
writings, Hick’s universalism is closer to ‘a relatively orthodox Christian theology’.
43 His 
belief in universal salvation emerged from his belief in a ‘God of Love’, as we will see in 
the chapter on Hick’s account. However, the fact that many human beings do not recognize 
the  God  which  he  proclaimed  led  him  to  offer  a  clearer  and  definite  pluralistic 
universalism. Hick considers various religions each with its own sacred scriptures, spiritual 
                                                 
40  Kvanvig  proposes  two  alternative  main  categories  of  universalism:  ‘necessary’  and  ‘contingent’ 
universalism. Contingent universalism holds that although an individual could end up in hell, ‘as a matter of 
contingent fact every human being will end up in heaven’. See Kvanvig (1993), p. 74. Different people give 
different meanings to what I have called strong universalism; see Parry (2003), p. xx; see Lindsey Hall, 
Swinburne’s Hell and Hick’s Universalism (Ashgate, 2003), pp. 21–23. 
41 William Lane Craig, ‘Politically Incorrect Salvation’, in Christian Apologetics in the Post-Modern World, 
P. Phillips and D. Ockholm, eds. (Downer’s Grove Ill.: Inter-Varsity, 1995), pp. 75–97. 
42 Trevor Hart, ‘Universalism: Two Distinct Types’, in Universalism and the doctrine of Hell, Nigel M. de S. 
Cameron, ed. (Paternoster Press, 1992), p. 7. 
43 Hart (1992), pp. 7–8. 16 
 
practices, forms of religious experiences and so on to ‘constitute different human responses 
to the ultimate transcendent reality to which they all bear witness’ and to be equally valid 
paths for salvation.
44 Hick abandons the idea that Christianity is exclusively true in favour 
of pluralism and he argues for what he calls a ‘relative absoluteness’ for it instead.
45 He 
argues  that  our  view  of  the  religions  of  the  world  should  be  theocentric  and  not 
christocentric. Christianity is absolute only for Christians whereas other world faiths are 
likewise  absolute  for  their  own  adherents.
46  Belief  in  Christ  and  acceptance  of  his 
teachings  is  but  one  of  the  many  ways  to  salvation.  This  statement  marks  a  definite 
moment in Hick’s universalism because it meant that Hick could no longer support the 
uniqueness  of  Jesus  Christ  and  thus  his  universalism  was  no  longer  compatible  with 
traditional Christian theology. Today, Hick regards the deity and incarnation of Christ as a 
myth or metaphor and he no longer speaks of the ultimate good of Christianity which is 
God but of the Real.
47 Nonetheless, Hick’s universalism is not easily classified. In this 
thesis, we examine Hick’s earlier writings in which his pluralistic approach is not yet fully 
developed.  
Christian Universalism: Christian universalism is a position founded on an understanding 
of God’s nature as a God of love. If God is what, ultimately, he asserts Himself to be—
love—then all persons will be saved. It claims that all human beings will eventually come 
to God through Christ. This position is expressed in various views which all share two 
features: (a) ‘the commitment to working within a Christian theological framework and (b) 
the claim that all individuals will be saved through the work of Christ’.
48 
Hart points out that to support their case most Christian universalists would appeal to a list 
of factors which are claimed to be proper to the inner logic of the Christian gospel itself in 
                                                 
44 John Hick, The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm, chap. 10 (Oxford: One World, 
2004), p. 83. 
45 John Hick, The Myth of Christian Uniqueness (London : SCM Press, 1988), p. 16. 
46 Hart writes that Ernst Troeltsch in his The Absolute Validity of Christianity also argues for what Hick calls 
relative absoluteness. His research into the history of Christianity led him to hold that Christianity is linked to 
the particular social and cultural patterns within which it has developed over the centuries; it stands and falls 
with elements of the ancient and modern civilizations of Europe. Hart says that Troeltsch argues that ‘If 
Christianity is in any sense absolute, then it is so only for those belonging to the culture of Europe. For other 
races in other temporal and spatial contexts, other religious traditions will serve in a similar way’. See Hart 
(1992), pp. 5–6.  
47 For more on Hick’s pluralism see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the 
Transcendent (Palgrave, 1989) and John Hick, The Myth of God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1993) and 
John Hick, 1988. 
48 Parry (2003), p. xxi.  17 
 
order  to  support  their  case.
49  They  generally  then  proceed  to  a  specific  philosophical 
consideration of what has been called ‘the omnipotence of divine love’.
50 Understanding 
God’s love is very important for Christian universalists. Normally their discussion about 
God’s omnipotent love takes place parallel to their discussion of the logical problem of 
evil. A similar parallelism may be identified in the philosophical case for universalism. If 
God were all-loving and omnipotent, He would have never permitted anyone to remain in 
hell for eternity. On the contrary, He would want all to be saved and He would be able to 
save all. The Christian universalist must, therefore, define God’s omnipotence and love in 
such a way that will permit him to conclude that God will save all eventually. 
As I have explained, Christian universalists hold the central Christian conviction that God 
is love. Since love is thought to be the very nature of God, they conclude that the ultimate 
relationship between God and human beings must be one of love. Moreover, God must 
ultimately have the final good of all His creatures in view.
  51 That is that no one will 
remain unredeemed but all will be saved in the end through Christ. Salvation is not for 
some special group of elected people but it is for all. Universal salvation will inevitably 
spring from God’s nature.  
It is important to understand that Christian universalism is not a single view. Christian 
universalists do not all share the same convictions on several matters such as the existence 
of hell, the experience of the horrors of hell, the exclusivism or inclusivism of Christianity, 
the nature of human freedom and the nature of punishment in the afterlife. Walls, for 
example,  makes  two  further  distinctions  within  Christian  universalism  which  he  calls 
‘convinced’  universalism  and  ‘hopeful  universalism’.
52  According  to  ‘hopeful 
universalism’,  universalism  finds  support  in  scriptures  but  it  cannot  be  dogmatically 
defended.  According  to  ‘convinced  universalism’,  the  idea  of  eternal  punishment  is 
morally  unacceptable  and  contrary  to  the  teaching  of  Christ.  The  difference  between 
‘convinced universalism’ and ‘hopeful universalism’ lies in the former’s certainty that the 
universalist interpretation must be correct.
53 Moreover, some universalists hold that one 
must have conscious faith in Christ in order to be saved (exclusivists such as Talbott, for 
example)  whereas  others  (inclusivists)  hold  that  someone  can  be  saved  through  Christ 
                                                 
49 Some of these factors would be: God’s nature is love and so His relation to His human creatures should be 
one  of  love;  the  conviction  that  God  must  have  the  final  good  of  all  His  creatures  in  view;  the  utter 
unconditionality of the salvation wrought by Christ etc. See Hart (1992), p. 15. 
50 Ibid., p. 16. 
51 Ibid., pp. 15–16. 
52 Walls (1992), pp. 13–14. 
53 Some philosophers and theologians would classify John Hick as a hopeful universalist whereas others 
would classify him as a convinced universalist. 18 
 
without having heard of Christ. The important thing that should be emphasized here is that 
universalists such as Talbott, Adams and Hick affirm that God is bound to love and would 
save all human creatures because He is constrained by the nature of His being. Moreover, 
they affirm that there may be a temporary state after death (more or less like the catholic 
purgatory)  which  involves  severe  punishment.  This  kind  of  punishment  is  usually 
understood in restorative terms instead of retributive terms and is a punishment that the 
sinners will have to go through in order to accept Christ and thus achieve salvation. 
Annihilation or Conditional Immortality 
Conditionalism  or  conditional  immortality  emerged  as  one  of  the  attempts  to  find  a 
mediating  position  between  the  extremes  of  universalism  and  eternal  punishment. 
According to the basic doctrine of conditionalists, God created human beings mortal but 
also with a capacity for immortality. At the fall of Adam God passed a sentence of death 
on human beings, but in His mercy did not put it into effect, so that, with the coming of 
Christ,  immortality  might  once  again  be  offered  to  human  beings.
54  Those  who  lived 
virtuous lives but who were not Christians are going to be given a post-mortem opportunity 
to attain eternal life by responding in faith to Christ; whereas those who did not respond 
are unfit to receive immortality and so are annihilated. 
Annihilation and conditional immortality are different concepts that are closely linked with 
whether  or  not  a  person  believes  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  We  can  discern  two 
variations of conditionalists: firstly, those who emphasized the biblical language of the 
‘second death’ and the value of retributive punishment as an ethical sanction, argued that 
annihilation occurred after the wicked had been punished. Secondly, those of the school 
who were strongly influenced by Darwinism believed in annihilation at death while the 
saved survived.
55 The most notable recent philosophers who argue in favour of conditional 
immortality  are  Jonathan  Kvanvig  and  Richard  Swinburne.
56  This  view,  although 
preferable  to  the  view  that  the  damned  will  suffer  eternal  torment  in  hell,  has  three 
problems:  Firstly,  it  is  accused  of  lacking  evidence  in  New  Testament.  Secondly,  its 
                                                 
54 Rowell (1974), p. 181. 
55 These conditionalists objected to the label ‘annihilationist’ which, they considered, classified them with 
materialist non-believers in their understanding of death. See, Rowell (1974), p. 197. Early advocates of 
conditionalism denied annihilationism. They argued that the destruction of the earthly life may be effected in 
two different ways; there may be two ‘deaths’. The first death occurs when a person dies and the second 
death occurs at the Second Coming of Christ at the Last Judgement. Rowell (1974), p. 197 and p. 181.  
56 Contemporary defenders of conditional immortality or annihilation are Jonathan Kvanvig and Richard 
Swinburne. See Kvanvig, 1993 and Richard Swinburne, 1998 and Richard Swinburne, Responsibility and 
Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 19 
 
eschatology  creates  some  difficulties,  particularly  in  respect  of  the  doctrine  of  the 
intermediate state between death  and the  Last Judgement. Thirdly, it does not give an 
adequate response to the moral problem of hell.  
Purgatory 
It is important to mention purgatory since the intermediate states which Hick, Talbott and 
Adams talk about, are reminiscent of traditional catholic views of purgatory. We could say 
that the accounts which they offer of the afterlife have been influenced by the doctrine of 
purgatory.
57 
The real change in the model of the afterlife came when Augustine, in order to establish 
hell, defined various categories of sinners and sins and grouped the dead into those who go 
to heaven, hell and purgatory.
58 Purgatory was proposed as the place where venial sins may 
be expurgated.
59 An important characteristic of purgatory is that the deliverance of the 
punishment in purgatory and the exact duration of it depend not only on God’s mercy but 
also on the quantity and quality of sin remaining to be purged and the intensity of prayers 
and spiritual aid offered by the living.
60 Belief in purgatory not only offers a second chance 
to attain eternal life but is also associated with the idea of individual responsibility and free 
will.
61  Human  beings  are  judged  for  the  sins  they  themselves  are  responsible  for 
committing and the suffering which they will be subjected to may resemble the tortures to 
which the damned are subjected in hell.
62  
                                                 
57 Jacques Le Goff traced the maturation from the 4th century of the doctrine relating to some kind of trial 
after death to the general acceptance of belief in purgatory in the late 12th century and beyond. See Jacque Le 
Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, Arthur Goldhammer trans. (London: Scholar Press, 1984). 
58 Le Goff (1984), p. 133 and pp. 221–222. Le Goff says that St Augustine is called the father of purgatory 
but those who have rightly been called the founders of the doctrine of purgatory were Greek theologians. The 
foundations of the doctrine were elaborated by Clement and Origen which drew ‘in part on certain pagan 
Greek philosophical and religious traditions and in part on their own original reflection on the Bible and on 
Judeo-Christian Eschatology’. Le Goff (1984), pp. 52–53. However, the Greek Church never developed the 
notion of purgatory as such even if their idea were not without impact on Greek Christianity. The Greeks 
accept that there is an intermediate state and they speak of penalties. Le Goff (1984), p. 286.  
59 The term ‘venial sins’ came to common usage in the 12
th century and it means ‘worthy of venia’, of 
pardon. The notion, says Le Goff, carried a ‘legal-spiritual connotation’. Le Goff (1984), p. 217. 
60 Pain can be lessened thanks to the prayers of particular living people who are authorized to intercede with 
God, provided that the person lived generally a good life and had made continuous ‘effort to improve, be the 
performer of good works, and by the practice of pertinence’. Le Goff 1984, p. 69. See also p. 76 and p. 292. 
See also D. P. Walker, The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century Discussions of Eternal Torment. (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 60; Bernstein (1993), p. 317.  
61 Le Goff (1984), p. 5. 
62 The theologian who gave the best account of purgatory was Dante. Modern catholic theology distinguishes 
between the fire of hell which is punitive, the fire of purgatory which is expiatory and purifying and the fire 
of judgment which is probative and takes purgatory to be ‘state’ rather than a place. See Le Goff (1984), p. 
13 and pp. 43–44.  20 
 
In the early 12
th century, the belief of the Christian Church about the fate of the dead was 
that after the Last Judgement human beings will be permanently separated into two groups, 
the blessed and the damned. Those who lived good and virtuous lives go to heaven straight 
away and those who lived entirely bad lives go directly to hell. Jacques Le Goff states that 
the system of purgatory was inspired by the judicial procedures and legal ideas associated 
with the earthly world rather than with the next. The 12
th century was a century of justice 
in two respects: justice, as an ideal, was one of the century’s most important values, while 
at the same time judicial practice was undergoing considerable change’.
63 I will say more 
on these changes in the second chapter of the thesis where I explain how the doctrine of 
hell came under attack. 
Before we continue with the presentation and the examination of the universalist accounts 
of Hick, Talbott and Adams I provide, in the next chapter, a brief historical survey of the 
doctrine of hell. This will help us to identify the main difficulties of the doctrine which 
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Chapter Two: Hell—a brief history 
 
The preaching of the doctrine of hell was common for much of the 19
th century as was a 
literal understanding of hell as a place of fire and torment. However, by the end of the 
century,  the  doctrine  of  hell  was  a  major  source  of  contention  among  Christians.  The 
pattern of the 19
th century debates about eschatology was determined by critical attacks on 
the doctrine of everlasting retributive punishment. So, before I begin the examination of 
the arguments which the universalists put forth against the doctrine of hell, a brief survey 
of the history of Christian eschatology will be helpful in order to trace its development and 
understand how it gave birth to contemporary positions on the doctrine of hell.
64 
 
1. Judeo-Christian development 
Christian eschatology emerged out of the faith of Judaism, and the writings of the New 
Testament on the Last Things (heaven, hell, death and judgement) reflected the tradition of 
Jewish  eschatology.  During  the  New  Testament  period,  the  main  eschatological  faith 
which dominated Judaism was the hoped for future of each individual and the community. 
The basis of the faith in God’s future saving activity, not only for Israel but also for all 
humans through Israel, was centred on God’s definite, saving acts in the past.
65 This hope 
led to the gradual development of two main beliefs in the Jewish world. Firstly, there was 
the development of ‘a sense of the responsibility of the individual of his own actions’, and 
secondly, ‘a growing conviction that the relationship which has been established between 
God and the individual believer was such that God would maintain it even in the face of 
death’.
66 The belief that the future of each human being is founded in the continuance of 
the covenant between God and His human beings and moreover, the belief that those who 
have suffered and died for God would be compensated in a life beyond death, enforced the 
hope of a future life. To the extent that the future life was closely connected with the 
restoration of the moral balance, it led to the development of belief in the future life of the 
                                                 
64 Eschatology means study of the end of human history or the end of things. 
65Geoffrey  Rowell,  Hell  and  the  Victorians:  A  study  of  the  nineteenth-century  theological  controversies 
concerning eternal punishment and the future life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 18. God has saved 
Israel before. 
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wicked.
67  Whereas,  those  who  follow  God’s  will  would  receive  rewards  for  their 
faithfulness and obedience in the life to come, those who acted against God’s will would 
receive their just deserts there as well.  
At the time of Christ, in Judaism there were two dominant conceptions of the afterlife: the 
resurrection of the body and the immortality of the soul.
68 In one conception, after death 
the departed spirits reside in sheol. The Jewish sheol (Hebrew word for the infernal world 
or ‘the unseen world’) is a place of darkness, a shadowy place similar to the Greek hades. 
References to sheol occur often in the Old Testament and it is sometimes identified with a 
devouring monster or again it is sometimes described as a gloomy city but never as a place 
of torture.
69 Therefore, the hope for a future life consisted in the belief that God would 
raise  the  dead  from  sheol.  The  resurrected  would  be  able  to  ‘share  in  an  eternal  life 
bestowed by God, in a state in which their historical community would be maintained but 
in which their being would be transformed’.
70 On the other conception, Hellenistic Judaism 
conceived the future life in terms of the immortality of the soul. According to this tradition, 
once a person dies the appropriate rewards or deserts for his or her earthly actions take 
effect immediately.
71 Early Christianity adopted both eschatologies and so the hope for the 
future life in communion with God came to be directed towards the Second Coming of 
Christ.  
The division of good and evil people is evident in the Jewish apocalyptic texts, such as the 
Book of Enoch. The conception and representation of the destiny of the blessed and the 
wicked  prefigures  the  traditional  Christian  conception  of  hell,  nevertheless  it  does  not 
entail it. For example, in the first part of the Book of Enoch, we read that Enoch wafted 
away to ‘a place (a house) whose inhabitants are like a blazing fire’. He sees ‘a deep pit 
near the heavenly columns of fire’ and ‘descending columns of fire, columns whose height 
and depth were immensurable’. He posits that ‘a final judgment will come, after which 
some will be annihilated and others held to suffer at the bottom of another valley of fire 
before the eyes of the righteous forever’. Again in Psalm 14, verses 10–13 we see the 
future manifestation of God’s justice with severe punishment for the wicked: ‘Let burning 
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of Purgatory, Arthur Goldhammer, trans. (London: Scholar Press, 1984), p. 26. 
70 Rowell (1974), p. 20. 
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coals fall upon [the wicked]! Let them be cast into pits, no more to rise!’.
72 The Christian 
scriptures use many of the Jewish prophetic themes when they discuss the afterlife, and the 
early Christian fathers claimed that the fate of the unrighteous or very evil people would be 
immediate, unending, physical and retributive. This is what has been called the traditional 
Christian view of hell.
73 
The traditional view of hell was elaborated by St Augustine of Hippo in his Enchiridion on 
Faith, Hope and Love, and The City of God, and by St Thomas Aquinas who was heavily 
influenced  by  Augustine’s  writings.
74  Four  elements  of  Augustine’s  system  are  worth 
noting. Firstly, he takes the term ‘fire’ which is mentioned in the scriptures to denote a 
material fire which burns the bodies of the damned without destroying them.
75 Secondly, 
he argues that eternal damnation is likewise an exile which cuts humans off from that 
future city of God. Since the good—God—from which the wicked are excluded is eternal, 
so  the  punishment  is  eternal.
76  Augustine  rejects  the  possibility  of  repentance  or  of 
alternative advance and regression over the ages. Part of the reason is that it would be an 
insult to the blessed.
77 Moreover, unlike in purgatory, in hell mitigations of pain cannot be 
obtained through the suffrages of the living. Thirdly, Augustine holds that the damned in 
hell will be miserable and their bodies will cause them intense pain. He holds that the death 
to which Adam subjected all human beings is a twofold one. The first death separates the 
body from the soul and happens when the individual dies. The second death occurs with 
the Resurrection and Last Judgement, after which no one’s fate can change. Both deaths 
share  one  common  aspect  of  suffering:  ‘in  both  deaths  the  soul  suffers  from  its  body 
                                                 
72 Alan E. Bernstein, The Formation of Hell: Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian 
Worlds (UCL Press, 1993), p. 170. 
73 There were other approaches and doctrines. According to one theory, the individual soul remained in a 
state of prolonged animation, ‘slept’, until the Last Judgement when the resurrection took place and it was 
reunited with its body. The alternative theory was that ‘the soul remained conscious in the intermediate state’, 
during which it was considered to experience a ‘foretaste of its future destiny’. See Rowell (1974), p. 21.  
74 See, St Augustine, The Enchiridion on Faith, Hope and Love, Thomas Hibbs, ed. (Regnery Publishing, 
1961), St Augustine, The City of God, Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald G. Walsh, trans. (Washington D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1950). Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
vol. 1 and vol. 2 (New York: Random House, c1945). A. M Fairweather, ed. and trans., Nature and grace: 
selections from the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas (London: SCM Press, 1954). Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, Beatitude: a commentary on St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Ia IIae, qq.1-54 (London : Herder, 
1955). 
75  Fire  signifies  salvation  through  purification.  Augustine  argued  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  fire,  an 
everlasting fire in which the dammed burn forever and a purgatorial fire. The hellish fire is opposed to the 
purgatorial fire which is extremely painful but not eternal and it acts not at the time of the Last Judgement but 
between the time of death and the time of resurrection. For detailed discussion on Augustine’s view on fire, 
see Le Goff, 1984. 
76 Bernstein (1993), p. 319. 
77  D.  P.  Walker,  The  Decline  of  Hell:  Seventeenth-Century  Discussions  of  Eternal  Torment  (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), p. 29. 24 
 
against its will’.
78 Finally, Augustine holds that after the Last Judgement there will only be 
two groups the damned and the blessed. One of the justifications he gives to support his 
claim  is  that  part  of  the  happiness  of  the  blessed  will  be  enhanced  by  knowing  the 
condition of the damned. He argues that the blessed can never be entirely free of evil 
because they would lose sight of the liberation from which they benefit. Only through 
some knowledge of evil can the blessed appropriately thank God. However, this does not 
suggest that the blessed will experience evil directly; intellectually ‘neither their own past 
misery, not even the eternal misery of the damned will be concealed from them’.
79 The 
blessed can fully appreciate God’s actions firstly, by knowing their own past pains and 
sufferings and secondly, by knowing the condition of the damned. 
Aquinas argues along similar lines in favour of both the punishment for damnation and the 
punishment of the senses. The harshness of punishment comes not from the quantity of sin 
punished but from the situation of the person being punished. The sinners are punished for 
sins which they have  committed during their earthly lives.
80 Aquinas  explains that the 
damned continue to commit evil acts by way of blasphemy but these acts are ‘due to the 
obstinate perversity of their will which is part of their punishment and do not therefore 
constitute demerit’.
81 
Final  stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  accepted  eschatology  of  Western  Christendom 
established that after death human souls immediately undergo the particular judgement 
they deserve and are assigned to heaven, hell or purgatory and remain there experiencing 
pain or happiness until Christ’s Second Coming. At the Second Coming, the resurrection 
of the bodies would take place and humans would be assigned either to heaven to enjoy 
eternal happiness with God or to hell to suffer punishment which consisted both in the 





                                                 
78 Bernstein (1993), p. 317. Augustine holds that whereas the first death forces an individual from the body 
against his will, the second holds him in the body against his will.  
79 Ibid., p. 331. 
80 Walker (1964), p. 24. Walker calls this the moral static view of hell. 
81 See St Aquinas Summa Theologiae, Part III, Q. 97, Art. 1 and Summa Contra Gentiles, Part IV, ch. 95. 
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2. The strengths of the doctrine of hell  
The doctrine of hell remained unchallenged for many centuries and it was not until the 19
th 
century that it began to lose its hold. There are four main theological and philosophical 
reasons why the doctrine remained unchallenged for so long.
83 
Firstly, the scriptural authority of the doctrine of hell was extremely strong. There are two 
crucial texts affirming, firstly, the eternity of hell (in Matthew) and secondly, the lake of 
fire and brimstone (in Revelation).
84 The fact that the doctrine was supported in the New 
Testament, where it was put into the mouth of Christ, prevented those who had doubts 
about it from explicitly denying or modifying it. The New Testament writings present hell 
as a place of unending suffering, ‘fire and brimstone’, and separation from God:
 85 
Mathew 8:12 
[W]hile the sons of the kingdom shall be thrown into the outer darkness; 
there men will weep and gnash their teeth. 
Matthew 25:41 
Then he will say to those at his left hand, ‘Depart from me, you cursed, 
into eternal fire, prepared for the devil and his angels...’. 
Matthew 25:46 
And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into 
eternal life. 
Revelation 14:9–11 
If any one worships the beast and its image, and receives a mark on his 
forehead or in his hand, he also shall drink the wine of God’s wrath …and 
he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy 
                                                 
83 I would like to say here that the reasons are mainly theological. People accepted the doctrine and believed 
in it mainly because it was strongly supported by the scriptures. We can say, however, that some of these 
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supporting the doctrine of hell.   
84 With regard to the former it can be argued that the ‘everlasting fire’ and ‘everlasting punishment’ did not 
necessarily mean that the torments of the damned would be eternal, since the Greek word αἰώνιος is often 
used elsewhere not to mean infinite period of time. However, some have argued that this interpretation is not 
probable since Christ draws a parallel between eternal bliss awaiting the blessed and the eternity of misery 
and pain awaiting the damned. ‘It can only stand if someone denies eternal life to the saved’. See Walker 
(1964), pp. 19–20. 
85  All  quotations  from  the  scripture  throughout  the  thesis  are  given  from  The  New  Testament  in  Four 
Versions, King James, Revised Standard, Phillips Modern English, New English Bible (London and New 
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angels and in the presence of the Lamb. And the smoke of their torment 
goes up for ever and ever; and they have no rest, day or night, these 
worshipers of the beast and its image, and whosoever receives the mark of 
its name. 
       Revelation 20:12–15 
[A]nd the dead were judged by what was written in the books, by what 
they have done. And the sea gave up the dead in it; Death and Hades gave 
up the dead in them; and all were judged by what they have done. Then 
Death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. This is the second 
death, the lake of fire; and if any one’s name was not found written in the 
book of life, he was thrown into the lake of fire. 
Secondly, the doctrine of hell worked as a deterrent in the earthly life. The idea was that 
without a doctrine of hell people would behave without any moral constraints whatsoever 
and society would collapse into chaos and anarchy. The threat of eternal punishment was 
‘the implicit sanction of both social morality and missions to the heathen’.
86 The view that 
there is a complete moral freezing at death and so neither the damned nor the saved can 
acquire  merit  or  demerit  would  serve  as  a  deterrent.
87  A  traditional  justification  for 
preaching a doctrine of hell is that in holding over human beings the threat of hell God 
must have had a moral purpose for them in the earthly life. 
Thirdly,  the  doctrine  of  hell  is  closely  connected  with  other  doctrines  of  Christianity, 
especially the doctrine of atonement. By removing the doctrine of hell, inevitably other 
doctrines  in  the  Christian  tradition  would  have  had  to  be  modified  or  rejected.  The 
doctrines and ideas of Redemption, the Fall, retributive justice and expiation by suffering 
rest on the moral assumption that the bad consequences of an action can be compensated 
for by the suffering of the wrongdoer. Anyone who would attack the doctrine of hell could 
justifiably be accused of also attacking other important Christian doctrines and ideas.
88 
                                                 
86 Rowell (1974), p. 1.  
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grave. See Michael Wheeler, Heaven, Hell and the Victorians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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Finally, there was strong support for the view that part of the happiness of the blessed in 
heaven consists in knowing that the damned are tormented. This view had the support of 
both St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. It is argued that the torments of the damned in 
hell give the blessed joy because they manifest God’s justice and hatred of sin and these 
torments provide ‘a contrast which heightens their awareness of their own bliss’.
89  
 
3. The eschatology of the 19
th century 
The doctrine of hell was not openly questioned until the 17
th century.  Those who had 
doubts about hell were cautious about publishing their thoughts on the doctrine because by 
doing so they would challenge the moral principles on which society was founded and 
thereby risk its collapse if their doubts became widespread. In the 17
th century, a growing 
minority began to question the justice of eternal punishment in hell, but it was not until the 
19
th century that the doctrine is seriously challenged. At this time significant changes in the 
Christian understanding of eschatology took place.
90 The idea that hell and heaven were 
fixed states and the vast majority of humankind is doomed to go to hell was incompatible 
with  a  just  and  all-loving  God  and  the  doctrine  was  challenged  on  ethical  grounds. 
Whereas hell was traditionally explained as an expression of God’s justice, it came to be 
seen more as an injustice. 
In the 19
th century the doctrine of hell was becoming less and less favoured on account of 
the dominant philosophical concern with the value of the individual, the expectation of 
progress, as well as developments in the realm of penal theory or practice.
91 Much of the 
opposition to the doctrine of hell was focused on the supposed duration, quality, finality 
and purpose of the punishment. 
The doctrine of hell was framed in terms of a retributive theory of punishment. The wicked 
in  hell  receive  their  just  deserts,  with  no  possibility  of  reformation.  Hell  as  a  future 
possibility  used  to  guarantee  virtuous  living  in  the  present  earthly  life  according  to 
Christian dogma. The doctrine was attacked on the ground that after the Last Judgement, 
hell could no longer be said to serve any deterrent purpose, since human beings would 
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already  have  been  judged  and  assigned  to  heaven  or  hell.  Moreover,  the  idea  that  the 
purpose of retributive punishment in hell was to give pleasure to the blessed in heaven 
through their knowledge that sinners suffer for their evil acts was becoming ‘distasteful 
and  hence  obsolescent’.
92  In  an  age  when  people’s  understanding  of  punishment  was 
influenced by the deterrent and reformative theories of punishment of Jeremy Bentham 
(1748–1832), the doctrine of post-mortem punishment was challenged. On the one hand, 
the insistence of the need of altering the intensity and duration of punishment became 
pressing,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  Bentham’s  principle  that  the  punishment  should 
correspond exactly in kind to the crime committed put the traditional doctrine of hell under 
intense  pressure.
93  Thus,  penal  theories  and  practices  that  became  popular  in  the  19
th 
century were in tension with the traditional Christian view of hell and the view of God’s 
nature that supported it. 
There  were  two  main  reasons  given  to  support  the  doctrine  of  hell  in  light  of  these 
criticisms. The first was to claim that eternal punishment in hell was a just retribution for 
the enormity of the offence. The main idea was that all human sin is infinite in seriousness 
because it is an offence against an Infinite Being—it therefore merits infinite punishment.
94 
However,  this  reply  created  an  even  more  difficult  situation  for  the  defenders  of  the 
doctrine, one that is still an issue even now. It was argued that not even the worst villains 
have done an infinite amount of wrong in their earthly lives and so cannot deserve an 
infinite punishment.
95 There are two main arguments for this view.  
Firstly, opponents of the doctrine of hell claim that if all sins deserve and receive infinite 
punishment, it is impossible to assert gradation of punishments in proportion to the gravity 
of evil acts. The defender of the doctrine of hell needs to show that eternal punishment is a 
just punishment for the wicked; that is, the punishment is proportionate to the wickedness 
of their acts.
 Secondly, if every sin deserves infinite punishment in intensity and duration, 
then it is obvious that it is impossible for each sin to be properly punished, since any one 
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sin of a wicked person ‘will fill his eternal life with intense suffering and leave no room for 
any more punishment for his other sins’.
96 
The second main reason given in support of the doctrine of hell was the so-called ‘morally 
dynamic’  view  of  hell  according  to  which  the  damned  continue  sinning  in  hell  and 
therefore they continue to be justly punished. Leibniz in his Theodicy initially supported 
this  view.
97  Leibniz’s  approach,  however,  was  widely  perceived  to  have  two  main 
disadvantages. Firstly, his approach diminished the moral weight of the earthly life as a 
unique period of trial and, secondly, it opened the door to universal salvation.
98 The ability 
to perform evil acts presupposes some free will and if the damned have the freedom to 
continue acting in evil ways this permits them to repent and be saved. It could be argued 
that conditions in hell would encourage the wicked to repent, and God would have to save 
those who truly repent. 
A further weakness of the doctrine was the fact that it seemed to entail that a very high 
proportion of human beings will be damned in hell. Christians became increasingly aware 
of the huge number of people who would be consigned to hell, especially if an exclusivist 
Christian theology was to be maintained, and some have attempted to defend this claim. 
One of the better known responses in the current philosophical debate is that of William 
Lane Craig who argues that God, in order to bring as many people as He can to salvation, 
had to pay the price of seeing the vast majority of them lost. The damned suffer from what 
he calls transworld damnation.
99 However, as we will see in later sections, universalists 
will argue that God’s love by definition would not permit any human being to be lost. 
Among the moderns, the most popular arguments in defending the doctrine of hell appeal 
to human freedom. Since the 19
th century one notices systematic efforts to discharge God 
from the responsibility of punishment, and it has been argued that God does not condemn 
the wicked in hell but they condemn themselves.
100 The appeal to freedom has been a main 
response to the problem of evil for as long as the issue has been addressed, and it has been 
the main reply to the charge of the moral indefensibility of the doctrine of hell. The nature 
of human freedom and its importance for answering the problem of evil and, consequently, 
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the  problem  of  hell  have  received  a  considerable  amount  of  attention  and  detailed 
explanation in analytic philosophy in the past few decades. However, the most influential 
work in this regard came from Alvin Plantinga’s ‘Free Will Defence’.
101 Given the fact 
that this argument has been widely discussed, and a detailed presentation of the debate is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, I will provide a brief summary of it here. The kind of 
freedom that Plantinga suggests that human beings have has not only been used in arguing 
in favour of a doctrine of hell but also it has been used by many universalists to argue 
against a doctrine of hell.  
One of the most important aspects of Plantinga’s argument is that he assumes a libertarian 
view of freedom: that is, freedom which is not compatible with determinism. According to 
libertarianism, if a person P was free with respect to a given action A, he/she has the power 
to choose to do A or refrain from it.
102 A choice is truly free in the libertarian sense if it is 
not determined by preceding conditions or causes and in which it is finally up to each 
individual how he/she chooses on the matter. Libertarian freedom is important not only for 
morally significant choices but also for genuine personal relationship. Those who affirm 
this sort of freedom argue that without it humans cannot engage in real acts of love, trust, 
loyalty and so on. God, according to Plantinga, values a world containing creatures that are 
significantly free in this way. If God decides to create a world in which human beings can 
exercise their libertarian freedom then he may not have the option of creating a world free 
of evil. If human beings are significantly free in regard to morally significant actions, then 
it  is  possible  that  they  will  go  wrong  with  respect  to  at  least  some  of  these  actions. 
Therefore, even if God is omnipotent He may not be able to create a world which has 
creatures  who  have  this  kind  of  freedom  but  does  not  contain  evil.  Returning  to  the 
doctrine of hell, Plantinga argues that those who end up in hell are those who suffer from 
what he calls transworld depravity. If a human being suffers from transworld depravity 
then it was not within God’s power to create a world such that this person has libertarian 
freedom and always does the right thing. Therefore, it was not within God’s power to 
create a world in which this person is significantly free but does no wrong. Those who end 
up in hell suffer from transworld depravity.  
Having briefly presented the historical background of the doctrine of hell and outlined its 
development and the problems which it encounters, I now turn to a very brief history of the 
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origins of universalism. In the following section, I give a brief survey of the development 
of  universalism  and  the  main  concepts  which  its  contemporary  proponents  employ  to 
defend  their  accounts.  This  will  make  clearer  on  what  grounds  universalism  has  been 
challenged by some and defended by others.  
 
4. Rejecting the doctrine of hell in favour of universal salvation 
We now take a brief look at the very early history of the denial of the doctrine of hell. As 
the doctrine came increasingly under attack, more and more people began to question the 
validity of the image of hell preached in the Bible. It was argued that there were passages 
in the New Testament which favour the doctrine of universal salvation; and so these were 
quoted against those which appeared to suggest eternal torment.
103 Although universalism 
gained ground in the late 19
th century and during the 20
th century, it is not a new position. I 
will focus in particular on the work of one individual who, according to many, is the father 
of universalism in Christian thought. This particular figure laid the foundations on which 
contemporary versions of universalism are built. 
 
4.1 Origen and restoration 
In the early 3
rd century, Origen was the first to develop the theme of universal salvation in 
his De Principiis.
104 He defended the belief that all creation would eventually be restored 
to God. Influenced by the teachings and ideas of Plato, the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, 
that the end should resemble the beginning, Origen argued that all human souls would need 
to return to their original state before their fall. Origen holds that the human soul gradually 
improves after death and, no matter how sinful it may have been during its earthly life, 
‘eventually makes sufficient progress to be allowed to return to the eternal contemplation 
of God’, which Origen called apokatastasis or restoration.
105 One of the most important 
aspects  of  Origen’s  system  is  that  it  offers  Christianity  a  philosophy  of  punishment 
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different from the one found in the tradition of the New Testament. Origen’s theory of 
punishment is ‘reflexive without being retributive’, is ‘corrective’.
 106 Origen argues that 
chastisement inflicted is not punishment but rather ‘means of education’ and salvation, it is 
part of the process of purification. From this, Origen deduced the idea that ‘to punish’ is 
synonymous with ‘to educate’ and that any chastisement by God contributes to a person’s 
salvation.
107 On this basis, Origen denied eternal damnation.  
Origen’s eschatology is based on two principles. Firstly, the justice and goodness of an 
omnipotent Creator and secondly, ‘the absolute free will of every rational being’.
108 He 
argues the humans are made in the image of God, but the likeness of God is granted to 
them  only  by  their  own  efforts  to  imitate  God.
109  Each  human  soul  will  return  to  its 
original  state  through  a  ‘pedagogical  process  of  purification’.
110  Using  the  Christian 
principle that God’s actions are always good and His power is always and everywhere 
effective, he argues that it is also effective in hell. Suffering can never be undeserved or be 
contrary to the goodness and efficacy of God. Thus if punishment after death accords with 
God’s actions and His power, and if God gave freedom to all rational creatures, then the 
suffering  which  sinners  will  undergo  ‘must  contribute  to  the  final  goal,  which  is  the 
restoration of the end to conformity with the beginning’.
111 In this view the degeneration of 
the soul through neglect is a choice and simultaneously a punishment. In due course this 
punishment—since it is inflicted by God and His power never ceases to be effective—will 
correct the fallen soul, and it will freely move from neglect to reconciliation with God. 
Once sinners have been corrected through punishment, there would be no further need to 
punish them. Accordingly, all human beings who are punished are cured and restored to 
divine favour. 
This process of pedagogical purification will, according to Origen, happen over the course 
of a limitless period of time and the changes will be realized at different times in different 
people.
112  For  Origen  punishment  may  be  horribly  painful  but  the  more  severe  the 
punishment is, the more certain the salvation.
113 The freedom which Origen ascribes to 
rational  creatures  to  choose  to  turn  away  from  God  or  to  turn  to  God,  ascribes 
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responsibility to each individual soul for its own fate. Each human being plays a crucial 
role in its own punishment. God punishes to chasten not to destroy, so punishment then 
must  heal;  it  must  correct.  Spiritual  progress  that  comes  from  increased  punishment 
eventually leads to a greater perfection and to restoration.
114 The sinner will be gradually 
educated by means of his own free will. Apokatastasis will come through penitence. 
Origen’s doctrine was officially condemned as heretical by the Council of Constantinople 
in 543.
115 It was briefly revived in the 9
th century by Scotus Erigena but it was not, as I 
have said above, until the mid 17
th century that we can find explicit attacks on the orthodox 
doctrine of hell and conversely defences of the belief in universal salvation.  
 
4.2 Contemporary universalist positions 
Origen’s view on human free will and punishment as remedial, as well as his wish to keep 
God clear of injustice and cruelty, find their modern expression in the universalism of John 
Hick, Thomas Talbott and Marilyn McCord Adams as well as a number of other thinkers. 
So, the debate on the doctrine of hell and its problems shifted from being a debate about 
the nature of God’s justice and the purpose of retributive punishment to become a debate 
on the nature of human freedom and God’s omnipotent love.  
Recent universalists, including Hick, Talbott and Adams, suppose that the wicked suffer 
torments  for  a  period  of  time  instead  of  being  saved  immediately  after  death.
116  The 
duration of punishment and suffering depends on each individual and often it is implied 
that it will be for several thousand years. As we have seen, it is common for universalists 
to understand God’s justice as restorative justice and His punishments as corrective.
117 
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Universalist positions differ with regard to what they say about the effects of the torment 
and its nature (which may be both physical and mental). Some hold that the torments in 
temporary hell will be at least severe as being burnt alive.
118 By holding that punishment is 
corrective rather than retributive in nature, they avoid the challenge as to why any finite sin 
requires eternal punishment. What is important and, at the same time, curious is that most 
universalists affirm a libertarian view of freedom. The universalist’s claim that God will 
save everyone without compromising their freedom gives rise to one of the major problems 
which  universalism  faces.  Namely,  that  a  clear  commitment  to  a  libertarian  view  of 
freedom demands that the possibility that not all will be saved is left open. I will explain 
this point in the following chapters. 
Universalism  raises  questions  about the  nature  of  human  freedom  and  God’s  love  and 
sovereignty. Is God able to achieve his purposes? Does God love everyone? Can humans 
freely resist God’s love forever?
119 It is because of the difficulty these questions raise for 
universalism that many philosophers reject it.
120 In the following chapters, I argue that the 
universalism  of  Hick,  Talbott  and  Adams  runs  aground  on  these  questions.  To  these 
accounts I now turn. 
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Chapter Three: John Hick’s Universalism 
 
Introduction 
John Hick rejects the doctrine of hell in favour of universalism.
121 He holds that God is a 
loving God, a ‘God of love’, and His ultimate purpose for humanity is to save it. God’s 
relation to all created things is such that He is able to fulfil His purpose. It is morally and 
practically certain that in unlimited time God will draw all human creatures to Himself and 
thus will achieve universal salvation.
122 Hick defends his universalist view by appealing to 
a theodicy which is eschatological in character. The earthly suffering and pain can only be 
justified if God is going to bring to a good end every individual personal life. Hick holds 
this to be true, whether the good end is achieved in this life or a future one and, because he 
considers  human  life  in  an  eschatological  context,  every  human  being  will  eventually 
achieve full consciousness of God and thus salvation. Therefore, there can be no hell as a 
place  of  unending  punishment  and  thus  a  doctrine  of  unending  punishment  should  be 
rejected. 
There are two central themes in Hick’s theodicy: (i) ‘Soul-making’ is the purpose of God 
in  making  finite,  immature  persons  endowed  with  a  degree  of  genuine  freedom  and 
independence  over  and  against  God  and  who  are  therefore  capable  of  entering  into 
personal relationship with Him and who are fashioned through their own free insights and 
responses  into  ‘children  of  God’.
123And  (ii)  salvation  occurs  when  there  is  real 
transformation of the human being.
124 Humanity’s salvation depends upon its positive and 
voluntary  response  to  God.  God’s  all-loving  purpose  cannot  be  fulfilled  without  the 
voluntary  co-operation  of  human  creatures.
125  Hick  holds  that  it  is  evident  that  this 
transformation does not occur for each individual in the earthly life. God’s purpose will 
never be fulfilled if evil still occurs so the realization of God’s purpose will take place in 
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an afterlife if it is ever to be realized. He introduces the notion of intermediate state or 
states beyond death which provide possibilities of reform and continuing transformation 
for all those who have not yet attained God.
126 Hick holds that if there is continued life 
after death, and if God will never cease working in bringing his human creatures into His 
glory, it follows that God will eventually succeed in His purpose of winning all humans to 
Himself in faith and love without having to override His human creatures’ freedom.  
In this chapter, I argue that Hick’s account fails to convince us that all will be saved in the 
end by focusing on his claim that God will achieve universal salvation through the free 
response of His human creatures. The chapter has two parts. In the first, I explain Hick’s 
main concepts of ‘soul-making’, human freedom, ‘epistemic distance’ and his view of a 
series of progressive lives after death. The explanation of these concepts will assist us in 
unfolding Hick’s theodicy and understanding its importance in rejecting the doctrine of 
hell.  This  prepares  the  ground  for  the  second  part  of  the  chapter  where  I  give  four 
arguments to defend my claim that Hick’s universalism is not defended adequately. My 
conclusion is that Hick’s arguments in favour of universalism do not convince us that God 
can guarantee the salvation of all human beings, and as a result he gives us no good reason 
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1. Human freedom and soul-making 
Hick holds that God has made human beings in such a way that their nature necessarily 
gravitates towards God. There is an inner telos (ultimate goal) in human nature, a quest of 
human beings’ whole being for their own proper good; and the basis for a human being’s 
own ultimate good is a relationship with God.
127 Human perfection or full humanization is 
the telos to which human existence is directed.
128 Hick’s theodicy requires that there will 
be a final resolution to life, an enjoyment of a common infinite good which will be seen by 
human beings as justifying any finite suffering.
129  
According to Hick, the divine purpose for humanity is that of ‘soul-making’.
130 The goal of 
‘soul-making’ requires God to make finite persons who have ‘a degree of genuine freedom 
and autonomy in relation to God’ and who are therefore capable of freely entering into 
personal relationship with God in trust and love.
131 Freedom of choice is expressed in 
actions which influence the course of events in the world. However, it is not enough to 
have the choice of freedom but it is important that the choices which a person makes result 
in significant changes in the environment he lives in; this second feature of human freedom 
is, according to Hick, human autonomy. God’s intention is to lead human beings ‘from 
human Bios, or the biological life of man, to that quality of Zoe, or the personal life of 
eternal worth, which we see in Christ’.
132 God’s purpose is to create persons and in order to 
achieve  this  He  did  not  bring  human  beings  into  existence  as  perfect  beings,  but  as 
imperfect  and  immature  creatures  that  are  only  at  the  beginning  of  a  long  process  of 
development  which  will  culminate  in  them  becoming  the  perfect  beings  whom  God 
                                                 
127 Hick (1976), p. 251. 
128 Ibid., p. 407. 
129 Hick’s theodicy attempts to give a justification of the evil in the world. This chapter does not focus on the 
problem of evil so I will not comment on it any further. We will see later on, that evil is required in the 
process of ‘soul-making’. The quality of human soul which God seeks to create could not be achieved apart 
from the existence of evil. All evil will be justified if what we find in the process of ‘soul-making’ is an 
infinite good. It is clear that Hick rejects the Augustinian approach on evil and hell. See Hick (1966a), p. 377. 
John Hick, ‘An Irenaean Theodicy’, in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Stephen T. Davis ed., 
London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), pp. 50–51. 
130 Hick (1966a), p. 295. 
131 We will see later in this section that genuine human freedom requires a degree of genuine autonomy. In 
order for humans to have significant autonomy over and against God they have to be placed in an ‘epistemic 
distance’ from God.  
132 Hick (1966a), p. 293. 38 
 
intended to create.
133 The process of ‘soul-making’ is not an infinite good but the end of it 
yields an infinite good which is the perfection and endless joy of all finite personal life.
134 
This is what Hick calls salvation. 
Two key features of Hick’s theodicy are his biological conception of a two-stage human 
creation and the concept of ‘epistemic distance’ which renders the use of human freedom 
possible. According to Hick’s ‘soul-making’ theodicy, the human developmental process 
involves two stages.
135 The first stage is the evolutionary emergence of Homo sapiens from 
the forms of organic life and as a result in a state of moral imperfection. The second stage 
is the gradual moral perfection and spiritualization of human beings as ‘children of God’ 
through personal travail in a hostile environment. 
The  first  stage  in  which  humans  are  created  through  an  evolutionary  process  into 
intelligent, social animals is, according to Hick, the way God establishes the conditions 
necessary for the realization of His divine purpose. Hick holds that whereas the first stage 
was  easy  for  divine  omnipotence,  the  second  stage  of  the  creative  process  cannot  be 
performed directly by an omnipotent God ‘for personal life is essentially free and self-
directing’.
136 Hick sees two aspects of the human self: as an ego and as a person. As an 
empirical ego, the self is formed by living within its historico-cultural setting.
137 It is an 
enclosed entity, self-centred and finite in nature, which protects itself and its autonomy by 
making cognitive choices in its awareness of the environment.
138 As the individual self 
becomes more perfect it becomes more and more a person and less and less an ego. Hick 
suggests that whereas the self as an empirical ego forms boundaries limiting thus a true 
personal life, the self as a person looks outward for a relationship with other persons. Only 
by becoming perfected does an individual become more a person and less an ego and thus 
                                                 
133 Ibid., p. 292. See also Geivett (1993), p. 152. Hick’s view that God’s purpose is to create persons is 
different to the Augustinian view that God’s purpose is to allow human beings freely to choose God. 
134 Ibid., p. 293; See also Geivett (1993), p. 206. 
135 Hick re-expresses St Irenaeus’ concept of  the two stage human creation in  modern  terms.  See Hick 
(1966a), p. 217 and pp. 290–291 and Hick (1976), p. 38 and p. 45. For a detailed presentation of St Irenaeus 
theodicy see John Lawson, The biblical theology of Saint Irenaeus (London: Epworth Press, 1948); Eric 
Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons, Part IV, chapter 10 and 11 (Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
136 Hick (1966a), p. 291. 
137 Hick (1976), pp. 407–414. Hick rejects the traditional Christian view of the human ego as immortal. 
138 Ibid., p. 51. Faith, in Hick’s view, is an act of interpretation. Since human interpretation is finite and open 
to error, it does not have an absolute knowledge of the world. Hick holds that the world around us in open to 
various  interpretations  and  choices  and  it  is  this  openness  to  various  interpretations  and  choices  that 
characterize what Hick calls ‘cognitive freedom’. Hick by ‘cognitive freedom’ or ‘epistemic distance’ means 
that human beings recognition of something important in a particular situation is not compelled by the force 
of conception but it is a voluntary act of interpretation. For more on Hick’s view on faith see John Hick, 
Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966b, 2
nd edition).  39 
 
able to live in full communion with God.
139 Humans are regarded as moral personalities in 
relationship with God. Natural evolution is the way for God to bring humans into existence 
but freedom is required for them to act as personal beings with respect to God. 
Hick offers his own version of the traditional free-will defence.
140 He commits himself to 
two central themes of the traditional free-will defence. The first one concerns the concept 
of divine omnipotence. Hick accepts the claim that God’s omnipotence does not suggest 
that God can do anything, if ‘anything’ includes the logically absurd or self-contradictory 
e.g. a married man being a bachelor, or saying that X and not X are true. The second one 
concerns  the  necessary  relationship/connection  between  moral  freedom  and  human 
personality. If human beings are to be capable of entering into a relationship with God 
freely  then  they  must  have  free  will.  Freedom  and  specifically  moral  freedom  is  an 
essential element of what we know as personal life and in order to be a person a human 
being must be free to choose right or wrong.
141 An omnipotent God cannot make a person 
without freedom, because God’s purpose was to create persons so it was necessary that 
they be created with moral freedom.
142 
                                                 
139 Hick (1976), p. 460. 
140 Sometimes Hick’s free will version is referred to as ‘Hybrid free will’ or ‘Quasi –free-will defence’. See 
‘John Hick: All’s Well That Ends Well’, in God, Power and Evil, David Ray Griffin, ed. (Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2004), pp. 174–204 (p. 174). 
141 Hick (1966a), p. 302. 
142 Hick follows Plantinga’s free will defence but in a modified way. Philosophers such as L. Hall, J. Walls, 
W. Holten etc point out that Hick does not seem to endorse libertarianism or compatibilism fully but follows 
a middle ground. He finds accounts of libertarian free will more defensible than compatibilist accounts of 
free will. He holds that a human being’s free actions are not equivalent to randomness and unpredictability, 
but that someone’s actions ‘are determined by his own inner nature’. See Hick (1966a), p. 74. The account of 
freedom which he suggest includes the rejection of external determinism and acts must not be detached from 
the agent because, he says, that ‘would be to equate freedom with randomness of behaviour’. See Hick 
(1966a), p. 311. So Hick argues, on the one hand, that freedom is not totally determined by one’s character 
which is liable to change during the process of decision making; and, on the other hand, he argues that 
freedom  does  not  entail  entirely  random  actions  completely  detached  from  the  agent  who  acts.  He 
furthermore adds that ‘we are free beings cannot mean that we are unconditioned, but that within the limits 
set  by  all  conditioning  circumstances  of  our  pedigree  and  environment  we  are  nevertheless  able  self-
creatively to exercise a certain energy of our own’. See John Hick, ‘Freedom and the Irenaean Theodicy 
Again’, Theological Studies XXI, no. 2 (1970b), pp. 420–421. Humans are restricted and limited by the 
nature of their beings and the environments. In elaborating his claim, he gives the example of the human 
gender and the time and place in which someone is born. He holds that humans do not normally object that 
these factors hinder on their freedom, so although their freedom is genuine it is, however, limited by the fact 
that  they  are  created.  Although  human  actions  are  not  externally  caused,  they  can  be  internally  caused 
although Hick holds that ‘internal influences are not fully sufficient causes because character itself can be 
transformed by the process of decision’. See Lindsey (2003), p. 147. These reasons led some philosophers, 
such  as  Lindsey,  to  say  that  Hick’s  account  of  freedom  is  not  strong  libertarian  freedom  but  can  be 
categorized as a type of compatibilist freedom as it recognizes internal influences. Nevertheless, Hick as we 
have  seen  recognizes  a  third  influence  on  action—the  process  of  action  or  decision  itself—which  will 
categorize his account as a type of libertarian freedom.  
Hick agrees with J. L. Mackie and Antony Flew that God being omnipotent could have created human beings 
in such as way as to always freely act in a moral way. Hick says that even if it is logically possible that God 
could create humans so that they would always freely act rightly in relation to one another, it is not logically 40 
 
He proposes that human freedom should be conceived as ‘limited creativity’.
143 He wishes 
to hold that human beings must have a determined nature as existents in a natural world 
order  but  if  their  nature  includes  moral  freedom  then  there  must  be  something 
undetermined  about  their  moral  character.  Human  beings  are  genuinely  free  with  the 
restricted freedom of created beings. Their freedom involves choices about how to respond 
to the environment that they are given with the abilities that they have. They are never 
absolutely  free  in  an  unrestricted  sense  because  they  have  been  created  with  some 
determined nature. Even if actions ensue from the nature of human beings, there is an 
element of unpredictability because the nature from which the action proceeds is that of the 
actual self alive in the moment of decision.
144 Humans have cognitive freedom—that is, 
they have the freedom to be aware or not aware of God; to turn from moral imperfection to 
moral perfection in virtue of choosing God.
145 Hick holds that ‘the concept of freedom as 
creativity would make it possible to speak of God as endowing His creatures with genuine 
though limited autonomy’.
146 
However, according to Hick, this freedom is guaranteed only if human beings are at a 
distance from God and his commitment to this claim is another key feature of his theodicy. 
Hick claims that there would be no point in creating finite persons ‘unless they could be 
endowed with a degree of genuine freedom and independence over against their Maker. 
For only then could they be capable of authentic personal relationship with him’.
147 This 
kind of distance which would make room for a degree of human autonomy is what Hick 
calls epistemic distance.
148 Free response to God’s love can be achieved only when humans 
are created initially in a state which is not that of knowing and loving God.
149 God’s reality 
and presence on His human creatures must not be coerced but He must be knowable only 
by a mode of knowledge which involves a free personal response from human beings.
150 It 
                                                                                                                                                    
possible that God could constitute humans in such a way that they freely responded to Himself in faith and 
love. Hick thinks that it is logically possible for God to create humans with perfect moral freedom; however, 
it is not logically possible for God to create humans with perfect religions freedom. See Hick (1966a), p. 
311–313.  Moreover,  Hick  rejects  views  which  hold  that  God  could  have  created  human  creatures  in  a 
paradisal world on the ground that God’s purpose is that human personality should be formed towards the 
pattern  of  Christ.  See  Hick  (1966a),  p.  294.  In  addition,  he  argues  that  the  view  that  there  might  be 
instantaneous transition of imperfect human beings into perfect beings should be abandoned because it would 
render the earthly travail of faith and moral effort needless. See Geivett (1993), p. 210 and p. 383. 
143 Hick (1966a), p. 312.  
144 Ibid., p. 312. 
145 Hick (1968b), p. 595. 
146 Hick (1966), p. 313. 
147 Ibid., p. 311. 
148 Ibid., p. 317. Hick holds that only by been placed in an ‘epistemic distance’, humans can have significant 
autonomy in relation to their Creator. 
149 Davis (2001), p. 43. Also see John Hick, ‘God, Evil and Mystery’, Religious Studies 3, no. 2 (1968a), p. 
540. 
150 See Hick (1966a), p. 317 and Hick (1968b), p. 596. 41 
 
is more profitable and valuable for a human being to be able to make his own choices and 
avoid temptations and build up his goodness through personal experiences of moral effort. 
Humans experience divine presence through faith and only this kind of faith-response can 
secure the kind of freedom which is possible for humans in relation to God. The notion of 
‘epistemic distance’ is proposed to show that human beings are religiously free to come to 
God but are not compelled to know God. It is by growing perfect in response to God that 
they are morally free agents.
151  
Because of ‘epistemic distance’ Homo sapiens evolved as self-centred creatures making it 
inevitable that some human creatures would distance themselves from God. The human 
beings’ self-centred alienation from God is necessary for the ‘soul-making’ which God has 
in mind.
152 However, God will ensure that His purpose is brought to full realization and He 
will succeed in His purpose because ‘it is a true deduction from God’s power and goodness 
that in the end man will somehow be drawn freely to open himself to his Maker’.
153 Hick 
sees that the process of ‘soul-making’ makes sense ‘only if we see this life as part of a 
much larger existence in which that creative process continues to completion beyond this 
world’.
154 
Before  I continue to explain Hick’s view of intermediate states after death there are a 
number of worries which I wish to point out, worries which I will address in the second 
part of the chapter. Hick’s notion of ‘epistemic distance’ is essential in order to maintain 
the human beings have genuine freedom of choice. In the second part of the chapter, I 
argue that he fails to preserve this notion in his account of intermediate states. Moreover, I 
accept  his  claim  that  the  process  of  ‘soul-making’  would  not  be  possible  without  the 
individual’s free and responsible choice. However, I do not think that by proposing that 
there might be a life after death in which human beings can be perfected, Hick shows that 
the kind of genuine freedom he proposes is preserved and is essential for salvation. This 
point will become clearer once we examine his view on the afterlife.  
 
                                                 
151 See Hick (1966a), p. 308. See also Geivett (1993), p. 192. 
152 God is ontologically responsible for evil in that his decision to create human beings ‘was the primary and 
necessary precondition for the occurrence of evil’. Evil is a necessary element for ‘soul-making’. Hick cannot 
attribute the existence of evil to human beings because he thinks that this would amount to postulating the 
self-creation of evil ex-nihilo. See Hick (1966a), p. 238 and p. 326. 
153 Geivett (1993), p. 209. 
154 John Hick, ‘Remarks’, in Reason and Religion, Stuart C. Brown, ed. (Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 
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2. Soul-making does not cease at death 
Hick holds that the  given freedom of human beings  entails that some  free agents will 
become self-centred rather than God-centred. These are people who, by the time of their 
death,  are  not  prepared  to  join  God.  Those  who  have  not  yet  come  into  faith  cannot 
experience the fulfilment of the divine purpose. It is clear then that, if God’s purpose is a 
‘soul-making’  one,  He  must  ensure  that  it  holds  beyond  the  present  life  and  that  it  is 
fulfilled for those who are not prepared to join God in this life. If salvation in its fullness 
involves  the  actual  transformation  of  human  character,  according  to  Hick,  it  is  an 
observable fact that it does not usually take place in this world. Actual transformation can 
take place in this world, but usually does not. He concludes from this that there must be 
further time beyond death in which the process of perfecting can continue.
155 
Hick distances himself from the traditional views of afterlife in hell, purgatory and heaven 
and holds that a human being’s eternal destiny should not be decided on the state of one’s 
nature/character at death. In the following sections, I explain the reasons why Hick thinks 
that hell and annihilation as the fates of the wicked are not acceptable for a Christian 
theodicy and why salvation is necessarily the fate of all human beings.  
 
2.1 The fate of damned can be neither eternal hell nor annihilation  
The theodicy to which Hick turns is one that seeks to justify the existence of all evil by 
appealing to an infinite good. Justification of the existence of evil can only be found if the 
end to which a human being’s soul-making is directed is an infinite good, ‘namely the 
perfection and endless joy of all finite personal life’.
156 Hick holds that ‘if the justification 
of evil within the creative process lies in the limitless and eternal good of the end-state to 
which  it  leads,  then  the  completeness  of  the  justification  must  depend  upon  the 
completeness,  or  universality,  of  the  salvation  achieved’.
157  The  fulfilment  of  God’s 
purpose must extend to all human beings.  
This leads Hick to reject the doctrine of hell. A theodicy, he says, which is eschatological 
in character can be affirmed only by faith and hope in the fulfilment of God’s purpose for 
                                                 
155 Hick (1976), p. 455. 
156 Hick (1977), p. 128. 
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His human creatures; in an infinite good that renders worthwhile all finite evils which 
preceded  it.
158  God’s  divine  purpose  must  be  universally  fulfilled  because  an  evil  that 
persists  for  eternity  would  signify  a  definitive  failure  on  God's  part;  God’s  divine 
sovereignty  would  be  shown  to  be  limited.  The  doctrine  of  hell  assumes  the  eternal 
existence of the damned’s evil nature and the existence of evil in the eternal suffering of 
the damned, thus it cannot be accepted. Hick holds that eternal misery and torment without 
any positive or reformative purpose excludes the possibility of any active development of 
human  character  and  this  renders  the  misery  and  anguish  of  the  damned  pointless.
159 
Sometimes Hick says that the images of hell should be taken seriously and its sufferings 
should be given the importance they deserve. Real suffering and misery should be feared 
as a consequence of rejecting God. But he uses the term ‘hell’ to name a temporary state, 
or one of the stages in the afterlives, and he understands it as consisting of purgatorial 
experiences  which  are  necessary  to  remedy  imperfection  and  compensate  for  sins 
committed in the earthly life.
160 
Moreover,  Hick  holds  that  annihilation,  according  to  which  the  wicked  ‘come  by  the 
disintegrating effect of their own evil to embody less and less being until they cease to 
exist’, cannot be permitted by God either.
 161 Even if the view escapes the criticism of the 
eternal punishment view and thus also of the eternal evil view, it does not escape another 
problem, ‘namely the eternal evil of God's failure to bring to a good end the finite personal 
life he has created’.
162 God’s divine purpose for His human creatures will fail in the case of 
those whose fate is annihilation because the evil which brought them to this end ‘remains 
eternally,  unredeemed,  not  made  to  serve  any  eventual  good,  and  thus  constitutes  a 
perpetual marring of the universe’.
163 
Hick concludes that the only real alternative to a doctrine of hell and annihilation is a 
doctrine  of  universal  salvation.  Remember  that  Hick  wishes  to  defend  human  moral 
freedom  so  he  holds  that  the  possibility  of  universal  salvation  does  not  entail  that  the 
choices which humans perform are unreal or without eternal significance. He argues that it 
is not the case that people cannot damn themselves, but rather that the possibility of hell 
will not be realized. He holds that it is ‘a true deduction from God's power and goodness 
that in the end that man will somehow be drawn freely to open himself to his Maker’ and 
                                                 
158 Hick (1966a), p. 377 and Hick (1968b), p. 598. 
159 Hick (1966a), p. 377. 
160 Hick (1976), p. 385. 
161 Hick (1968b), p. 599.  
162 Ibid., p. 599. For more on the arguments against the eternal punishment view see chapter two. 
163 Ibid., p. 599.  44 
 
that in the end none are to be finally lost.
164 Those who have not attained their perfection 
by the time of their death are drawn towards their perfection in an existence which lies far 
beyond our present life.
165 
 
2.2 Further lives/intermediate states 
Hick  proposes  that  for  those  who  by  the  time  of  their  death  have  not  attained  full 
transformation  there  might  be  some  kind  of  continual  existence  in  an  environment 
specially  formed  for  humans  in  order  to  achieve  their  further  moral  and  spiritual 
development.  Influenced  by  the  paraeschatology  of  religions  such  as  Buddhism  and 
Hinduism, Hick proposes an alternative fate after death, that of a series of progressive 
afterlives, each bounded by something analogous to birth and death, lived in other worlds 
in spaces other than that in which human beings now are.
166 The ‘soul-making’ process 
continues  in  another  post-mortem  intermediate  state,  or  states,  until  it  ‘reaches  its 
completion in the infinite good of the common life of humanity within the life of God’.
167 
Perfection  of  human  beings  consists  in  a  self-transcending  state  beyond  separate  ego 
existence.
168 Those who die and have not yet attained perfection continue further in time as 
                                                 
164 See Hick (1976), p. 22 and p. 408.  
165 Hick holds that in most cases human beings shall not attain immediately to the final heavenly state. Only 
those who various religious traditions call ‘saints or buddhas or arhats or jivan-muktas have fulfilled the 
purpose of the temporal existence which is the gradual creation of perfect persons’. See Hick (1976), p. 399. 
166 Hick suggests something similar to that described in the Bardo Thödol. Bardo Thödol or Tibetan Book of 
Dead in English language comes from the tantric branch of Mahayana Buddhism in Tibet. It describes the 
Bardo state between death and rebirth and it outlines the sequence of experiences undergone by the soul or 
conscious mind during the forty-nine days between death and its return to the new body. At the moment of 
death, when the ego ceases to be organically related to this world, its final transcending perfection is possible 
and it might enter to its ultimate nature. Individuals go through three distinct stages after death. In the first 
stage, the individual encounters the ultimate reality and the individual will have to decide if he wants to 
abandon his ego-existence. If he abandons his ego-existence then, according to Hindu thought, it attains to a 
realization of its identity with the one infinite and eternal Spirit or, according to Buddhism, until it attains to 
the perfect state of Nirvana. However, there are many cases in which the individual does not wish to abandon 
itself and it regains consciousness in a post-mortem stage which is subjective or dream-like. This is a stage of 
self-discovery. The experiences in the individual’s mind are subjective. There is a series of karmic illusions 
which are formed by the individual’s past actions. Benevolent deities offer to the individual salvation but if 
the good which the individual has within him does not correspond to them then he encounters evil deities 
who represent the evil within him. These experiences then make him realise that he must live again and select 
an appropriate birth. The third stage is when the individual is drawn to its next rebirth. See Hick (1976), pp. 
400–404 and pp. 414–415. 
167  John  Hick,  Evil  and  the  God  of  Love (Palgrave  Macmillan,  2007  Reissue),  p.  374. Hick  rejects  the 
traditional  view  of  the  Christian  heaven,  hell  and  purgatory  but  also  the  repeated  reincarnation  of  the 
individual in the earthy life. See Hick (1976), p. 456. 
168 Hick (1976), p. 399. Hick’s approach can be criticised on the ground that if all human beings go beyond 
their separate ego existence then there is the question of whether or not they will still be them, would they 
still be persons or human beings. Hick’s reply to this is that the final state which he proposes will include all 45 
 
distinct self-conscious egos.
169 The right and wrong actions performed during the earthly 
life lead to appropriately different experiences beyond this world which provide infinite 
possibilities for further spiritual growth and development.
170  
Hick assumes that ‘the immediately post-mortem phase is subjective and dream-like and 
that  it  can  take  either  a  sharply  defined  form,  reflecting  an  imagination  effectively 
conditioned by a powerful religious culture, or be experienced as a kind of continuation of 
earthly life’.
171 Two striking features, which Hick uses in formulating his view, are that the 
mind of each individual creates its own post-mortem world in accordance with its beliefs 
and  that  this,  the  Bardo  state,  is  ‘solipsistic’.
172  Since  most  human  beings  in  modern 
societies are not as influenced by the teachings of Christianity as they were in the past, this 
leads Hick to hold that these individuals in the absence of vivid and compelling religious 
or other expectations would find the future world to be more or less similar to the earthly 
world. Their subjective post-mortem environment would be based upon their memories of 
the earthly world.
173  
The Bardo state, however, is a transitional phase, says Hick, which sooner or later will 
change through factors such as experience of higher or positive realms or of boredom and 
emptiness. It is going to be an experience of self-discovery and of realization of what one 
has become through the bad and good choices, which they have acquired for themselves 
during their earthly lives. When this experience is over for the individual, Hick assumes 
that  there  will  be  a  ‘transition  to  a  further  embodiment  in  another  world  in  another 
space’.
174  The  next  world  will  be  a  real  spatial-temporal  environment  functioning  in 
accordance with its own laws, within which there will be real personal life and character 
with pain and suffering to overcome, sacrifices and achievements. The present conscious-
self does not end but continues with some memory of the immediately past life, probably 
                                                                                                                                                    
of human beings in a perfected state of unity with each other and with the Transcendent Reality. Hick rejects 
the notion of the immortal ego of traditional Western religions but also he rejects the idea of complete 
personal  extinction  or  absorption  of  traditional  Eastern  religions.  He  holds  that  ‘since  personality  is 
essentially outward-looking as a relationship to other persons…the perfected individual will have become an 
entity without egoity, a living consciousness which is transparent to the other consciousness in relation to 
which it lives in full community of love’. See Hick (1976), p. 460. At the end of ‘soul-making’ the individual 
will maintain its individual identity, having left behind its ‘ego-aspect’ and having been filled with “the 
unselfish love which the New Testament calls agape”. See Hick (1976), p. 464. 
169 Ibid,, p. 399. 
170 Hick (1966a), p. 385. 
171 Hick (1976), p. 416. 
172 Ibid., p. 416. 
173 Ibid., p. 416. 
174 Ibid., p. 417. 46 
 
fading as the individual becomes a part of the succeeding life.
175 Hick holds that if the 
future lives are few then they may all be remembered but if they are many then they should 
not be expected to be all clearly or fully remembered. When that life comes to an end 
humans shall presumably again ‘die’ and undergo another transition, via another Bardo 
type experience, into another life or world.
176 The progressive worlds are going to have 
environments of more morally and spiritually perfect modes of existence.
177 The duration 
and extent of the soul-making process will be determined by each individual’s character 
and the degree of unsanctification (or imperfection) remaining to be overcome at the time 
of death.
178  
Hick holds that human beings can never escape God’s love because God has determined 
the nature of the environments in which human beings exercise their freedom, both in this 
world and in other worlds to come.
179 From this, he assumes that God’s love will never 
cease  until  all  human  beings  respond  to  His  love  and  goodness  freely.  However,  the 
process  in  which  human  beings  come  into  realization  of  the  infinite  good  will  not  be 
infinite in duration. Human beings will arrive at their own self-fulfilment in a right relation 
to God, since this process depends upon the fact that human beings have been created from 
God for Himself.
180 Hick concludes that the outcome of ‘the soul-making’ process will be 
that of all human beings brought into the glory of God.  
Even if Hick’s view is conceptually coherent at first sight, he does not show that salvation 
is guaranteed to all human beings. The main problem which I will go on to examine in the 
next part of the chapter, is that there is a significant tension between what Hick says here 
and the idea that ‘soul-making’ and salvation requires genuine free will. God can only save 
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Hick holds that God wants to save all human creatures and that He will succeed in doing 
so. Salvation will be attained through the free response of each human being to God’s love. 
It is obvious that Hick wants to hold that human freedom is necessary for salvation, for if 
eternal happiness were the only good that God was concerned to actualize one could ask 
Hick why God did not create everyone in heaven without forcing them to undergo the 
painful process of soul making.
181 If God were to create perfect beings in a twinkle of an 
eye He, on the one hand, would be erasing the consequences of human freedom, which 
would lessen the value of any achievement on their part, and on the other hand, human 
beings  would  not  really  be  perfect  unless  they  achieved  this  through  free  choices. 
Attainment  of  the  ultimate  good  should  be  through  the  individual’s  free  response. 
Universal salvation will be the ultimate outcome because (i) human nature is created in a 
way such that it always tends towards the ultimate good and the ultimate good is God and 
(ii) the process of salvation does not cease at the moment of death but will continue in 
other spheres or worlds. Since human nature is drawn towards God then there will be a 
time where all human beings will be united with God.  
I argue that his account fails to adequately show that everyone will be saved in the end. In 
defending this claim I will maintain that:  
1.  The  idea  of  intermediate  lives  as  opportunities  for  salvation  diminishes  the 
importance  of  human  autonomy.  Although  humans  have  free  will,  they  are  not 
genuinely free, as Hick claims. 
2.  The existence of the intermediate states does not exclude the possibility that some 
individuals might never attain perfection/salvation. 
                                                 
181 As I have said in a previous footnote, Hick maintains that God would not create human beings in a way 
that  they  would  always  freely  choose  the  good.  Even  if  it  is  logically  possible  for  God  to  do  so,  it  is 
impossible to expect human beings to join God in faith and love if they do not have genuine freedom. Let us 
also remember that this is the question which J. L Mackie and A. Flew ask theists when considering the 
problem of evil. See chapter one, section 1. 
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3.  It is not obvious that the afterlives are progressive in character. If the afterlives are 
not progressive then there is no guarantee that some human creatures  will ever 
choose God.  
4.  Hick’s notion of ‘epistemic distance’ in relation with human freedom of choice 
presents some problems. If epistemic distance is necessary for genuine autonomy 
and freedom then the existence of the Bardo state and the existence of the afterlives 
undermines Hick’s notion of ‘epistemic distance’ and human freedom. 
My arguments against Hick are grounded in the following analogy.  
Imagine that you find yourself in an enormous labyrinth. Either you can choose to remain 
in the labyrinth or you can choose to take the path which leads to the exit and to a good 
which is beyond your imagination. The exit leads to a good you have never imagined—
eternal life, bliss and happiness—whereas if you decide to remain in the labyrinth you will 
be subjected to different kinds of evils, deception and finally death. However, the journey 
to the exit is not an easy one and the residence in the labyrinth is not a pleasurable one. The 
labyrinth has a security system (LSS from now on) which attempts with various warnings 
or/and obstacles to persuade you to pursue the path which leads to the exit. Moreover, it 
attempts to make your journey to the exit as challenging as possible in order to make sure 
that you are ready for the exit. The LSS wills your escape and so it decides to give you 
several opportunities to escape the labyrinth. Whether you decide to remain in the labyrinth 
or you cannot reach the exit for whatever reasons e.g. injuries, death etc., the LSS gives 
you the opportunity to choose the exit by bringing you back to life; so every time you fail 
to reach the exit you wake up and you find yourself in a different place in the labyrinth. 
The same rules and outcomes apply. Whether you choose to remain in the labyrinth for a 
second time or you choose the exit and you die before you are free the LSS gives you 
another chance and then another and then another until you choose the exit. Depending on 
your progress in your previous attempts, the LSS re-creates you in a different place and 
assigns you appropriate challenges and obstacles to overcome. 
The point of this hypothetical scenario is that we can take it to be analogous to Hick’s view 
of earthly life and the intermediate afterlives. As we have seen, Hick thinks that human 
beings, through the exercise of their given freedom, can choose good or evil. (In terms of 
the labyrinth, there are two choices either remain in the labyrinth or choose the exit). God’s 
purpose is a ‘soul-making’ one and this purpose can be achieved only if human beings are 49 
 
placed in environments in which there are obstacles and challenges to overcome. In the 
labyrinth, you can choose using your given freedom. The warnings and obstacles that are 
presented in the labyrinth are analogous to the moral and natural evil that we encounter in 
our earthly lives which, according to Hick, help our moral and spiritual development. The 
exit of the labyrinth is analogous to reconciliation with God—the ultimate good and eternal 
life—whereas the residence in the labyrinth is analogous to the earthly corruption, deceit, a 
place in which vices triumph and death is the ultimate fate. Moreover, the chances which 
the LSS gives you to reach the exit in re-creating you again and again is analogous to the 
re-appearance of humans in intermediate states after their earthly life until they develop a 
perfect character and come into union with God. With this analogy in mind, I now turn to 
my arguments against Hick’s theory. 
 
1. Human beings are not genuinely free in the future lives 
The importance of freedom and autonomy is evident in Hick’s view. Freedom of choice 
and  autonomy  are  valuable  to  a  person  because  they  are  necessary  in  order  for  the 
transformation to perfection to occur and for union with God to be realized. The genuine 
freedom that Hick has in mind is expressed in actions which influence the course of events 
in the world.  It is not enough to have the freedom; of choice; it is important that the 
choices which a person makes result in significant changes in the environment he lives. 
This  second  feature  of  human  freedom  is  what  Hick  calls  human  autonomy.  As  a 
theodicist, Hick attempts to justify the evil in the world and its effects on each human 
being and the environment they live in. This can only be justified if he holds that each 
person has the autonomy and freedom to change the course of things by choosing one way 
or another. So a world with autonomous human beings is a world where they are, firstly, 
allowed to make evil choices, and secondly, are allowed to make choices which issue in 
evil acts and have evil consequences which have an impact in the environment in which 
they live. I argue that if Hick claims that everyone will be saved in the end by appealing to 
the notion of the intermediate afterlives then he has to abandon the view that human beings 
have the kind of freedom and autonomy which is significant for their ‘soul-making’ and 
the attainment of the infinite good.  
Let us consider the analogy I have offered to illustrate my criticism against Hick. Imagine 
that it is now your 20
th time in the labyrinth. That would suggest that in all your previous 50 
 
attempts either you have chosen to remain in the labyrinth or you have failed to reach the 
exit. Now you decide to reach to the exit but by the time you do so you die. The LSS once 
more re-creates you to give you another chance. In all your reappearances in the labyrinth, 
you were free to choose between the two options. However, did you choose to reappear in 
the labyrinth for a second time, or for a 20
th or even 21
st time? I am inclined to say that you 
did not. Your reappearances in the labyrinth as a result of your failure to choose or reach 
the  exit,  is  not  something  that  you  have  chosen  for  yourself.  Can  you  choose  not  to 
reappear in the labyrinth? No, because you cannot make that choice. The LSS does. The 
LSS chooses for you because it is the LSS which thinks that it would be better for you to 
finally reach the exit and succeed in escaping from the labyrinth. The LSS does not permit 
you  to  retain  the  character  which  you  have  developed  during  your  residence  in  the 
labyrinth, especially if that character is a vicious one. It does not give you that choice.  
While  the  above  analogy  allows  freedom  of  choice,  it  denies  autonomy  because  your 
ultimate fate does not vary with the choices which you have made in the labyrinth. Hick 
allows human beings to make free choices during their existence in the earthly life and the 
post-mortem lives because union with God can only be achieved voluntarily. It is up to 
humans whether or not they want to act in evil or good ways and so, we can argue that 
freedom of choice is still significant in this sense. However, the notion of intermediate 
lives denies human autonomy because each individual’s eternal fate is entirely independent 
of the choices he/she makes and the beliefs and character which he/she adopts in his/her 
earthly existence and post-mortem existence later on.  
While Hick’s notion of intermediate states allows each agent to choose one thing over 
another  upon  recognizing  the  value  of  the  respective  choices,  including  the  choices 
appropriate for soul-making, it does not allow outcomes to vary accordingly. It allows each 
agent to act in such a way as to acquire an evil character or a lesser good character but in 
the end one cannot be what one has chosen to be. This is evident since those who choose to 
acquire vices and act upon them rather than upon virtues are nevertheless going to be 
placed  in  another  environment  meant  for  transformation.  Humans  are  allowed  to  do 
whatever they like but with God, you have it this way.
182 Human beings do not choose to 
progress from one future intermediate life to another. So while the choosing of one act over 
another may continue it is, nevertheless, a free choosing which lacks autonomy since one 
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transforms into a child of God whether one chooses to be or not. In the end, if a person 
chooses to cultivate a character which does not accord with God’s plans he will not be 
allowed  to  become  that  sort  of  person.  Hick’s  view  of  intermediate  states,  therefore, 
presents the following difficulties for him: 
Firstly, Hick’s universalism is an attempt, as we have seen, to justify all evil in the world, 
natural and moral. The justification is based on his view of human freedom of choice and 
autonomy. People can change the course of events by using their given freedom which is 
important for their soul-making. If the eternal fate of each individual is independent of the 
choices  he  has  made  in  his  earthly  and/or  intermediate  lives  then  Hick’s  universalism 
seems to suggest that the earthly life and intermediate worlds and the evils and challenges 
they contain are not significant, at least for the purposes of ‘soul-making’. This would 
suggest that all the challenges that human beings have to face and overcome by using their 
given freedom and all the suffering and evil they have to undergo in order to become 
children of God were completely pointless. 
Secondly, if an individual’s reappearance in the intermediate worlds and consequently his 
eternal fate is completely independent of the choices he has made, then God blocks the 
consequences of the free choices of evil individuals and so He blocks their autonomy. If 
human autonomy entails the freedom to act in evil ways which result in evil consequences 
which in turn affect the course of things and the life of the individual who makes them 
(and others), by blocking the consequences, God blocks human autonomy. If autonomy is 
an essential feature of having genuine creaturely freedom then God ignores and diminishes 
the  value  of  the  freedom  which  human  beings  are  worth  having.  Therefore,  universal 
salvation is not the result of genuine freedom that Hick wants to maintain.  
 If Hick wishes to save the genuine freedom which he ascribes to human beings, that is the 
ability to choose freely and be autonomous beings he will have to permit their eternal fate 
to be based on the choices and the character which they cultivate for themselves. If he does 
so then he will have to accept that there is no guarantee that all will achieve salvation since 
in having genuine freedom humans will be allowed to carry the character that they have 
chosen for themselves in the lives to come; or be permitted to retain that character and not 
been re-created in another world. In addition, if the individuals decide that they do not 
wish to continue their existence in other worlds then I think it is reasonable to expect them 
to ask their Creator to annihilate them. If freedom is genuine then Hick has to accept that 
the above scenarios are possible.  52 
 
Nevertheless Hick could reply to my criticism in the following way: he could argue that 
those who offer this argument in attempting to show that salvation is not the product of 
free response to God’s will overlook the fact that the Christian doctrine of salvation offers 
‘an alternative route to the universalist conclusion’.
183 Firstly, Hick, as we have seen, holds 
that God has created human beings in a way that their nature has an inherently gravitation 
towards God. There is an inner telos in human beings for relationship with God. Since 
human beings have been created by God and they are oriented towards God there ‘is no 
final opposition between God’s saving will and our human nature acting in freedom’.
184 He 
holds that if human ordinary notion of freedom is compatible with humans having been 
brought into existence by forces outside their selves, then it must be compatible with them 
having brought into existence by the will of God.
185 Secondly, Hick has often argued that 
God cannot be an infinitely powerful being who sometimes intervenes miraculously on 
earth in response to human prayers. If there were an all-powerful intervening being, Hick 
argues, we would not think of him worthy of worship. To strengthen his point he gives the 
following example: Suppose, he says, there is a car crash and three of the people in it are 
killed  but  one  survives  more  or  less  unhurt.  ‘If  that  one,  believing  in  a  miraculously 
intervening deity, then thanks God for saving her life, she's forgetting that if God decided 
to save her, he must have decided at the same time not to save the other three. But if he 
could if he wanted equally easily save everyone from all harm, why is there so much pain 
and suffering in the world? This would be a cruelly arbitrary God, and the only people who 
could reasonably worship him would be the chosen few whom he protects’.
186 God cannot 
arbitrarily intervene in the world; events which happen that we take to be unexplainable or 
miraculous may in fact be laws of nature which we were not familiar with before. So for 
these reasons Hick could maintain that the laws of nature can be seen as the actions of 
God, so the difference between such laws and God’s actions is not as striking as might first 
appear. The fact that human beings have to go through a series of progressive lives through 
the process of rebirth and death might not undermine the free nature of the agent’s choice 
and in particular autonomy if this process is part of the plan God had for human creation 
and their salvation.  
To  this  reply  we  can  say  that  Hick’s  account  of  human  freedom  is  still  vulnerable  to 
criticism. One could argue that Hick’s account of universalism seems to suggest that the 
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fate of human beings is predetermined from the moment of creation for salvation.
187 If this 
is the case then it is not obvious how his account is compatible with the freedom of choice 
and genuine autonomy he wishes to defend. If predetermined nature diminishes genuine 
freedom of choice and genuine autonomy then Hick cannot speak of libertarian free will. It 
would seem that Hick would have to defend a compatibilist account of freedom if he wants 
to hold, one the one hand, that human nature is predetermined to attain God and, on the 
other hand, to show that humans can make genuine free choices. One way in which Hick 
could strengthen his argument is by offering an account of God’s knowledge something 
which surprisingly he does not do. Hick, in order to affirm that universal salvation will be 
the fate of all human beings, must at least assert that God has foreknowledge.
188 Without 
this  kind  of  foreknowledge  not  even  God  can  know  the  outcome  of  each  individual’s 
salvation.  The  omission  of  an  account  of  God’s  knowledge  makes  Hick’s  account  of 
genuine freedom of choice and autonomy vulnerable to criticism. 
Moreover,  Hick’s  reply  is  vulnerable  to  a  further  criticism:  if  God  has  the  power  and 
knowledge  to  predetermine  all  human  beings’  nature  for  salvation  why  should  God 
postpone this fate to future environments instead of employing them in the present earthly 
life? Why does the process of human soul-making takes a long as it does? Hick himself 
admits that these are questions which we cannot answer, we ‘do not know why the time 
scale of God’s dealings with us as it is’.
189 If Hick wishes to show that human beings have 
compatibilist  freedom  of  choice  and  offer  an  account  of  God’s  knowledge  which  will 
permit  genuine  freedom  of  choice,  on  the  one  hand,  and  predetermined  nature  for 
salvation,  on  the  other hand,  then  Hick  will  have  to  explain  why  the  process  of  soul-
making has to be as long or why human beings have not been created perfect in the first 
place if God had the power and knowledge to do so. 
 
2. Intermediate states and the possibility of choosing to do wrong 
When Hick discusses the character of the afterlife he holds that the next world will be a 
real  spatial-temporal  environment  functioning  in  accordance  with  its  own  laws,  within 
which there will be real personal life and character with pain and suffering to overcome, 
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sacrifices and achievements.
190 In answering questions regarding the personal identity and 
memory of each individual in the lives to come he holds that the present conscious-self 
continues  existing  in  other  new  environments  even  with  some  fading  memories.  He 
assumes that the fewer future lives someone has the more he will be able to remember 
from his previous lives; whereas if they are many then it should not be expected that they 
will all be clearly or fully remembered. The individual might have some memory of the 
immediately past life but not of all past lives because of the limits of human memory and 
self-apprehension. Hick could say that when the earthly life of a human being comes to an 
end and the ascent to another world and yet another life occurs and so on, the individual 
might remember the events which have occurred in his earthly life or his immediate past 
life. If this is the case, he will be able to evaluate situations and act in better ways in the 
lives to come than he has in the past. In this sense, he might also be able to avoid the 
criticism that God blocks human autonomy. 
I think that Hick’s claim that there might be memory of previous events in the lives to 
come which would help each individual to make right choices and wish in the end the 
infinite good, presents some serious problems to his theory. In particular, 
a)  Some individuals might choose salvation for the wrong reasons. 
b)  Some individuals might use the afterlives to prolong their residence in the after 
world. 
Let us return to the labyrinth scenario and add that every time you fail to choose the exit 
and the LSS gives you another chance to do so you have memories of the immediately past 
choice or choices and also you have some faint memories of previous attempts in previous 
lives. Also let us suppose, as Hick seems to claim, that if you are in your 20
th attempt, for 
example, you do not need to recall the first fifteen times to know what it is best for you to 
do since the last two or three attempts will suffice for that. As long as you have some 
memory of the past then you are free to choose good or evil or, in the case of the labyrinth, 
the exit or to remain in the labyrinth, because you will be able to compare and evaluate 
previous attempts. Freedom of choice still plays a significant role for salvation. I accept 
that if you have memories of previous events, or in Hick’s view, of previous lives, then 
you  can  realise  what  is  a  better  and  more  valuable  choice  and  be  able  to  overcome 
challenges in ways which you have never thought of before. Someone could choose the 
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right path because, ultimately, he realizes that it is the right path. I am free, for example, 
when I refrain from putting my hand on the stove on the basis of my memory that it hurts 
to do so. The fact that human beings are taught lessons through their life experiences does 
not suggest that their choices thereafter are not free.  
The problem here is not about whether or not human beings will be free in deciding to 
choose God. Instead, it concerns whether or not they will choose God for the right reasons 
and whether or not, knowing that they will never really cease to exist, they will ever be 
sufficiently motivated to accept God.  
Recall  again  the  labyrinth  analogy.  Let  us  say  that  in  my  100
th  reappearance  in  the 
labyrinth I choose the path which leads to the exit. This decision was made on the basis of 
recalling previous experiences. I know that every time I fail to reach the exit I return to the 
labyrinth. Since I know that every time I return to the labyrinth it is because I have to 
choose the path which leads to the exit, I decide to choose the path which leads to the exit. 
It is a better choice to follow the path which leads to the exit than remain in the labyrinth. 
It is a good thing to reach the exit but at the same time it will be something I have to do. It 
is not the right reason to choose the exit. How does this present a problem for Hick? 
The analogy implies that if human beings act in accordance with God’s plan out of self-
interest, it contradicts Hick’s view according to which human beings can be perfected only 
through  their  faith  and  trust  in  God.  If  in  every  afterlife  I  have  memories  of  my  past 
afterlives and I know that if I do not choose the ultimate good, and if I do not act in 
accordance with God’s plan, I will have to move to another world or state, it is quite 
possible that I will choose God’s plan since the alternative will be me inhabiting another 
world. The reasons behind my decision to choose the exit will not be the right ones. People 
do  not  always  choose  to  do  one  thing  rather  than  another  for  the  right  reasons.  For 
example, the reasons behind my decision to help my little brother finish his homework or 
tidy up his room might be that I cannot stand his constant moaning or my mother telling 
him off all the time. Someone might say that the right reasons for helping my brother 
would be out of duty to help him or out of sisterly love and compassion. In the afterlives, it 
might be the case that some human beings will choose salvation out of self-interest e.g., 
they might be tired from dying repeatedly and being resurrected in the intermediate worlds. 
My  choice  will  not  be  made  for  the  right  reasons  but  out  of  self-interest  and  this  is 
something that Hick would want to avoid. 56 
 
In the labyrinth analogy, if I choose the exit for the wrong reasons that would suggest that I 
am not ready to attain salvation. If reconciliation with God, according to Hick, can be 
achieved only through faith and trust in God, those who have chosen the exit out of self-
interest will have to necessarily reappear in another afterlife. This would be because they 
are not ready for salvation. It may be the case that some people will never choose salvation 
(or the exit) for the right reasons. They might always see salvation or the labyrinth’s exit as 
something that they have to do in order to stop the reappearances and if this is so then 
some of them might never be saved.  
The  above  point  can  be  strengthened  if  we  take  into  consideration  Hick’s  account  of 
human nature. Hick as we have seen endorses the Irenaeus approach of human creation. He 
holds that human beings are created immature and finite. They begin the painful process of 
soul-making and restoration in ignorance, living in a hostile environment. Through their 
own interpretation of the world they come to trust and love God. Their vulnerability to evil 
and suffering makes their journey to reconciliation all the more difficult so by the end of 
their  earthly  lives  most  of  humans  are  not  transformed  into  the  beings  God  desires. 
Salvation in its fullness involves the actual transformation of human character and Hick 
himself holds that ‘it is an observable fact that this does not usually take place in the course 
of our present earthly life’.
191 The problem with Hick’s view here is that the only time 
human beings are saved is when they have transformed into children of God. If they are 
not saved that would suggest that they are not perfected yet and consequently this suggests 
that they are still vulnerable to suffering and evil. If they are still vulnerable to suffering 
and evil then it is not obvious that they will choose God out of faith and trust. It seems that 
they will have more or less the same nature which they had in their earthly lives. If the 
kind of character they had in their earthly lives did not permit them recognizing God or 
acting in ways which are praised by God then if they have the same character and nature in 
the lives to come then it is not obvious why or/and how they would be capable in choosing 
salvation for the right reasons. 
Moreover, if human beings have freedom of choice and if they are aware of the reasons 
(either worked out the reasons or God informed them) as to why they reappear in new 
worlds and they have memories of their previous lives, another objection can be raised. 
The objection I have in mind goes along these lines: Suppose certain individuals, knowing 
that they will have as many opportunities in the future as they require, decide to wait 
                                                 
191 Hick (1976), p. 455. 57 
 
indefinitely.
192 It is may be the case that some individuals would decide that reappearing in 
other worlds is what they want to do for eternity. If the worlds to come are similar to the 
earthly one then it is acceptable to hold that there will be pleasures to experience, different 
things to choose from and so on. Moreover, if you know that death is not the final stage of 
your existence and God will always give you opportunities to repent and become better, 
you might find it beneficial not to act morally in every single world since whatever you do 
you will eventually be saved. Who would not want more chances to achieve things he has 
not succeeded in achieving, or wanting to know more or experiencing more? It seems 
logically  possible  that  some  individuals  will  continue  to  make  the  wrong  choices  for 
eternity and thus never attain perfection.  
Hick could reply to this by holding that since God has created human beings for himself 
and since human nature gravitates towards God then over a potentially infinite number of 
lives all humans will freely achieve their natural end state. Nevertheless, Hick cannot argue 
that universalism is a certainty. It is probable that all human beings will be saved but 
because  of  the  vulnerable  nature  he  ascribes  to  people  and  the  account  of  libertarian 
freedom of choice he proposes, universal salvation cannot be certain. 
The fact that some people may continue to perform evil acts in knowing that no matter 
what they do they will nevertheless be saved leads to another problem. The choices that 
humans will have in each intermediate life can lead to the development of a bad character, 
and so the successive lives can make a person worse. I will say more on this in the next 
section where I examine Hick’s claim that the next lives will be progressive in character. 
To summarize my argument so far: Firstly, I argued that Hick’s account of progressive 
lives renders human freedom not as significant for salvation as Hick would like it to be. I 
argued that even if human beings can make significant choices during their intermediate 
lives nevertheless, their autonomy is crushed since their eternal fate does not depend on 
those free choices. So they are not genuinely free. Since autonomy is essential for the 
genuine  freedom  that  Hick  talks  about,  human  beings  do  not  have  that  freedom  and 
salvation is not the product of that freedom. Secondly,  I  argued that the possibility of 
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lives are what await human beings after their earthly life then two problems come up. Firstly, there is the 
possibility that some of the human beings will extend their reappearances as long as they want. There will be 
no definite point where they will want reconciliation with God and we will have an infinite series of lives. 
Secondly, it is against the message of the scriptures and the saints who speak of urgency to accept God and 
finality. See Geivett (1993), p. 222. 58 
 
having memories of previous lives in the lives to come presents the following problem for 
Hick: human beings might choose salvation for the wrong reasons or might deliberately 
prolong their residence in the intermediate states. I am inclined to hold that both reasons 
(in sections 1.1. and 1.2.) that I offered so far against Hick’s account of intermediate states 
should lead us to hold that there is no guarantee that salvation will be the fate all human 
beings. 
 
3. Can we speak of progressive lives?  
God, according to Hick, gives the opportunity to human beings to grow in morality and 
spirituality and attain perfection by inhabiting a series of progressive lives lived in other 
worlds. An essential factor for moral and spiritual development is the occurrence of pain 
and suffering and the opportunity to choose between good and evil actions. A world which 
contains challenges to be overcome and significant choices to be made is a better world 
than one which does not. There are situations in which the experience of some traumatic 
event frees people and helps them to get in touch with reality.
193 Since the afterlives exist 
with the express purpose of giving the opportunity for transformation, their environments 
may  be  more  challenging  in  order  to  ensure  human  beings’  salvation.  Hick  holds  that 
afterlives may lived in environments that are similar in structure and nature to the earthly 
environment.  However,  if  the  afterlives  exist  for  moral  and  spiritual  growth  and  their 
environments’ structure and nature is similar to the earthly one, I argue that it may be the 
case that some people might never become better people; they might always chose wrong 
and  always  deny  God’s  love.
194  Hick  does  not  say  if  in  the  next  lives  there  will  be 
opportunities of refusal and diminishment. If pain and suffering are important for moral 
and spiritual development then they must occur in the intermediate afterlives. If freedom of 
choice is important for human beings’ moral and spiritual development then there must be 
good and bad things to choose from, there must be pain and suffering to overcome. If 
humans are free to exercise their freedom of choice, then in an environment which there 
will be pain and suffering to overcome, there is always the possibility that some human 
                                                 
193  Hick  holds  that  divine  grace  operates  in  the  earthly  world  in  some  way  or  another  e.g.  traumatic 
experience makes people see things differently. See Hick (1976), pp. 250–259. 
194 Davis points out this weakness of Hick’s theory but he does not discuss it in length, something which I do 
here. He asks if human beings are going to be as free as they are in the earthly life, from evidence of how 
human beings behave now, surely we cannot have much hope that they will change in the after lives. See 
Davis  (2001),  p.  59.  Moreover,  he  holds  that  even  if  an  agent  reaches  the  age  of  moral  and  spiritual 
responsibility (whatever this might be) he will not remain morally innocent for long. See Davis (2001), p. 86. 59 
 
beings will not choose to be reconciled to God in any intermediate life; and if this is the 
case then Hick’s afterlives are not necessarily progressive. 
Let us look at a further modified version of the labyrinth scenario to illustrate my point. 
Imagine that you find yourself in the labyrinth and you have the choice either to remain 
there or look for the exit. This is your first appearance in the labyrinth and you choose to 
remain there. However, after a while, you change your mind and you follow the path which 
leads to the exit. Let us also suppose that before you make it to the exit you die due to old 
age. The LSS brings you back to life and you wake up in a different part of the labyrinth 
having  again to choose  between the two fates.  During  your time in the labyrinth,  you 
encounter different difficulties and different challenges to the previous time you were in 
the  labyrinth.  The  same  pattern  continues  for  the  next  fourteen  reappearances  in  the 
labyrinth. Most of your attempts so far to reach the exit were unsuccessful. However, every 
time  that  you  reappear  in  the  labyrinth  you  get  better  and  better  at  dealing  with  the 
different challenges and obstacles. Let us also suppose that on your 15
th attempt to reach 
the exit, and having been extremely good in recognising and evaluating good and bad 
situations, something happens and you change your mind. A few meters before the exit you 
are  presented  with  a  challenge  that  you  have  not  encountered  before  and  your  choice 
results in your failure to reach the exit.  
If human beings are free to choose between different situations then there is always the 
possibility that at some point on their way to the exit, or in Hick’s case on their attainment 
of salvation, they might change their mind or they might act in a way which might not 
reflect the quality of the lives which they have attained. In the case of the labyrinth, I think 
it  is  quite  possible  that  you  will  choose  something  else  over  escaping  the  labyrinth. 
Experience shows that different situations and events can lead a human being to act in 
bad/immoral ways and to rebel and to refuse God. If this is possible in the earthly life, why 
can it not be possible in the afterlives? If the environment in the progressive lives is like 
the earthly one, or similar to it, a person who has reached a level close to moral and 
spiritual perfection could choose bad over good. There will be opportunities of refusal and 
diminishment  in  an  environment  which  would  help  the  humans’  moral  and  spiritual 
growth. If it is important that the environment provides opportunities for human beings to 
exercise their significant freedom, then there is the possibility that some of them will not 
wish the ultimate good and will not be saved. But why would they choose something 
different to the exit if they are so close to perfection? What reason would there be for this?  60 
 
I have said in section 1.2 that those people who have learnt to evaluate good and bad 
situations might come to a point where they will decide to attain perfection/salvation or the 
exit for the wrong reasons. Moreover, I have argued that some would continue to act badly 
if they know that they will reappear in future lives. The choices that humans will have in 
each intermediate life can lead to the development of a bad character, and so the successive 
lives can make a person worse. Consider the following analogy: The first time someone 
has an affair might be difficult for him, he may feel guilty and stressed. However, it makes 
it easier for him to have more affairs in the future. Once he has had an affair—has done 
something bad—at once it becomes easier to do it again. In the intermediate lives if an 
individual believes that it is not really that bad acting contrary to what it is good, it is 
possible that next time he faces a similar challenge he would find it hard to resist the 
temptation. Therefore, in this way successive opportunities to do bad things might lead to a 
person becoming worse.  
This last point is closely connected with the fact that a main characteristic of human beings 
is that they are prone to temptation. It might be the case that they want the ultimate good 
but there is something else which they prefer. For example, returning to the labyrinthean 
situation, it might be the case that the challenge which you have to overcome is to refrain 
from eating from a dining table which is right in front of you. By refraining from doing so 
you show, firstly, that you obey and respect the LSS’s (or God’s) warnings and commands, 
and secondly, that you possess self-discipline (abstinence) which, in the case of Christian 
tradition,  is  a  virtue.  If  however,  after  days  and  days  of  overcoming  challenges  and 
obstacles you are hungry, you will find that the dinner table with all its goods is quite an 
attractive choice. In addition, if you know that there is really nothing to lose in eating from 
that dinner table since you know that you will come back to the labyrinth (see criticism 
1.2.), there will be nothing really to keep you from eating it. If a person is free to exercise 
his freedom of choice, then in an environment in which there will be pain and suffering to 
overcome,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  he  will  choose  to  be  reconciled  to  God  in  any 
intermediate life. Successive lives which include pain and suffering do not guarantee that 
the choices which each individual makes will be towards the good.  
Knowing  that  something  is  good  and  knowing  that  there  are  good  reasons  to  choose 
something good over something bad does not necessarily entail that our choices will be 
influenced by such knowledge and thus that we will always act in the right way. In the case 
of the dinner table, my desire for food overrides the LSS’s or God’s will. I do not claim 
that knowledge of God’s plan or for what is a good or a valuable choice for us will have no 61 
 
impact on our behaviour and character, but I think that even then it is still possible for 
human beings to rebel and refuse God’s love. Moreover, it is a common feature in every 
day life that people do not always do the right thing even if they have enough good reasons 
to do so. It is evident that people defy authority; there will always be those who do not 
agree or who think that they know better.  In the case of the afterlives what would be 
intriguing to those who find themselves in these lives is that they know that they can live 
another life after this one. It may be the case that they like the fact that they will live 
another life; this leads them to think that it is fine to fail to be reconciled to God (or reach 
for the exit).  
Recall that in section 2, I have argued that the description which Hick gives to human 
beings’ nature is one which does not guarantee that humans will act well or according to 
God’s plan in each and every situation in which they find themselves. Since their salvation 
can only be guaranteed once they are transformed into ‘children of God’ it is not obvious 
that while in the process of transformation or soul-making they will not choose something 
less than what is best for them; especially if they are still vulnerable to the temptations of 
their imperfect environment and they carry an imperfect nature. 
If  Hick  is  not  convinced  so  far,  we  can  think  of  examples  from  the  Judaeo-Christian 
tradition which show that people, even if they were in God’s presence and knew what the 
right thing to do was, exercised their free will and disobeyed nevertheless.
195 An example 
to support my claim can be found in the Old Testament in the story of Moses and the water 
from the rock.
196 Moses was in the presence of God. As far as the scriptures hold, the 
people in the Old Testament could talk to God, and God was present to those who believed 
in him. This is the story: The people of Israel became thirsty while wandering in the desert 
after their flight from Egypt. The people began fighting and grumbling with Moses, who 
asked for help from God. God listened to his call and told him to touch with his hand a 
rock so that water would come out. But, as the story goes, Moses disobeyed God. He did 
not touch the rock with his hand but with his stick, and after that we are informed that his 
punishment was not to see the Promised Land. This example shows that even if human 
beings have knowledge of God and know what the right thing to do is, it is still possible 
that some will disobey or act in bad ways because human beings exercise their freedom of 
choice. 
                                                 
195 Hick holds that figures such as Mother Teresa or/and saints even if closer to moral and spiritual perfection 
are still vulnerable to temptations despite their closeness to God. 
196 Old Testament, Exodus 17:1–7 62 
 
This  brings  us  to  my  second  point  of  criticism.  If  in  the  lives  to  come  there  is  the 
possibility  of  refusing  God  then  it  seems  that  not  all  lives  will  be  progressive  in 
character.
197 The afterlives will not necessarily be progressive. If some human beings do 
not grow in morality and spirituality during one progressive life but become worse then I 
do not think that there is any good reason to hold that their next life will be a progressive 
one. 
Let us return to the labyrinth scenario and suppose that on your 15
th time in the labyrinth 
you refused to find the exit and you have woken up for the 16
th time in the labyrinth. 
According to Hick, the experiences which you will go through this time will be different 
than last time. This is because he believes that each (future) life is different than previous 
lives because its content depends on your level of moral and spiritual progress which entail 
that you require different experiences in each after life. If during your 15
th reappearance in 
the labyrinth you not only chose something else over the exit but also made that choice on 
reasons which were different than the reasons you acted on during your 14
th reappearance, 
then I will assume that the life you will have in your 16
th appearance in the labyrinth will 
be a step back from the one which you have had in the 15
th time. This is because the good 
character  which  you  developed  up  to  a  point  in  the  15
th  visit  to  the  labyrinth  was 
‘destroyed’ when you refused to exit the labyrinth. The 16
th time might be a life in which 
you still have to progress into a child of God, but the life you will live will not have the 
character which your 15
th reappearance had. It will be a step back for you.  
Extrapolating from the labyrinthean scenario, I want to hold that if some human beings do 
not grow in morality and spirituality in one progressive life but become ‘worse’ or stay the 
same  because  they  make  the  wrong  choices,  then  their  next  afterlife  will  not  be  a 
progressive one. Reappearing in the labyrinth for the 16
th time with a character which 
represents a level of moral development which is not as great as the one in the 15
th time 
would suggest that it is not a progressive life. There will be no progress made by you 
during your 15
th reappearance, so it is not obvious how your 16
th reappearance would be 
progressive. If human beings have genuine freedom to choose to perform different acts 
then it is not obvious that they will choose God. If they choose not to act according to 
God’s will, then their next intermediate life would not be at a level of moral development 
as high as in their previous life so it cannot be a progressive one. If it is not a progressive 
one then there is no guarantee that there will be a point when all will achieve salvation. 
                                                 
197 Hick says that progressively ‘higher’ worlds are worlds which are the environment of ever more morally 
and spiritually perfect modes of existence. See Hick (1976), p. 463. 63 
 
4. Epistemic distance and genuine freedom 
Hick holds that the ‘epistemic distance’ caused by God’s hiddenness is a required measure 
for  genuine  human  freedom.  ‘Epistemic  distance’  is  not  distance  in  space  but  in 
knowledge. In order for human beings to live as free finite persons in God’s presence, God 
must not be evident to them.
198 In order to have significant autonomy in relation to God, 
humans must be in epistemic distance from God. Hick says that God has made the world to 
look ‘as if there were no God’. He maintains that ‘the world must be to man, to some 
extent at least, etsi deus non daretur, “as if there were no God”. God must be a hidden 
God, veiled by His creation’.
199 God can make room for human freedom only if he is 
hidden and at the same time ‘readily found by those who are willing to exist in the divine 
presence’.
200 The ‘soul-making’ process can only be realized in this setting. The freedom 
to choose to love God is guaranteed by the creation of human creatures which are prone to 
suffering and pain but which also assures that the choice to love God will not be coerced in 
any way. In a similar way, the freedom to make a voluntary cognitive choice to believe that 
God exists is assured by the fact that the world can be interpreted without reference to 
God. 
Given Hick's ‘soul-making theodicy’, in which suffering and pain are essential elements 
for the transformation of human beings and their salvation, and given Hick's notion of 
‘epistemic distance’ as a required element for genuine freedom and autonomy I propose 
the following criticisms:  
1.  If God remains hidden in the lives to come, then there is no guarantee that people 
will believe in His existence and consequently, no guarantee that they will love 
Him. 
2.  The Bardo state, which Hick presents, is one way for God to reveal himself to 
human beings. That is, human beings can understand through their experience of 
the Bardo state that God, or something analogous i.e. a being with supreme power 
and knowledge, exists. It seems that God does not remain hidden in the lives to 
come. 
                                                 
198 John Hick, The Fifth Dimension: An Exploration of the Spiritual Realm (Oxford: One World, 2004), p. 43.  
199 John Hick, Arguments for the Existence of God (London & Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1970), p. 318. 
200 Hick (2004), pp. 43–44. 64 
 
Firstly, according to Hick, God is hidden in the earthly life. Humans come to believe in 
God’s existence and consequently come to love Him only by willing to believe in God. 
However, it is evident that humans have been created in an environment with real pain and 
suffering but this is not fact enough evidence on its own to justify belief in God. Most 
human beings have not believed in God’s existence and have not acted according to God’s 
will by the time of their death. The purpose of the afterlives, in Hick’s account, is to 
provide this opportunity; to believe in God and come to love Him. I argue that if freedom 
of choice is important and can be genuine only if God remains hidden then God has to 
remain hidden in their afterlives as well. Hick holds that it is the environment around us 
and our cognitive freedom which help us interpret the world as a place of soul-making and 
acknowledge that God exists and so believe in Him and love Him. If awareness of God’s 
existence comes only through faith that He exists and this is the case in the afterlives then 
there is no guarantee that anyone will come to God in faith and love. If there is no more 
evidence for God’s existence in the afterlives than there is in the earthly world, and if the 
environment in the afterlives is similar to the earthly environment, then it is not obvious 
that the process of restoration which Hick has in mind will ever be fulfilled or even begin 
in  the  case  of  the  worst  of  sinners.  The  afterlives  will  not  guarantee  more  success  in 
salvation for all than the earthly life. With no guidance in the afterlife then it would seem 
that the process that Hick has in mind will be endless and does not guarantee that all will 
come to God in faith. 
A person has genuine freedom, in Hick’s view, when he is able to understand, to choose 
and  decide  between  alternative  courses  of  action.  I  argued  that  to  believe  in  God’s 
existence presupposes that the individual knows what the alternatives are and makes a free 
choice to act. So how can people in the afterlives know what is morally appropriate and 
how can they achieve salvation if God is hidden from them? An important aspect of Hick’s 
account is that religious experience comes to those who believe. Faith is required in order 
to realize that you live a virtuous life in the presence of God. Oddly, as a person cannot 
have a religious experience unless he already believes in the existence of God. It would 
seem that the people in the afterlives would have to believe in the existence of God and 
then the evidence will become obvious.
201 In the case of the worst sinners who have never 
                                                 
201 Robert Mesle makes a similar observation when examining Hick’s argument on God’s hiddenness. He 
argues that ‘[t]o say that we must first make the deeper moral commitment to love God and then the evidence 
will become obvious is simply to beg the question…A genuinely free choice about faith must presuppose that 
we know what we are choosing for or against’. See Robert Mesle, ‘Does God Hide from Us?: John Hick and 
Process Theology on Faith, Freedom and Theodicy’, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 24, 
No. 1/2, The Problem of Evil (Jul. - Sep., 1988), p. 103. 65 
 
looked for God, the process of restoration may not even start.
202 Moreover, in the case of 
those who are in some sense virtuous but non-religious, it is not obvious that the process of 
restoration will ever come to an end even for them. If the process of restoration begins 
once  humans  believe  in  God’s  existence  it  is  not  clear  that  restoration  will  come  to 
completion. Those human beings who will be reappearing in other lives would be in the 
same state as they were in their earthly lives. They would be ignorant of God’s existence in 
an environment in which they have to find God themselves. 
Moreover, if the  environments that the people will find themselves in are of pain and 
suffering, and with no evidence of God’s presence, I do not see how they can learn to love 
a God who not only does not give them any signs of His existence but also lets them suffer 
in order to achieve reconciliation. If from the beginning the individual does not believe in 
God’s existence then the pain and suffering which he will have to suffer in order to begin 
the process of restoration will not be experienced as something which will lead to a greater 
good—reconciliation with God. The pain and suffering will not be experienced differently 
than the way it was experienced in the earthly life and the question will remain, why is 
there so much evil in the world?  
Secondly, Hick holds that every time human beings die, before they reappear in the next 
world, they would go through the Bardo state in which they are challenged in various 
ways. The purpose of this state is mainly for self-discovery. Depending on their response 
to  these  challenges,  God  relocates  them  in  appropriate  worlds.  We  might  say  that  the 
Bardo state is one way for God to reveal Himself to human beings. That is, human beings 
can understand, through their experience of the Bardo state that God, or something similar 
i.e. a being with supreme power and knowledge, exists. 
If  human  beings  can  recognize  some,  let  us  say,  of  God’s  characteristics  during  their 
experiences in the Bardo state and thus acknowledge God’s existence then it seems that 
God is not hidden in the sense that Hick wants to hold. If they know that God exists in 
some way or another then it would seem that the genuine freedom which Hick talks about 
is  not  available  anymore.  The  existence  of  the  Bardo  state  and  the  existence  of  the 
afterlives  undermine  Hick’s  notion  of  ‘epistemic  distance’.  If  there  is  no  ‘epistemic 
                                                 
202 Paul Helm asks Hick to explain how God cannot be known by human beings while, on the one hand, 
believing  that  all  religious  positions  are  partial  insights  into  one  infinite  whole,  and  on  the  other  hand, 
claiming  that  God  cannot  be  definitely  known  by  anyone.  Paul  Helm,  ‘Are  they  That  Be  Saved?’  in 




distance’ then, and if we also have in mind that Hick argues that ‘epistemic distance’ is a 
necessary element for genuine human freedom, we have to conclude that God does not 
leave  any  room  for  genuine  human  autonomy.  If  God  reveals  himself  to  His  human 
creatures, making clear that He exists it seems that He violates the same autonomy and 
freedom which He gave them in the first place. Moreover, we may say that only in the first 
life, which is according to Hick the earthly life, God is hidden, and so only in that initial 
life do human beings have genuine freedom of choice. Once they begin to reappear in other 
environments and worlds, the importance of the ‘epistemic distance’ is undermined and 
Hick’s notion of human freedom is at risk.
203  
Furthermore, even if people would have knowledge that God exists this, nevertheless, is 
not enough to achieve salvation. Hick argues that humans not only have to believe in 
God’s existence but they also have to love Him. I argued in section three, that human 
beings can act against God’s will and are free to choose something bad even if they have 
good reasons not to. Even if God reveals Himself to human beings in order to assist them, 
let us say, in searching for Him it is not obvious that they will come to love Him. Even if 
humans have an awareness of God from the Bardo state and have freedom of choice this 
does not entail that it is impossible that some will refuse God in every single life. 
To  summarize  my  arguments:  Firstly,  Hick’s  notion  of  ‘epistemic  distance’  and  his 
account of God’s hiddenness present some intractable problems for his account. God’s 
hiddenness and ‘epistemic distance’ are important for genuine human freedom. God is 
hidden in the earthly life and it is up to humans to choose whether or not to believe in Him 
and love Him. Most humans die without ever knowing God and His love and so God gives 
more opportunities to make this happen in future lives. If humans are to have genuine 
freedom in the lives to come then God has to remain hidden. However, if in the afterlives 
God remains hidden and the environment in which humans are set is an environment of 
real and apparent suffering and pain similar to the earthly environment then there is no 
guarantee  that  people  will  believe  in  God’s  existence  and  love  Him.  Secondly,  the 
                                                 
203 I am aware that William Rowe has an objection which uses the same argument as me in ‘Paradox and 
Promise—Hick’s  solution  to  the  Problem  of  Evil’.  His  argument,  contrary  to  mine,  focuses  on  God’s 
goodness.  He  argues  against  the  possibility  of  having  genuine  freedom  and  that  a  notion  of  ‘epistemic 
distance’ seems useless. He holds that God creating human beings in an ‘epistemic distance’ from Him does 
not seem like the action of a good God. He agrees that if God were present to His human beings then they 
would be compelled to respond to Him. However, even if human beings will have a very good reason to 
respond to God, it would not compel them to do so. Therefore, ‘epistemic distance’ is not necessary for 
genuine  freedom  and  it  is  questionable  what  good  is  served  by  the  human  beings’  state  of  ‘epistemic 
distance’ from God. See William Rowe, ‘Paradox and Promise: Hick's Solution to the Problem of Evil’, in 
Problems in the Philosophy of Religion: Critical Studies of the Work of John Hick, H. Hewitt Jr., ed. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 115. 67 
 
existence of the Bardo state and the existence of the afterlives, I argue, undermine Hick’s 
notion of freedom. The existence of the Bardo state puts pressure on Hick’s notion of 
‘epistemic distance’  and the importance of the  notion of God’s hiddenness.  If humans 
know that God exists then the ‘epistemic distance’ is compromised and so the genuine 




















In  this  chapter,  I  argued  that  Hick  fails  to  show  that  salvation  is  guaranteed  for  each 
individual  life.  Firstly,  if  Hick  wishes  to  maintain  that  human  beings  have  genuine 
freedom, he will have to permit their eternal fate to be based on the choices they make and 
the character which they cultivate for themselves. If he does so, then he must concede that 
there is no guarantee that some people will come to God in faith and trust. Secondly, I 
argued  that  the  possibility  of  having  memories  of  previous  lives  in  the  lives  to  come 
presents the following problem for Hick: human beings might choose salvation for the 
wrong reasons or might deliberately choose to prolong their residence in the intermediate 
states. Both of these reasons suggest that there is there is not guarantee that all will be 
saved.  Thirdly,  since  the  intermediate  afterlives  occur  in  environments  similar  to  the 
earthly one there should be opportunities of dismissal and refusal similar to these available 
in  the  earthly  life.  If  an  individual  can  exercise  his  freedom  of  choice  in  such  an 
environment then clearly there is no guarantee that he will choose not to be reconciled to 
God in any life, so Hick’s afterlives are not necessarily progressive. Finally, I argued that 
reconciliation with God cannot be achieved if humans do not exercise freedom which is 
warranted by God’s hiddenness. On the other hand, salvation is not guaranteed if humans 
have no awareness of God. I conclude that Hick’s account of progressive afterlives makes 
his universalism weak and leads us to reject it. 
In the next chapter, I examine Thomas Talbott’s account. Talbott, like Hick, argues that 
God’s love demands that all will be reconciled to Him in the end. His rejection of the 
doctrine of hell differs from Hick’s account in that he argues that no one could make a free 
and responsible choice to reject God’s love in light of the eternal misery of hell. To this 
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Chapter Four: Thomas Talbott’s Universalism 
 
Introduction 
Thomas  Talbott  rejects  the  doctrine  of  eternal  hell  in  favour  of  Christian  necessary 
universalism.
204 He argues that it is necessarily true that if God is the all-powerful and all-
loving being which Christianity affirms, then all human beings will be saved in the end. It 
is logically impossible that some people will, despite God’s best efforts to save them, 
freely and irrevocably reject God and thus separate themselves from God forever.
205  
Talbott’s account of universal salvation hinges on three important concepts: (i) his concept 
of God’s loving nature, (ii) his concept of free and responsible choice and (iii) his concept 
of post-mortem punishment as ‘forcibly imposed punishment’. Talbott holds that human 
creation  is  a  process  whereby  God,  firstly,  brings  all  His  human  beings  into  being  as 
independent and rational agents, and secondly, reconciles all both to Himself and to each 
other.
206 An essential part to the whole redemptive process whereby God transforms His 
human creatures into children of God is that those humans exercise their moral freedom—
that they choose freely one way or the other in the environment in which they are placed. 
All free persons will eventually turn to God in some finite amount of time after becoming 
fully informed about the source of their supreme happiness. God is love and the source of 
human  happiness.  In  loving  humans  God  wills  for  them  exactly  what,  at  the  most 
fundamental  level,  they  want  for  themselves.
207  And  what  they  want  is  to  experience 
supreme happiness. Since God is the source of supreme human happiness, He will seek to 
promote of necessity this kind of happiness in every single person and so will save all in 
the end. Even the worst sinners will be reconciled to God through post-mortem curative 
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punishment.  God  will  bring  all  human  beings  to  the  point  where  they  ‘voluntarily, 
wholeheartedly, and joyfully submit [their] wills to him’.
208  
In this chapter,  I argue  that Talbott’s universalism fails to convince us that all human 
beings will be saved in the end by focusing on two of his claims: that God will achieve 
universal  salvation  through  inflicting  unbearable  suffering  as  a  forcibly  imposed 
punishment, and that no one can freely reject God’s love. The chapter has two parts. In the 
first one, I explain Talbott’s main views of God’s loving nature and his relationship with 
His human beings, his concept of free and responsible choice and his concept of ‘forcibly 
imposed punishment’. This prepares the ground for the second part of the chapter where I 
give three arguments to show that Talbott’s accounts of curative punishment and freedom 
of choice are inadequate to show how salvation is guaranteed to each and every individual 












                                                 




1. God’s relationship with His human creatures and human disobedience 
The argument that Talbott proposes as to why it is impossible not to choose God arises 
from his view of what makes a choice or decision coherent, and his view of God’s nature 
and His relationship with His human creatures. To explain why a decision freely to reject 
God is incoherent and hence impossible, Talbott offers an account of what it might mean to 
embrace an eternal destiny. According to Talbott, one freely chooses an eternal destiny 
only under the following three necessary conditions: 
(i)  the choice must be ‘fully informed’  
(ii)  the agent has to have ‘a minimal degree of rationality’  
(iii)  a person ‘never comes to regret the choice’ once the person making the choice 
gets what he wants.
209  
A fully informed decision is defined as a decision which does not rest upon ‘ignorance’, 
‘misinformation’ or ‘deception’ of any kind and which is not influenced by bondage to 
unhealthy  desires.  A  person  freely  chooses  an  eternal  destiny  only  if  he  has  full 
understanding of exactly what he chooses.  
The second necessary condition of free choice is ‘a minimal degree of rationality on the 
part of the one who acts freely’.
210 Talbott oddly enough does not give a clear account of 
what it means for someone to have a minimal degree of rationality. This creates a problem 
for his account which I examine in the second part of the chapter.  
One freely chooses an eternal destiny if he never comes to regret the choice he has made at 
some later time.
211 If someone comes to regret a choice—that is wishing that he had never 
made it in the first place—that would prove either that he ‘incorrectly assessed some aspect 
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of the choice when making it, in which case it was not fully informed’ or the choice was 
determined by some kind of compulsion in which case it was not truly free.
212 In the case 
where  human  free  choices  have  unintended  or  unforeseen  consequences,  and  these 
consequences are such that if they were foreseen someone would have chosen otherwise, 
then those consequences have not been freely embraced.
213 So Talbott holds that someone 
freely  embraces an eternal destiny  and never  comes to regret the chosen destiny if he 
pursues that destiny both in his original choice as well as later, he attains it at the end, and 
possesses ‘full disclosure of truth about the nature of that destiny’.
214 
After presenting the conditions for freely embracing an eternal destiny, Talbott turns to 
investigate what it would mean for someone to make a free and fully informed decision to 
reject God forever. Talbott distinguishes two senses in which a person might reject God. 
He holds that 
[i]f a person refuses to be reconciled to God and the person’s refusal 
does not rest upon ignorance, or misinformation, or deception of any 
kind then, let us say that the person has made a fully informed decision 
to reject God; but if the person refuses to be reconciled to God and the 
person’s refusal does rest upon ignorance or deception of some kind, 
then  let  us  say  that  the  person  has  made  a  less  than  fully  informed 
decision to reject God.
215 
Regarding the second sense of someone rejecting God, Talbott argues that any decision to 
reject God that arises from ignorance, misinformation, deception and bondage to unhealthy 
desires is by definition not fully informed. Hence the destiny apart from God is not freely 
embraced.
216 These conditions are obstacles to free choice on his conception. If someone is 
ignorant or deceived about the true consequences of his choices then he cannot embrace 
those consequences freely. If someone suffers from a deception which does not permit him 
to see God’s true nature then he cannot reject the true God freely.
217 A person who rejects a 
caricature of a god, instead of the true God and chooses an eternal destiny without full 
appreciation of what this destiny entails, does not freely embrace that destiny.
218 Finally, if 
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someone is in bondage to unhealthy desires this means that he is overwhelmed by these 
desires so that they causally necessitate his choice of the object of desire and so he cannot 
desire anything apart from those objects. Talbott argues that as long as human beings are 
subject  to  these  conditions—ignorance,  misinformation,  deception  and  bondage  to 
unhealthy  desires—they  will  ‘undoubtedly  misjudge  their  real  wants  and  yearnings 
repeatedly  and  especially  the  means  of  satisfying  them’.
219  Ignorance,  deception, 
misinformation and bondage to unhealthy desires render a less than fully informed decision 
to reject God intelligible, but also render it less than fully free.
220 
Regarding the first sense of someone rejecting God, Talbott argues that if a person is fully 
informed,  then  there  will  be  no  coherent  motive  for  a  decision  to  reject  God.  The 
impossibility of someone having a  coherent motive for rejecting God forever  gains its 
force from Talbott’s particular view of God’s metaphysical nature and His relationship 
with His human creatures.  
God is love and the ultimate source of human happiness. As a loving creator, He seeks to 
promote each human being’s best interest. In loving human beings, God wills for them 
only what they, at the most fundamental level, will for themselves. He wills for them that 
they  should  experience  ‘supreme  happiness’,  that  their  ‘deepest  yearnings  should  be 
satisfied’ and that all their ‘needs should be met’.
221 Since what is best for human beings is 
supreme happiness, and since God is the ultimate source of all human happiness it follows 
that separation from God will only lead to misery and suffering. A person, says Talbott, 
cannot reject the ultimate source of happiness without rejecting his ‘deepest desires and 
yearnings and without choosing perpetual misery … as well’.
222 Given that God is the 
ultimate source of human happiness, it follows not only that nothing seems to qualify as a 
motive for rejecting God, but also that anyone  in a position to make a fully informed 
decision would have the strongest conceivable motive not to reject God.
223 Once someone 
sees clearly that God is the ultimate source of human happiness and that separation from 
God can bring only greater and greater misery into his life and into the lives of others, ‘an 
intelligible motive for such rebellion no longer seems possible’.
224  
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Talbott argues that experience shows that human beings may jeopardize some future good 
in order to satisfy some present desire, especially if they only have an abstract knowledge 
of some possible danger lurking in the distant future. As long as misery lies in the distant 
future, someone can discount it or not assign it the appropriate weight. However, Talbott 
holds that once intense misery ‘thrusts itself into immediate consciousness, it becomes 
harder and harder and finally impossible to ignore’.
225 So a person in a state of prolonged 
misery, such as the state the damned will experience in hell, would know all the relevant 
facts about the source of human happiness and would suffer from no more illusions about 
his misery or its source. Knowing these things, he would have no possible motive for 
freely embracing a destiny apart from God.
226 A decision to embrace a destiny apart from 
God cannot survive without regret once there has been a full disclosure of truth about that 
chosen destiny.
227 
It is important to have in mind that Talbott, like most universalists, affirms libertarian 
freedom.
228 A necessary condition to this kind of freedom, he says, is absolute clarity of 
vision. Let me explain this notion. His view that each person will come to embrace God 
freely in the libertarian sense centres on a particular view which he has on first-person 
accounts of dramatic conversions. In order to hold that the choice for reconciliation to God 
is  free  in  a  non-deterministic  way  he  argues  for  the  possibility  of  the  right  kind  of 
compulsion by which God would elicit from a sinner an act of submission full of love. He 
describes the right kind of compulsion as: 
[a]  stunning  revelation…one  that  provides  clear  vision  and  compelling 
evidence,  thereby  altering  one’s  belief’s  in  a  perfectly  rational  way  [and 
which] does not compel behavior in the same way that threatening someone 
with a sword might. A sword…provides no evidence for the belief its wielder 
seeks to influence and therefore has no power to alter such a belief in some 
rational way.
229 
Clarity of vision and understanding, or even a stunning revelation of truth, removes every 
reason for rejecting God and provides compelling reasons to accept God’s love. If someone 
is fully informed, then he has clarity of vision about what is in his best interest—that God 
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is the source of supreme happiness. One cannot then make a fully informed decision to 
reject God. If, however, while knowing what is best for him, he continually rejects his own 
deepest desires and yearnings and chooses perpetual misery for himself, he exhibits a kind 
of irrationality which is incompatible with free choice.
230 If a fully informed person would 
have the strongest conceivable motive not to reject God  and the strongest  conceivable 
motive to be reconciled to God then a fully informed decision to reject God would have to 
be  irrational  in  a  very  strong  sense,  but  also  impossible.
231  It  is  not  possible  that  an 
individual would make a fully informed but free decision to reject God.  
Talbott concludes that there is no coherent motive to reject God. If a person is not fully 
informed then he is no position to justifiably reject the true God, and if he is fully informed 
then he is incapable of rejecting God. In neither case is a person free to reject the true God. 
The idea of a person rejecting God forever ‘is deeply incoherent’.
232 Whereas a freely 
embraced destiny in fellowship with God is quite possible, a freely embraced destiny apart 
from God seems not to be possible at all.
233  
Talbott’s argument that fully informed choice can never lead us to reject God, if correct, is 
sufficient to defend the impossibility to someone rejecting God forever. Talbott also has 
another argument in defending the logical impossibility of someone rejecting God forever 
that I present in the following section. 
 
2. No one can reject freely and irrevocably God forever 
The logically impossibility of someone rejecting God forever is defended by Talbott with a 
two-fold thesis:  
first,  God  loves  all  created  persons  only  if  it  is  his  intention  to  secure 
blessedness—that is supreme worthwhile happiness—for each of them, and 
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second,  that  the  eternal  misery  of  a  single  person  would  undermine  the 
blessedness of all others.
234  
According  to  Talbott,  blessedness  or  supremely  worthwhile  happiness  is  the  kind  of 
happiness that could survive a complete disclosure of truth about the universe. It is the kind 
of  happiness  which  cannot  rest  upon  deception  or  false  beliefs.  It  is  also  the  kind  of 
happiness that one possesses only when one is filled with love for others.  
Given the above conditions, Talbott argues that it is logically impossible that God could 
produce such happiness in some created persons without also producing it in all others.
235 
A loving creator would, of necessity, seek to promote this kind of happiness in his loved 
ones.
236  Talbott  holds  that  God’s  love  is  inclusive.  That  is,  it  binds  people’s  interests 
together. Blessedness in one person requires blessedness in others and one person’s ruin 
implies the ruin of others.
237 The choice of rejecting God forever would undermine the 
very possibility of supreme worthwhile happiness both in the one making the choice and in 
everyone else.
238 The misery of those in hell would inevitably undermine that blessedness 
of those in heaven. The more one is filled with love for others, the unhappier one becomes 
in knowing the unhappiness of his loved ones. If the blessed know that their loved ones are 
in hell afflicted with unbearable suffering, and know that God could have saved them but 
did not, they can never be happy.
239 To love God, says Talbott, would entail the blessed 
respecting God, but also approving of his actions, and being grateful for what he has done 
for them and bringing their will into conformity with his.
240 If the blessed know that God 
could have saved their loved ones but did not, then the redeemed cannot be truly happy in 
the presence of God and so cannot truly love him. Thus, necessarily, God would not create 
a world in which some persons are damned and in which they freely reject God forever.
241  
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Given the Christian understanding of God—that of a being who is all-wise, all powerful 
and all-loving—Talbott maintains that ‘the very idea of someone making a free and fully 
informed decision to reject God forever, or of someone freely embracing an eternal destiny 
apart  from  God,  is  deeply  incoherent  and  therefore  logically  impossible’.
242  But  a 
universalist account is incomplete without an account of how the sinners will come to 
repent for their evil actions and request reconciliation. Talbott, just like Hick, gives us an 
account of what the next life holds for the sinners, to which I turn now. 
 
3. Punishment and the life to come 
In the introduction of the thesis, we saw that most universalists do not reject the idea of 
unbearable suffering in the life to come. On the contrary, they argue that most people will 
go through temporary punishment in order to achieve salvation. Suffering from punishment 
is important for redemption since it educates and restores the sinner’s moral character. 
Talbott argues that hell might be a place of unbearable suffering; however, it would be a 
merely temporary state.
243 His universalism gains force from a particular view he endorses 
of  hell  as  ‘forcibly  imposed  punishment’  for  sin,  rather  than  as  a  freely  embraced 
condition.
244 Hell, he argues, will be compelling evidence to change the sinners’ hearts. He 
does not understand ‘unbearable suffering’ and ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ in the same 
way that they are understood in traditional accounts of hell. He holds that the ‘good in even 
the worst of sinners—the indestructible image of God if you will—can itself become a 
source of “unbearable suffering”.’
245 That is, a sinner’s sorrow, remorse and guilt would 
become a source of unbearable torment for the sinner; and as long as these unforeseen and 
unintended consequences of his evil actions ‘fall under God’s providential control and 
occur  entirely  against’  the  sinner’s  will,  they  are  in  this  sense,  ‘forcibly  imposed’.
246 
Talbott maintains that insofar God ‘uses a [person’s] suffering as a means of correction, or 
as a means of encouraging repentance’ we can say that the person has endured a ‘forcibly 
imposed punishment’ for his evil actions.
247 
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Talbott follows John Hick’s account and holds that the purpose of the earthly realm is that 
of ‘soul-making’. It is evident then that the process of ‘soul-making’ has not come to a 
completion for some persons by the time of their death and so they are not in a position to 
accept  God’s  love  and  thus  salvation.  This  leads  Talbott  to  argue  that  since  God  is 
omnipotent love, He will permit to those who have refused Him to continue to exist in 
other environments and/or spiritual realms where they can start over and develop a new 
and better character, and in which God can progressively remove their false beliefs. God 
would place people in environments similar to the earthly one where they are subject to 
illusion,  deception,  real  harm  and  suffering  of  a  temporary  kind,  and  where  they  are 
required to take some responsibility for their actions.
248  
Damnation, according to Talbott, is a process whereby the damned gradually learn from 
experience the true meaning of separation from God. God can change the sinners into 
children of God by progressively making clear to them that making evil choices and having 
a vicious character is ultimately not in their true self-interest. In order for this progressive 
change in character to be guaranteed, God must allow the damned to experience the full 
reality of what they have chosen, ‘however clear a revelation and however irresistible a 
means of correction such experience might be’.
249 A well chosen punishment, he holds, 
may be the best means of communicating the implications of such rebellion insofar as 
punishment  expresses  God’s  continuing  love  and  forgiving  attitude.
250  Punishment  and 
forgiveness  have  the  same  object  and  goal—that  is,  reconciliation.  Once  the  damned 
clearly understand, i.e. once they are, as Talbott puts it, ‘fully informed’ that their suffering 
is  the  result  of  their  evil  actions,  and  hence  all  ignorance,  deception  and  bondage  to 
unhealthy desires is removed, there can be no possible motive for continuing to do evil and 
for  rejecting  God.  Since  motiveless  choices  are  impossible,  according  to  Talbott,  the 
damned can thus no longer continue to reject God. If separation from God is a horror that 
no one rational enough to qualify as a free agent could possibly prefer to the bliss of union 
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with God, ‘then the very idea of someone freely embracing forever a life apart from God 
expresses a logical impossibility’.
251 
It is important to point out that Talbott claims that the more the damned cling to their 
illusions the more severe will be the means and the more painful the processes whereby 
God shatters their illusions and frees them from sin.
252 The intense misery and unhappiness 
that their bad actions bring into their lives can serve as a redemptive purpose because they 
can provide in the end a compelling motive to repent. I argue in a following section, i.e. 
Part II, sec. 1, that Talbott in fact seems to endorse the kind of compulsion which he earlier 
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As we have seen, Talbott holds that God of necessity will save all human creatures and that 
reconciliation with God will be gained through the free response of human beings to God’s 
love. It is logically impossible that despite God’s best efforts to save all human beings, 
there will be some that will freely and irrevocably reject him. Talbott argues that there is 
no coherent motive for rejecting the ultimate source of supreme happiness and, given the 
relationship between God and His creatures, God in His love and wisdom ensures that in 
no possible world does a person reject him freely forever. In this part of the chapter, I 
argue that even if there is a plausible case for universalism, it is still possible that not all 
will  be  saved  based  on  the  accounts  Talbott  offers  on  human  freedom  of  choice  and 
curative punishment. Talbott’s account fails to show how all human beings will achieve 
salvation universalism fails and I give three arguments to defend my claim: 
1.  Unbearable suffering as forcibly imposed punishment does not guarantee that all 
sinners will eventually repent and be reconciled to God.  
2.  Talbott’s argument is unsuccessful in showing that the damned cannot freely reject 
God. He mistakenly takes for granted that free actions exclude irrational acts. 
3.  Salvation is not the result of human freedom since human autonomy is thwarted. 
 
1. Forcibly imposed punishment and the possibility of universal salvation 
While  Talbott  rejects  the  idea  of  hell  as  eternal,  he  gives  punishment  a  role  in  God’s 
salvific dealings with human beings. He seems to have in mind a version of what is more 
commonly  called  the  therapeutic  view  of  punishment,  according  to  which  ‘involuntary 
suffering or coercing treatment is designed and administrated for the purpose of restoring 
or rehabilitating the wrong doer’.
253 What is interesting here is that Talbott holds that the 
right  kind  of  punishment—intense  misery—can  cure  the  worst  sinner  given  the  right 
amount of time and lead him to accept God’s love. I agree that punishment can correct 
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rebellion, but the main problem with Talbott’s account is that it is not obvious that the 
forcibly  imposed  punishment  of  unbearable  torment  will  bring  about  the  damned’s 
repentance and acceptance of God. I propose three arguments in support of this claim: 
a.  It is not obvious that the ‘unbearable suffering’ of the sinners in hell which Talbott 
talks about will lead even the worst of the sinners to accept God’s love.
254 The 
description of the source of unbearable suffering as ‘the good—the indestructible 
image of God—within each person’ is not enough to guarantee that the damned in 
hell  would  not  continue  to  reject  God  forever.  Talbott  has  to  hold  that  the 
punishment is such as to make someone completely miserable and completely in 
pain.  
b.  If Talbott modifies his account and takes ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ to be the 
kind of punishment that makes someone completely miserable and completely in 
pain, then Talbott would be endorsing the sort of compulsion he has rejected as 
inappropriate  in  the  first  place.
255  This  in  turn  will  undermine  his  claim  that 
repentance and attainment of reconciliation under forcibly imposed punishment are 
free in a non-determined way. 
c.  Whether  or  not  the  punishment  is  truly  unbearable,  it  can  induce  genuine 
repentance and reconciliation to God only if punishment is seen as an act of a 
loving God. Talbott’s system does not guarantee that the damned will realize that 
their punishment is an act of God’s love. 
Talbott has to show that the kind of punishment he has in mind, firstly, is guaranteed to 
work so that the sinners will embrace God in faith and love, and secondly, that this kind of 
punishment does not invalidate human freedom. If we can show this, he faces a dilemma: 
one which makes his case for necessary universalism much less plausible. He would either 
have to modify his account of unbearable suffering and forcibly imposed punishment or 
give up his claim that there will be a point where all sinners will reconcile to God.
256 
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a. If suffering is bearable then it is possible that some will resist God 
In  section  three,  we  have  seen  that  Talbott  argues  that  the  good  in  even  the  worst  of 
sinners—the  indestructible  image  of  God  if  you  will—can  itself  become  a  source  of 
‘unbearable suffering’. So, for example, great suffering such as sorrow, guilt and remorse 
which results from bad actions can be a source of ‘unbearable torment’.
257 The unbearable 
suffering will be experienced as forcibly imposed punishment for someone as long as it 
occurs  under  God’s  providential  control  as  a  means  of  correction  or  as  a  means  of 
encouraging  repentance  and  is  against  someone’s  will.  Talbott  illustrates  his  point  by 
presenting the following case: suppose that a foolish married man has a frivolous affair 
with a woman who, unbeknownst to him, has an unstable personality. The woman’s fatal 
attraction to the man drives her to murder his wife and baby. The man’s ensuing sorrow, 
guilt and remorse, or in Talbott’s view the good / the indestructible image of God can 
become a source of unbearable suffering to him.
258 Since the unintended consequences 
were not freely chosen, the man’s suffering as a means of correction is forcibly imposed 
against his will. And this kind of suffering will serve to correct or to encourage repentance. 
However, the illustration that Talbott offers to explain how this kind of punishment would 
lead the sinners to repent presents a serious problem for this account. I argue that it does 
not guarantee that the wicked will be corrected or repent. I offer two reasons in support of 
my claim. 
Firstly, it might be possible in the cases of the worst sinners that the good within them—
the  indestructible  image  of  God—would  not  serve  as  ‘unbearable  suffering’.  The  case 
which Talbott presents is not a worst case scenario of a sinner. The unfaithful husband who 
still cares for his family and so feels sorrow and guilt when he finds out what his lover has 
done to them—killed them—is not the same as the case of murderers, rapists, paedophiles 
and so on who may not have this kind of relationship with their victims, friends or family. 
Someone can act in evil ways and feel no remorse about what he has done, whether or not 
the bad result was foreseen or intended. For example, the man who kills his wife and 
children because he finds out that his wife has an affair might feel no remorse or guilt if 
this is indeed what he wants to do. A paedophile, for example, may love his children, in a 
sick kind of way, but still feels no remorse or guilt for abusing them and messing up their 
lives for years. These cases show that the sinners do not feel remorse, guilt or sorrow in 
committing evil acts. I argue that the good / the indestructible image of God is insufficient 
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for these people to be caused unbearable guilty misery. Talbott surprisingly maintains that 
‘if the man in our example cared nothing for his wife and baby and had no worthwhile 
desires at all, then neither would the murders have been a source of torment for him’.
259 I 
find this claim quite strange because he admits that someone who does not have these 
kinds of feelings or the image of the good cannot suffer unbearable misery. So it seems to 
me  that  Talbott  might  have  something  else  in  mind  when  it  comes  to  the  kind  of 
punishment the sinners will have to suffer in order to repent and be reconciled to God. It 
seems that suffering which comes from the indestructible image of God would not suffice 
in bringing sinners (at least the worst kind) to repent for their sins and so to be reconciled 
to God. What he might have in mind is a kind of punishment which would inevitably lead 
all sinners to repent and accept God’s love. I will say more on this in the following section, 
when I will suggest that Talbott would have to modify his account of unbearable suffering 
in order to guarantee that all will be saved. 
Secondly, it is possible that the person who commits an evil act feels remorse, guilt and 
sorrow,  nevertheless,  is  able  to  switch  off  these  feelings.  If  the  suffering  is  not  truly 
unbearable but is the kind which results from feelings of remorse, guilt and so on, then it is 
possible that the wicked will find a way to suppress them and ignore them.
260 Consider the 
following case: a cannibal might feel bad about killing people in order to eat. But at the 
same time he can rationalize his actions or even stop caring about the pain his actions 
cause  to  others  by  convincing  himself  that  there  is  nothing  else  he  can  do  about  his 
condition. He can convince himself that there are no alternative options for him, that he is 
doing nothing wrong and so it will be best if he just accepts his condition no matter the 
consequences. Hence feelings of remorse and guilt would cease to affect him.  
Of course, Talbott could say that this person is self-deceived and self-deluded in thinking 
that he does nothing wrong, and that there are no other alternatives to his condition and so 
his choice is not really free. Based on what Talbott says about what makes an action free 
this would be true. However, the point I want to make here is not about the nature of the 
action but about the nature of the punishment which Talbott argues that all sinners will 
experience—painful emotions stemming from the indestructible image of God. I argue that 
it is possible that if the ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ is not punishment which makes 
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someone completely miserable and completely in pain then it is not obvious that the result 
of such punishment would be repentance. If the suffering, which the sinners will undergo, 
results from feelings of remorse, guilt, despair and so on, we can hold that some of the 
wicked,  if  not  all,  will  become  numb  to  the  evilness  of  their  actions  and  their 
consequences. They could deal with the torment by suppressing the good that causes the 
torment.
261 If the feelings the image of God produces are not a strong enough punishment 
to break through one’s evil nature then Talbott’s account cannot guarantee that all sinners 
will come to God. I will say more, in section three, on the reasons and the possible motives 
of why one would rather remain in hell forever than accept God. There I will be rejecting 
Talbott’s position that the damned cannot make a free decision to prefer hell to heaven. 
In the next section, I argue that Talbott's claim that all sinners will reach a point where they 
cannot but give in to God’s love is convincing if God will indeed inflict forcibly imposed 
punishment that is more than just the suffering which would result from the indestructible 
image  of  God.  However,  even  if  Talbott  modifies  his  account  in  this  way  it  still  is 
vulnerable to criticisms. 
 
b. Unbearable suffering as forcibly imposed punishment 
What follows from the above is that Talbott will have to modify his account of unbearable 
suffering or claim that not all sinners will reach a point where they will accept God’s love. 
Talbott in his paper ‘Misery and Freedom: reply to Walls’ explains that the expression 
‘unbearable  suffering’  in  his  account  is  the  kind  of  suffering  which  ‘signifies  intense 
misery of a kind that undermines altogether any capacity for joy or happiness’.
262 If the 
sinner totally misunderstands the source of his misery and moreover the source of supreme 
happiness, and clings to his illusions despite the suffering they produce, his suffering will 
become increasingly unbearable. This kind of unbearable suffering will lead the sinners to 
request reconciliation from God in trust and love. Talbott’s approach, however, is still 
vulnerable  to  criticism  even  with  this  clarification  of  what  is  involved  in  unbearable 
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suffering. He has to give good reasons for thinking that the punishment being increasing 
misery,  firstly,  guarantees  that  the  sinners  will  embrace  God  in  faith  and  love,  and 
secondly, that this kind of punishment does not invalidate human freedom. I argue that if 
he holds that misery in hell will be such as to make someone completely miserable and 
completely in pain then: 
(i)  Talbott will have to endorse the sort of compulsion he has rejected as inappropriate  
(ii)  This  in  turn  will  undermine  his  claim  that  repentance  and  attainment  of 
reconciliation under ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ are free in a non-determined 
way 
Talbott distinguishes two kinds of compulsion that God can use to ensure that all human 
beings will eventually be reconciled to Him. There is the kind of compulsion caused by 
stunning revelation which provides ‘clear vision’ and ‘compelling evidence’ thus helping 
someone to change his beliefs in a perfectly rational way and on the other hand, there is the 
way of compelling someone’s behaviour with ‘the threat of a sword’ which does not alter 
someone’s belief in any rational way.
263 He defends the first kind as the right kind of 
compulsion and argues that the unbearable suffering which the damned will undergo in 
hell serves as compelling evidence to help them recognize what their best interest is, and 
the  truth  about  their  actions  and  themselves.  It  is  important  here  to  point  out  that  for 
someone to have a clear vision is to have knowledge not only of the truths of the universe 
but also knowledge of God. The damned must gain a meaningful understanding of God as 
the source of supreme happiness, and an understanding of the relationship between God 
and them. Human beings must be reconciled to God in love, faith and trust. This is the 
appropriate loving relationship for God and human beings to have. Without entering and 
growing in this kind of relationship, there can be no revelation of the truth. Once they 
come to see what is best for them then they will genuinely want to change themselves and 
be reconciled to God.  
From the above it is obvious that such understanding and knowledge of God can only be 
attained willingly. It cannot be coerced or ‘implanted’ by any kind of punishment if the 
damned are to understand God as the source of supreme happiness. However, the kind of 
punishment that Talbott argues in favour of involves intense and unbearable suffering. If 
the  damned  continue  to  sin  and  remain  unrepentant  for  their  evil  actions  and  their 
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consequences, then it seems that their misery would become utterly and truly unbearable. 
If this is the case then it seems that Talbott endorses the second kind of compulsion. If the 
compelling evidence which God uses to change the damned’s beliefs is excruciating pain 
which becomes more and more unbearable, we can say that God does not use as a way of 
compulsion the kind of revelation which Talbott defends. God uses ‘the force of the sword’ 
to change people’s beliefs. If Talbott endorses the sort of compulsion he has rejected as 
inappropriate,
 then his claim that repentance and attainment of reconciliation to God under 
forcibly imposed punishment are free in a non-determined way is false. 
It is evident that human beings cannot physically and psychologically bear intense misery 
and suffering for a long time. They do not have the power or psychological ability to 
endure constant misery and so under great pressure and pain they ‘crack’.
264 For example, 
consider cases of people who are captive to the enemy and who suffer intense suffering, 
eventually revealing their government’s military secrets. These people are no longer able 
to handle the pain, they give in to their enemy’s demands; they conform to the will of their 
torturer or, in other cases, become mad. 
Returning  to  the  case  of  the  damned,  if  the  damned  undergo  punishment  which  is 
experienced as utter misery and suffering it is possible that they will reach a point where 
they would request salvation instead of damnation. However, this kind of request or choice 
will not be the appropriate kind of free choice, the kind that Talbott has in mind.
265 Talbott 
holds that those who will choose God will do so in faith, love, and trust. Reconciliation and 
repentance comes about willingly and so Talbott cannot hold that the choice of accepting 
God would be determined in any way. If, however, the damned undergo increasing misery, 
it is possible that their choice will be the result of coercion. If God would inflict greater 
and greater misery and physical pain on the damned in order to change their beliefs this 
will either coerce the damned to submit, or will drive them mad and even further away 
from God. The damned will be coerced in accepting God and so choose salvation for the 
wrong reasons. The sinner, being incapable of enduring intense misery and excruciating 
psychological and physical suffering for a long period of time would at some point crack, 
wish for this to end, and so request salvation. His decision will be solely based on his wish 
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to avoid further misery and pain. But this kind of coercion would be something that Talbott 
would want to avoid.  
Talbott holds that human beings love God when they respect and approve his actions, are 
grateful for what he has done for them, and their will conforms to his will.
266 If the damned 
repent so they can escape hell it is obvious that the relationship between God and His 
human creatures that Talbott has in mind is not achieved. Firstly, it would suggest that they 
did not approve God’s actions. Secondly, it would suggest that they are not grateful for the 
intense misery they suffered. Thirdly, it would suggest that their will is not in conformity 
with God’s will. From these we can say that the damned do not love God appropriately. If 
the damned do not love God appropriately and choose salvation in order to avoid more 
misery and suffering then it is obvious that they do not choose God for the right reasons. If 
they choose God for the wrong reasons, firstly, we can hold that they do not make a fully 
informed and thus free and responsible choice to reconcile to God, and secondly, they are 
not ready to be reconciled to God. Of a sinner who would accept salvation for the wrong 
reasons we can say that he accepts a caricature of a god, instead of the true God. He hence 
chooses an eternal destiny without full appreciation of what this destiny entails, and so 
does not freely embrace this destiny. What follows is that if the sinner does not accept the 
true  God,  and  so  his  request  for  salvation  is  the  result  of  a  less  than  fully  informed 
decision,  then  he  does  not  choose  God  freely.
267  Therefore,  it  is  not  obvious  that  the 
‘forcibly imposed punishment’ that Talbott talks about will necessarily elicit a free choice 
to accept God which is morally significant. If the sinner does not make a free choice to be 
reconciled to God, obviously he is not ready for salvation and God would not save him. 
God would have to wait until the damned chooses Him for the right reasons—something 
that cannot be guaranteed if ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ can lead someone to request 
salvation for the wrong reasons. If, however, Talbott holds that God would reconcile to 
Him even those who have chosen salvation for the wrong reasons, then we will be inclined 
to say that Talbott goes contrary to his own claim that reconciliation is achieved through 
love, faith and trust in God.  
From these above criticisms we can say that Talbott can either abandon his claim that 
‘forcibly imposed punishment’ guarantees that all will be saved in the end or his claim that 
salvation will be the result of a freely embraced destiny. In the next section, I focus on 
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Talbott's  claim  that  ‘forcibly  imposed  punishment’  can  induce  genuine  repentance  on 
behalf of the damned. I argue that this genuine repentance can be guaranteed if punishment 
is experienced as an act of a loving God, but that Talbott’s system cannot guarantee that 
punishment will be experienced as an act of a loving God. 
 
c. It is not obvious that the wicked will accept God’s love 
Talbott  holds  that  restoration  and  reconciliation  of  sinners  can  be  achieved  not  only 
through punishment but also through the sinner making amends for his wrong actions in a 
way that would cancel out the bad consequences of those actions. He holds that a well-
chosen punishment may be the best means of communicating an individual’s rebellion 
against God insofar as the punishment expresses God’s continuing love. Only when the 
sinners recognize God as the ultimate being, and their only source of ultimate happiness, 
through their suffering, will they begin to appreciate the meaning of their punishment and 
the true nature of their evil deeds. They will then ‘be on the road to redemption’.
268  
What is of importance here is Talbott’s claim that only when the damned recognize God as 
the ultimate being and the source of their happiness will they appreciate their punishment 
and  change  their  hearts.  I  argue  that  punishment  can  induce  genuine  repentance  and 
requests for reconciliation to God providing that punishment is seen as an act of a loving 
God, and also that the sinners are led to recognize their wrong actions and make amends 
for  them.  However,  Talbott’s  system,  as  we  have  argued,  does  not  guarantee  that  the 
damned will accept God’s love. It is possible that God would not be recognized as the 
ultimate loving being by the damned, and, as such, his actions will not be seen as acts of a 
loving God. So the punishment which the damned undergo would be experienced as a 
hateful thing. Consequently there may be some sinners who would not accept God. 
Talbott holds that the damned in hell will not have direct experience of God. At least not in 
the same way that the blessed will have. Absolute clarity can be achieved only through a 
progressive response to God’s will in faith, trust and love. Absolute clarity comes when 
human beings have responded to God’s will.
269 When humans have this kind of vision then 
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they are capable of freely and happily accepting God. When God, we can imagine, makes 
His first appearance in hell, of course some sinners will be so bad that they will not be 
fully informed about God’s nature and His intentions towards His human creatures. If the 
sinners are not ‘sufficiently equipped’ to appreciate the true God and recognize him as the 
source  of  their  supreme  happiness,  then  how  would  the  damned  know  that  they  are 
punished  instead  of  hatefully  hurt?  The  kind  of  punishment  which  Talbott  talks  about 
requires that the wicked person, firstly, accepts the authority of the one who punishes him, 
and secondly, that he understands that what he did was wrong. If he does not accept the 
authority of the one who punishes him and the badness of his actions, then he would think 
that he is unjustly hurt.  
I will argue that the forcibly imposed punishment which the damned will have to suffer 
could have the effect that Talbott argues for—that is, it could lead to knowledge of God’s 
nature  and  will,  and  consequently  the  repentance  of  the  sinners—only  if  the  damned 
recognize the following. Firstly, they will have to recognize God’s authoritative power—
that He is the ultimate being and that the intense misery they undergo is a form of remedial 
punishment. Secondly, they will have to understand that what they did was wrong. In one 
of his papers however, Talbott says that even if intense misery can reveal that something 
has gone terribly wrong, it cannot itself cancel the bad consequences of bad choices. It can 
reveal the true nature of separation, but it may not reveal how to overcome that separation. 
It  can  shatter  illusions  concerning  true  human  needs  and  the  conditions  of  human 
happiness,  but  it  cannot  by  itself  teach  humans  to  trust  God  or  to  love  Him 
wholeheartedly.
270 In response to this, I am inclined to say that without knowing God the 
damned cannot appreciate their punishment and cannot make amends for their evil acts. 
Talbott  contends  that  if  God  chooses  to  allow  the  sinner  ‘to  experience  the  chosen 
condition of being separated from every source of human happiness, then the resulting 
horror will at last shatter any illusion that some good is achievable apart from God’.
271 
However, it is not true that a punishment which is truly unbearable will inevitably shatter 
the illusions and deceptions which the damned have. It seems that just the opposite would 
be the case if the damned do not recognize God’s authority. And from what has been said 
so far it is possible that the dammed will not recognize the authority of God but might take 
God’s  actions  to  be  unfair  and  believe  that  the  suffering  they  undergo  is  unjustly 
distributed.  
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C.S. Lewis in his The Great Divorce presents several stories which illustrate well this kind 
of reaction towards God’s authoritative power. I use one here to make my point clearer. 
According to one of the stories, the traveller, in the story, witnesses the ghost of a man who 
encounters his murderer. The murderer is not in hell but he has received the beatific vision 
after he took responsibility for his actions, repented for his sins and asked to be reconciled 
to God. The murderer is sent to guide and help the ghost man and he asks the ghost man to 
join him and together reconcile to God. The ghost man, however, replies: ‘It’s all a clique, 
all a bloody clique…I’d rather be damned than to go along with you. I came here to get my 
rights see? ...I did not come here to be treated like a dog…’.
272 The ghost man (damned) 
finds it unfair that his murderer received God’s beatific vision and he did not.
 273 He finds 
it insulting that his murderer was sent instead of someone else to help him in his journey to 
reconciliation. Moreover, he finds it unfair that God did not punish his murderer for taking 
his  life  away.  This  particular  member  of  the  damned  is  in  hell  for  persisting  in  not 
recognizing God’s will and not forgiving his murderer. As long as the damned does not 
recognize God’s love for those who have repented and have been forgiven for even the 
worst crimes, and as long as he does not love those who have wronged him, then he can 
never be reconciled to God. 
The  above  story  can  help  us  maintain  that  the  damned  would  experience  the  intense 
suffering and pain they undergo in hell as an unjust and hateful thing in the following 
circumstances.  Firstly,  they  do  not  recognize  God  as  the  appropriate  distributor  of 
punishment. Secondly, they do not realize that their punishment is for their own good. And 
thirdly, they do not recognize that the only way to escape hell is by realizing the wrongness 
of  their  actions.  The  damned  cannot  accept  and  receive  forgiveness  unless  they  take 
responsibility for their evil acts, recognize God as their only source of happiness, and ask 
for  forgiveness.  The  process  of  reconciliation  can  begin  only  if  the  damned  make  a 
conscious choice to recognize God as the ultimate good. It might be the case that some of 
the damned would not wish to forget the sufferings and the unfair treatment they (or even 
their loved ones) have received during their earthly life and so hold a grudge against God. 
Instead of repenting, they might become angrier and more bitter.
274 If punishment is seen 
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as  an  act  of  a  loving  God  then  it  can  induce  repentance.  But  if  not  it  will  only  be 
experienced as a hateful thing. And if it is experienced as a hateful thing then the damned 
will not want their wills to conform to a God who is perceived to harm them. If, according 
to Talbott, human beings have to be fully informed and have to have a minimal degree of 
rationality in order to be able to recognize God’s authority and accept their punishment 
then  lack  of  these  will  prevent  the  damned  from  appreciating  their  punishment  and 
accepting God’s actions.  
I agree with Walls when he maintains that the more the damned move away from God by 
not recognizing Him as the ultimate source of their happiness and love ‘the more [they] 
harden their hearts and dull their consciences, the more they rationalize their sinful actions, 
the less they will be inclined to repent and be reconciled to God’.
275 If they find God unfair 
in His dealings with the blessed and the wicked, it is possible that the damned will refuse 
more and more of the ways in which God attempts to reconcile them to Him. The longer 
they resist, the easier it may become for them to continue doing so. In this sense, the doors 
of hell are locked from inside. In this section, I did not argue that Talbott’s necessary 
universalism  is  false  but  only  that  the  negation  of  universalism  is  consistent.  The 
punishment  model  which  Talbott  offers  does  not  guarantee  the  salvation  of  all  human 
beings and in particular reconciliation to God which is made out of trust, faith and love in 
God.  
 
2. Why can we not freely reject God?  
As we have seen, Talbott argues that a decision to reject God has to be ‘fully informed’. In 
other words, the decision cannot rest upon ignorance, deception or bondage to unhealthy 
desires. Given that God wills for His human creatures what they, at the most fundamental 
level,  will  for  themselves  (that  is  supreme  worthwhile  happiness),  it  follows  that  any 
person  in  a  position  to  make  a  fully  informed  decision  would  have  the  strongest 
conceivable motive not to reject reconciliation with God.
276 Someone who rejects what is 
best for him—reconciliation to God—without any motive for doing so, but having the 
strongest  conceivable  motive  for  refraining  from  such  a  rejection,  exhibits  irrational 
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behavior.  Irrationality  is  incompatible  with  free  choice.  Someone  who  acts  irrationally 
does not act freely, and a decision to reject God is not free if it is irrational. In this section, 
I argue that Talbott’s argument is not successful in showing that the damned cannot make a 
free and irrevocable rejection of God. I think that there are two problems with Talbott’s 
argument: 
a.  Full disclosure of truth does not guarantee that the sinners will reconcile to God. 
There is one case widely accepted in Christian tradition in which someone even in 
the presence of God nevertheless rejected God.  
b.  Talbott does not sufficiently explain what ‘fully informed’ and ‘a minimal degree 
of rationality’ mean. They can both be interpreted in such a way that would either 
make  Talbott’s  account  unintelligible  or  would  force  him  to  accept  that  some 
sinners will freely reject God.  
 
a. Full disclosure of truth does not guarantee that the sinners will reconcile with 
God 
Talbott argues that only those in heaven can appreciate the full horror of separation from 
God since they have experienced God’s love and wisdom. The inhabitants of heaven find 
themselves in the best and, as it seems, ultimate circumstances in which their decision to 
accept God’s love and attain it for eternity does not rest upon deception, ignorance or 
misinformation of any kind. So those who have a full experience of God and have received 
the beatific vision can never turn away from God.
277 However, usually proponents of the 
doctrine of hell who support libertarian free will respond to Talbott’s argument by saying 
that there is one case widely accepted in Christian Tradition in which someone has made a 
fully informed decision to reject God—Satan.
278 I will use the case of Satan to argue that 
Talbott’s view that no one can reject God once he has a full experience of Him is false.  
We can suppose that Satan had made a fully informed decision to reject God. Why suppose 
that? Satan was in God’s presence and if we follow Talbott’s argument, someone who is in 
God’s presence and has a full disclosure of truth cannot be ignorant or deceived about 
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God’s love, wisdom and intentions. Satan was placed in this situation. If he was in the 
presence of God and if he had a first hand experience of God’s love then he would have the 
strongest conceivable motive not to reject God. He was able to evaluate what is involved in 
loving and trusting God and presumably knew that He is the source of supreme happiness. 
Nevertheless, he did reject God. 
Talbott’s reply is that Satan‘s decision to reject God ‘hardly illustrates a fully informed’ 
decision.
279 Satan still has many illusions which need to be shattered so Satan’s decision to 
reject God was less than fully informed. Talbott seems to hold that by definition no one 
can ever make a fully informed decision to reject God. As we have seen he argues that 
even if there is someone who would make a fully informed decision to reject God, he 
would exhibit an irrational behaviour and as such, his decision to reject God would not be 
free. Satan acted irrationally and not freely because by rejecting God, Satan shows that he 
was deluded and self-deceived about what it is best for him. Therefore, his fully informed 
decision was in fact less than fully informed in that it rested upon some kind of deception 
because only then he could have rejected God.  
What is interesting about Talbott’s reply is that he does not say what kind of illusions the 
ones Satan had are. His answer seems to imply that even in the presence of God some who 
would have this kind of illusion would not accept God’s love. We can assume that these 
illusions must be of a different kind than regular illusions. Not even God’s presence and 
obvious  love  can  remove  them,  at  least  not  immediately.  The  problem  that  Talbott 
encounters is that it is possible that some of the damned will make a decision to reject God 
even if they are placed in the best circumstances if they have this kind of illusion. His 
system does not guarantee that God will save all human beings in faith, trust and love. 
Satan was in God’s presence and so had first hand experience of God’s love and intentions. 
If those who have a full disclosure of truth and know God’s nature can nevertheless make, 
as Talbott says, a less than fully informed decision to reject God, then there is no guarantee 
that anyone from the damned will be reconciled to God once God has revealed his true 
nature and intentions.
280 Even in God’s presence, some of the damned will not recognize 
Him as their source of supreme happiness. So there must be something which compels the 
sinners even in God’s presence to turn away from God. I will come back to this in the 
following section. 
                                                 
279 Talbott (1992), pp. 500–501.  
280 This claim creates a problem for those who support a doctrine of heaven. If it is possible that in the 
presence of God people would still prefer not to reconcile to him we may also say that even the blessed in 
heaven may not remain blessed for ever even in the presence of God 94 
 
In  addition,  if  those  who  are  in  the  presence  of  God  make  a  less  than  fully  informed 
decision to reject him then we can say that it is possible that some of the damned who have 
no direct experience of God will never reconcile to God. Talbott argues that the worst of 
the  damned  have  no  direct  experience  of  God’s  love  per  se  since  they  have  never 
experienced this kind of love and so cannot appreciate in full what they are missing by 
rejecting God. The main way in which the worst of the sinners will experience the lack of 
the good in their residence in hell will be through the infliction of unbearable suffering and 
‘forcibly  imposed  punishment’.  Suffering  and  punishment  would  compel  them  to 
recognize that there can be nothing good apart from God and so continuous rebellion can 
only result in greater misery. This reply, I argued in previous sections, does not guarantee 
that the damned will have a change of heart. I argued that Talbott’s account of unbearable 
suffering and ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ does not guarantee that the damned will be 
reconciled to God. One of the arguments offered in supporting this was that salvation is not 
possible  if  the  damned  never  know  God  completely.  If  they  do  not  realize  that  their 
suffering is for their own good then there is no guarantee that they will accept God as the 
source of their supreme happiness. Combining this with Talbott’s claim that the damned 
have no direct experience of God it gives us an additional reason to hold that God might 
not succeed in saving all sinners.  
If those who experience God’s love and know of God’s intentions, such as Satan, can still 
make a less than fully informed decision to reject God, then there is no guarantee that the 
damned, who do not possess the same kind of revelation as the blessed do, and so are less 
than fully informed or are in complete ignorance and deception, will ever accept God. If 
those who are in the presence of God can still make a less than fully informed decision to 
reject God, we can say that it is even more likely that the damned who have no knowledge 
of God would never accept him. From what has been argued, it follows that if those who 
have experienced God can nevertheless decide to reject Him, there must be something 
which leads some human beings (the worst of sinners) to reject God even when they have 
all the information they need not to reject Him. In the following section, I examine what 
would compel some sinners to turn away from God. Moreover, I argue that the choice that 




b. What does it mean for someone to have ‘a minimal degree of rationality’ and 
be ‘fully informed’?  
The main flaw in Talbott’s account of choosing something freely—in this case our eternal 
destiny—lies in his understanding of what it is for a choice to be free. He holds, as we have 
seen, that someone can make a free choice if, firstly, he is ‘fully informed’, and secondly, 
if he has ‘a minimal degree of rationality’. Talbott is never clear about what it means to be 
‘fully informed’ and what it means to have ‘a minimal degree of rationality’. The fact that 
he does not explain this clearly leaves this interpretation to us and so it is possible to argue 
that the damned make a free choice to reject God. In this section, I will look into two 
interpretations of what it may mean to be ‘fully informed’ and two interpretations of what 
it may mean to have ‘a minimal degree of rationality’. Both may be interpreted in ways 
which may force Talbott to reconsider the fact that the rejection of God may be freely 
made. 
Michael  Murray  in  his  ‘Three  Versions  of  Universalism’  explains  very  well  two 
possibilities of what it may mean for someone to be ‘full informed’. I will use this to make 
my case against Talbott. For someone to be ‘fully informed’ may mean, on the one hand, 
that one knows all the relevant facts about the decision being made, and holds no relevant 
false beliefs concerning that decision. On the other hand, it may mean that one knows all 
the relevant facts about the decision being made and ascribes the proper weight to things 
known. The latter, says Murray, entails that one has additionally structured one’s desires so 
that they properly reflect the importance of what is known.
281 
Taking the first meaning of the term, we can say that one can be ‘fully-informed’ but 
nevertheless reject God. For example, someone can be fully aware that eating lots of fried 
food, excessive smoking, or lack of exercise can be extremely dangerous for one’s health, 
and yet he can still freely choose to engage in these activities. These are cases of what is 
commonly known as weakness of will. The problem presented by theses cases is that even 
if a person holds all and only true beliefs concerning his good, i.e., is ‘fully informed’, it 
nevertheless does not entail ipso facto that he will choose to act in accord with his true 
good.
282 This sense of ‘fully informed’ is the one associated with libertarian accounts of 
free will, which most universalists, including Talbott, defend. 
                                                 
281 Michael Murray, ‘Three Versions of Universalism’, Faith and Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1999), p. 10.  
282 Ibid., p. 11.  96 
 
Taking the second meaning of the term, we can say that if someone is ‘fully informed’ in 
this sense then he cannot reject God freely. Someone who not only recognizes that the 
ultimate  human  fulfilment  consists  in  reconciliation  with  God  but  also  structures  his 
desires accordingly will not ultimately reject God.
283 However, I would argue that someone 
can be ‘fully informed’ in this sense only if he has already achieved that state of perfection. 
The moment that someone is ‘fully informed’ in this sense is the moment where a person is 
reconciled to God. It is the moment where the person comes into communion with God. 
When a person has his desires structured in such a way this would suggest that he has 
achieved that ‘level’ where he knows what is best for him, and will act accordingly. For 
example, we would not call someone a master of the martial arts unless he has reached the 
mental and physical state corresponding to martial art perfection. To be fully informed 
would  suggest  that  the  person  has  reached  a  state  of  perfection.  He  cannot  be  ‘fully 
informed’  in  this  sense  and  still  be  attempting  to  be  reconciled  to  God.  Being  ‘fully 
informed’, in this sense, is achieved once someone has attained God. Therefore, from this 
explanation, it seems to me that Talbott must hold that humans are ‘fully informed’ in the 
first sense.  
Having presented the two interpretations of what it might mean to be ‘fully informed’ I 
turn now to the interpretation of what it may mean for someone to have ‘a minimal degree 
of rationality’. We can interpret ‘a minimal degree of rationality’ in two ways. Firstly, we 
may interpret ‘a minimal degree of rationality’ as what a person needs to qualify as a free 
agent  in  Talbott’s  theological  framework.
284  Secondly,  we  may  interpret  it  outside 
Talbott’s theological framework. 
Let  us  consider  the  first  interpretation.  Talbot  holds  that  an  essential  element  for  free 
choice is a minimal degree of rationality. This is what an agent needs in order to qualify as 
a free agent. If we presume that this is what Talbott has in mind then we can say that as 
long as choices are made within the framework of achieving the ultimate good, which is 
God, we can speak of degrees of rationality. If this is the case, Talbott will have to explain 
where that level is, and what the other levels of rationality amount to. He will have to 
explain where the line between minimal degree of irrationality and a minimal degree of 
rationality is drawn, and hence when we can speak of free agency. For example, someone 
can have a lesser degree of rationality and can still be free in some respect.  
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In addition, Talbott’s theological framework seems to imply that only those who choose 
and act within this theological framework can be considered to perform free and rational 
acts. This presents a problem for Talbott because his account implies that those who act 
outside this theological framework act in a non-free and irrational way. It implies that even 
those who are religious but nonetheless do not follow the Christian religion, or those who 
live a moral life but do not have explicit faith in Christ, perform actions that are irrational 
and thus not free. As we have mentioned, Talbott is a Christian exclusivist universalist. 
Hence he holds that all human beings will be saved only through explicit faith in Christ 
and his teaching. Salvation will be the fate of those who recognize God and accept Him 
through Christ. It is obvious that there are many religious traditions which teach what the 
ultimate good in each individual’s life should be. For example, non-monotheistic religions 
such as Buddhism speak of Nirvana, a state of mind of perfect peace, whereas monotheistic 
religions,  such  as  Islam  and  Judaism  speak  of  reconciliation  with  Allah  and  Yahweh 
respectively. I think that it is unintelligible to hold that the choices of people who follow 
different religious traditions are not rational and thus not free. Moreover, there are people 
who live virtuous and moral lives and who do not ascribe to any religious tradition. Could 
we  say  without  sparking  serious  objections  that  any  choices  these  people  make  are 
irrational  and  thus  non-free?  I  would  say  no.  So  it  seems  that  if  we  accept  the  first 
interpretation of what it means for someone to have ‘a minimal degree of rationality’ we 
can only apply this interpretation in Talbott’s theological framework because it cannot be 
applied consistently out of this framework. 
If we stand back from this theological framework and consider the goals to which human 
actions are directed, goals which are different to the ultimate goal which Talbott talks 
about, it would be incorrect to hold that actions which are not directed towards the ultimate 
end—the  Christian  God—are  irrational  and  thus  not  free.  If  we  step  away  from  this 
framework and see how philosophers have explained rationality, we get different views 
that take different approaches as to what it means to act rationally and freely. In what 
follows, I look into some approaches of rationality that are relevant to my argument against 
Talbott. 
Here I briefly present three views of rationality: (i) instrumental rationality: a person is 
required by rationally to take the means that are necessary to achieve a given end. An agent 
is  open  to  rational  criticism  to  the  extend  he  fails  to  exhibit  this  kind  of  instrumental 
consistency. (ii) Maximizing rationality: the rational act for a person to take is one that 
would optimally advance the agent’s complete set of ends. A person acts rationally to the 98 
 
extent he does what is likely to bring about the best state of affairs given those ends. This 
depends both on his preferences over the results that may be brought about through his 
actions and his beliefs about the probability of those results.
285 And (iii) the satisficing 
model of rationality: a given action can be rational even when the agent acknowledges that 
an alternative action would bring about a more valuable state of affairs. In some cases it 
seems that perfectly rational agents appear to be pleased with states of affairs that are 
‘good enough’ from their viewpoint of their aims and desires, even when they know that 
the alternatives which are available to them promise a higher return.
286 
All the above accounts of rationality suggest that rational deliberation is concerned with 
matters of value—with what it would be desirable to do. It is quite evident that basic 
human aims in life are rather unclear. People want to develop good relationships with the 
people they love; they want success, loyalty, good health, etc. Human beings as rational 
agents have the ability to judge some ends as good or worth pursuing, and hence value 
them,  even  though  satisfying  them  may  result  in  considerable  unpleasantness  for 
themselves.
287 An agent is free when his deliberation is sensitive to his own judgments 
about what is good/best for him in the circumstances when one acts upon a judgment. Let 
us consider an example to make the point clear: Alex wants to be a rock star. He finds the 
life of a musician in a rock band quite exciting. The parties, the fans, the money and the 
travelling are things that he wants to have and believes that by achieving them he will be 
happy. Let us suppose that Alex knows or has some idea that by pursuing that kind of life 
he would have to give up other things, such as having a family of his own and all that 
comes with that, such as love, trust, friendship, loyalty etc. Nevertheless, Alex decides to 
pursue the life of a rock star. In this case, according to instrumental rationality, Alex wants 
to have the life of a rock star and so takes the means necessary to achieve that end and so 
he  acts  rationally.  According  to  the  satisficing  model  of  rationality,  Alex’s  action  is 
rational even when he knows that an alternative action would bring about a more valuable 
state of affairs. If we take the maximizing theory, Alex’s action could still be the rational 
one to take. It depends both on his preferences over the results that may be brought about 
through his actions, and his beliefs about the probability of those results.
288 If, on the other 
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hand,  any  decision  to  refrain  from  having  a  family,  getting  married,  having  strong 
friendships and the like, would be contrary to what is worth pursuing when considered 
from Alex’s view on any of these accounts then Alex’s decision will be considered as 
irrational.
289 By contrast, by itself Alex knowing that what he chooses—that is the career 
and the life of a musician—is not the most valuable thing, this does not necessarily suggest 
that he acts irrationally and so non-freely.
290 I would like to strengthen this claim with the 
following additional case/example. 
Now, compare the above case with the following: Alex wants to become a rock star and he 
takes the necessary steps in achieving this goal. However, he commits himself to a ten-year 
contract. Once his contract is expired, he would want to settle down, have a family, and 
experience all those things he would have missed if he had decided to follow a career in 
music for all the years of his life. I propose this case in order to permit us to make a 
distinction  between  two  kinds  of  acts that  both  are  rational  and  free  but  that  differ  in 
degree. We can say that rationality comes in degrees. I think we could say that Alex’s 
action in the second case has a different degree of rationality than his action in the first 
case. We can say that in this case, Alex’s action is more rational than in the case which I 
presented above. Here he accepts that the life of a rock star is worth pursuing but at the 
same time, he knows that a marriage life is worth pursuing as well. So he acts in a way that 
would satisfy both ends. 
The above cases of deliberate actions, however, are different from the following cases: (i) 
cases in which the agent deliberately chooses to act as he does but is motivated to do so by 
a compulsive, controlling sort of desire. In cases such as that of OCD, drug and alcohol 
addictions, and strange psychological conditions, the agent who is vulnerable to these not 
only displays an irrational behaviour but we can also say that his actions are not free. 
Consider the following cases: Someone who suffers from OCD, for example, and needs to 
turn on and off the light before he leaves the house, both exhibits an irrational behaviour 
and does not act freely. He cannot willingly stop himself from performing these actions. Or 
imagine a case of a woman who has a strange psychological condition or addiction and she 
keeps buying herself yellow shoes which she will never wear. These cases show that these 
people suffer from a kind of compulsion that renders their actions irrational and non-free. 
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And: (ii) cases in which an agent’s psychology is being externally manipulated by another 
agent, for example, through a brain implant, such that the agent is caused to make a choice, 
and act on it, which he previously was not inclined to choose. In both cases, the agent is 
neither acting rationally nor freely. 
Talbott seems to suggest that someone who does not have the kind of minimal degree of 
rationality which he proposes, cannot act freely in precisely the same way as someone who 
suffers from one of the above conditions. However, from what it has been argued above, 
people judge what is good and what is bad for them according to what they value to be the 
best thing for them in every case. Their judgment of a thing A being better than a thing B, 
requires that they have a kind of imagination and information which would help them 
make a decision. For example, in the case of Alex, Alex has certain preferences and he 
makes a choice in light of those preferences. Alex does exhibit an irrational behaviour in 
the way that Talbott presents things, but intuitively we do not think Alex is irrational.
291 
Talbott is not sufficiently clear on what form of rationality he bases his argument on. He 
holds that a free choice is one that is ‘fully informed’ and the person who makes it has ‘a 
minimal degree of rationality’. If we interpret ‘fully informed’ in the first sense I have 
explained above and ‘a minimal degree of rationality’, in the second sense I have also 
explained above we can say that someone can choose something which is not the best thing 
for  him  and  at  the  same  time  his  choice  will  be  ‘fully  informed’,  rational  and  free. 
Someone can know all the relevant information he needs to know and holds no relevant 
false beliefs concerning the decision, and yet prefer not what would be the most valuable 
thing for him to do whilst at the same time exhibiting the kind of rationality that is enough 
to say they acted freely. 
In the same way we can say that the damned’s choice to remain in hell is irrational on one 
level  and  rational  and  free  on  another;  it  has  its  own,  as  Walls  says,  ‘twisted  sort  of 
logic’.
292 Talbott claims that some of the sinners, probably the worst of their kind will not 
have a real conception of God’s nature and love and this leads me to hold that these sinners 
in hell will not be ‘fully informed’ in the second sense presented above. Even if God 
makes Himself and His love present to the damned, some of the damned might still choose 
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hell in the same way that if, for example, I offer you the opportunity to attend a philosophy 
class and give a brief explanation of what it is involved doing philosophy,  you would 
rather spend your time in a pub. People value what is the best end for them according to 
what they regard to be good for them in each circumstance.  
Someone could say that adopting a strong notion of being fully informed (according to 
which one is aware of all the relevant facts and weights them appropriately) and a non-
theological notion of minimal degree of rationality (of any of the three varieties mentioned 
above)  can  plausibly  deliver  Talbott’s  conclusion.
293  This  however  can  be  rejected  by 
returning to the Satan example. I have argued in the previous section that Satan had a full 
disclosure of truth since he was in God’s presence and so could have not been ignorant or 
deceived about God’s love, wisdom and intentions. If he was in the presence of God and if 
he had a first hand experience of God’s love then we can say that he was fully informed in 
a strong theological sense. Nevertheless, he did reject God. I have said above that an agent 
exhibits a minimal degree of rationality, according to instrumental rationality, if a person is 
required  to  take  the  means  that  are  necessary  to  achieve  a  given  end.  He  possesses  a 
minimal degree of rationality, according to maximizing rationality, if he acts in a way that 
would optimally advance his complete set of ends depending on his preferences over the 
results that may be brought about through his actions and his beliefs about the probability 
of  those  results.  And  he  possesses  a  minimal  degree  of  rationality,  according  to  the 
satisficing model of rationality, if he acknowledges that an alternative action would bring 
about  a  more  valuable  state  of  affairs.  We  could  assume  that  Satan  while  being  fully 
informed  about  the  source  of  ultimate  happiness  and  God’s  nature  he  nevertheless 
preferred something else e.g., self-autonomy.  
We can say that even if God makes Himself and His love present to the damned and some 
of  the  damned  have  a  real  conception  of  God’s  nature  and  love  and  so  will  be  ‘fully 
informed’  in  a  strong  theological  sense  it  may  still  be  the  case  that  they  will  prefer 
something different. Again we can say that the choice to remain in hell is irrational on one 
level and rational and free on another; it has its own ‘twisted sort of logic’. Recall for 
example, C. S. Lewis’s stories in his The Great Divorce.
294 I agree with Lewis when he 
states  that  hell  is  creaturely  rebellion  against  God.  The  damned  are,  in  one  sense, 
successful  rebels  to  the  end  and  so  the  doors  of  hell  are  locked  on  the  inside.
295  The 
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damned have the opportunity to escape hell but no one ever does because there is always 
something  which  they  prefer  to  the  ultimate  good  and  happiness,  and  they  insist  on 
pursuing it even at the price of eternal misery. The damned have the chance to change their 
minds and reconcile with God, but in fact most of them, if not, all may prefer their self-
autonomy. Milton’s Satan is a paradigmatic example of such a decision. 
And what I should be, all but less than he 
Whom thunder hath made greater? Here at 
least  We  shall  be  free;  th’  Almighty  hath 
not built Here for his envy, will not drive us 
hence: Here we may reign secure; and, in 
my  choice,  To  reign  is  worth  ambition, 
though in Hell: Better to reign in Hell than 
serve in Heaven.
296 
The  desire  for  self-autonomy  might  be  enough  to  refuse  God’s  love  and  supreme 
happiness.  In  Craig’s  words,  the  damned  find  the  price  to  pay—‘bowing  the  knee  to 
God’—too high.
297 Or in Lewis’s view, the damned are not interested in what they could 
have; they are happy with what they are and have. The damned choose some ends as 
‘good’, even if satisfying them may result in considerable unpleasantness for themselves. 
They do not wish to abandon their selves and so they remain in hell.  
Moreover, it seems to me that Talbott ignores another category of people, the category 
which consist of people who are genuinely evil. I argue that some people act in evil ways 
and persist in their evils actions out of mere wickedness. It might be the case that some 
people are just wicked. They act in evil ways just for the sake of acting in evil ways. Even 
if someone knows that God is the ultimate source of happiness and joy someone’s moral 
character might be such that he would want to rebel just for the sake of rebelling. For 
example, consider the case of a man who knows that his family loves him; he knows that it 
is  wrong  to  wind  them up  and  psychologically  bully  them.  Nevertheless,  he  continues 
doing so just for the sake of doing it. Talbott will have to accept that it is conceivable that 
some people are genuinely evil and they act in evil ways just for the sake of acting in evil 
ways. If this is the case then we can say that such people act freely in rejecting God. The 
damned in hell, or a least, some may say, the worst of the sinners, may have all the relevant 
information they need about the source of their supreme happiness. They may not be self-
deluded and may be aware of the consequences of their actions. But they may continue to 
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rebel and act in evil ways just so they can frustrate God’s plans. In this sense, their actions 
are free. 
To summarize my arguments thus far: firstly, I have argued that it is possible that some of 
the sinners even in the presence of God will still make either a fully-informed or less than 
fully-informed decision to reject God. The reasons behind the decision of rejecting God’s 
love led me to my second argument. I have argued that Talbott is not sufficiently clear as 
to what it means for someone to be ‘fully informed’ and to have ‘a minimal degree of 
rationality’. If we interpret them in a theological context, Talbott will have to hold that all 
other actions that are not directed towards the Christian God are irrational and not free. If 
we interpret them in a non-theological context Talbott would have to accept that some 
people can refuse God and still make a choice which is rational (to some degree) and free. 
If we interpret ‘fully informed’ in a strong theological sense and ‘a minimal degree of 
rationality’ in a non-theological sense then again Talbott will have to accept that some 
people may be fully informed about God nevertheless refuse while making a choice which 
is rational and free. Self-autonomy and pure wickedness may be reasons for rejecting God. 
So  the  account  of  freedom  of  choice  which  Talbott  offers  does  not  guarantee  that  all 
human beings will ever freely reconcile to God.  
In the following section, I argue that Talbott’s view of future afterlives encounters the 
same problem as Hick’s account does; that is, the idea of future afterlives as opportunities 
for salvation diminishes the importance of human autonomy. 
 
3. Future afterlives and the possibility of human autonomy 
Talbot holds that God has the power and wisdom to work with each human being and 
undermine over time every possible motive that a human being might have for rejecting 
Him.
298 He argues that God can think in terms of a billion lifetimes, a billion different 
realms and universes and sets of appearances, a billion ways to prevent the choices that 
other persons make from having the wrong kind of influence upon a given choice that a 
person  makes.
299  There  will  be  environments  specifically  created  in  such  a  way  that 
humans can choose freely, experience the consequences of their free choices, and finally 
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learn from experience that God is their ultimate source of happiness. God will permit those 
who have refused Him by the time of their death to continue to exist in other environments 
and/or spiritual realms, where they can start over and develop a new and better character, 
and in which God can progressively remove their false beliefs. 
Talbott’s account is vulnerable to the same criticism as Hick’s account.
300 The problem 
with this view, as in Hick’s view, is that even if Talbott allows for freedom of choice in 
each new created environment, it nevertheless diminishes human autonomy. Recall the 
labyrinth analogy I presented earlier in chapter three: Imagine that it is now your 20
th time 
in the labyrinth. That would suggest that in all your previous attempts either you have 
chosen to remain in the labyrinth or you have failed to reach the exit. You decide to reach 
to the exit but by the time you do so you die. The LSS once more re-creates you to give 
you another chance. In all your re-appearances in the labyrinth, you were free to choose 
between the two options. However, did  you  choose to re-appear in the labyrinth for a 
second time or for a 20
th or even a 21
st time? As I have argued before, you did not. Your 
reappearances in the labyrinth as a result of your failure to choose or reach the exit, are not 
something  that  you  have  chosen  for  yourself.  Can  you  choose  not  to  reappear  in  the 
labyrinth? No, because you cannot make that call. The LSS does. The LSS chooses for you 
because it is the LSS which thinks that it would be better for you to finally reach the exit 
and succeed in escaping from the labyrinth. The LSS does not permit you to retain the 
character which you have developed during your residence in the labyrinth, especially if 
that character is a vicious one. It does not give you that choice. 
The main problem here is that whereas you have freedom of choice during your residence 
in the labyrinth, and you can choose to either remain there or follow the path that leads to 
the  exit,  nevertheless  your  autonomy  is  completely  ignored.  Like  Hick,  Talbott  would 
allow human beings to make free choices during their existence in the earthly life and in 
the  billions  lives  to  come  because  union  with  God  can  only  be  achieved  voluntarily. 
However,  the  ‘billion  lifetimes,  billion  different  realms  and  universes  and  sets  of 
appearances’ which God can think of to save all humans denies human autonomy because 
each  individual’s  eternal  fate  is  entirely  independent  of  the  choices  he  makes  and  the 
beliefs and character which he adopts in his earthly existence and post-mortem existences 
later on.  
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Applying this to the case of the damned, even if the damned are free to act according to the 
character which they develop for themselves in each future life, they are not free in the 
sense that they cannot ultimately keep the character that they have chosen for themselves. 
God blocks the consequences of their actions and thus blocks their autonomy. Autonomy is 
an essential feature of having genuine creaturely freedom according to libertarians such as 
Talbott.  And  if  it  is  an  essential  feature  then  God,  by  blocking  the  consequences  of 
people’s  actions,  diminishes  the  value  of  the  freedom  which  human  beings  have. 
Therefore,  universal  salvation  will  not  be  the  result  of  the  kind  of  libertarian  freedom 
which  Talbott  wants  to  maintain.  If  Talbott  wants  to  maintain  libertarian  freedom  of 
choice, he will have to permit their eternal fate to be based on the choices and the character 
which they cultivate for themselves in their earthly life and consequently in the lives to 
come. If he does so then he will have to accept, like Hick, that there is no guarantee that all 
will achieve salvation, since to have significant freedom humans must be allowed to carry 
the character that they choose for themselves in the lives to come; or be permitted to retain 















In this chapter, I argued that the negation of Talbott’s universalism is not inconsistent. 
Talbott’s accounts of human freedom of choice and curative punishment fail to adequately 
show  that  salvation  is  the  ultimate  fate  of  all  human  beings.  Firstly,  his  account  of 
unbearable suffering as ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ does not guarantee that the damned 
will repent and accept God’s love. I argued that either Talbott can modify his account of 
‘forcibly imposed punishment’ or he can give up his claim that all sinners must eventually 
reach a point where they can resist God no further. If he modifies his account in such a 
way as to claim that the intense misery the damned undergo is truly unbearable he will be 
endorsing the sort of compulsion which he has rejected as inappropriate. Moreover, by 
accepting  this  kind  of  compulsion,  he  would  undermine  his  claim  that  repentance  and 
reconciliation to God is not determined in any way. Secondly, I argued that his argument is 
not successful in showing that the damned cannot make a free and irrevocable rejection of 
God. The case of Satan’s rebellion shows that full disclosure of truth does not guarantee 
that the sinners will reconcile to God. Moreover, Talbott does not sufficiently explain what 
‘fully-informed’ and what ‘a minimal degree of rationality’ is. Both may be interpreted in 
ways which may force Talbott to reconsider the fact that the rejection of God may be freely 
made.  Finally,  I  argued  that  his  view  that  there  will  be  future  lives  for  further  moral 
development encounters the same problem as Hick’s account; that is, human autonomy is 
diminished and consequently the kind of libertarian free choice which he has in mind does 
not play the significant role it should in human salvation. 
In the next chapter, I examine Marilyn McCord Adams’ account. Adams, like Hick and 
Talbott, argues that God’s love demands that all will be reconciled to him in the end. Her 
rejection of the doctrine of hell differs from Hick’s and Talbott’s account in that she argues 
that human beings’ freedom is impaired to such a degree that God would not hold them 
fully responsible for their earthly actions and so he would not condemn anyone to eternal 
hell. Moreover, she argues that the horrors of hell are such as to deprive the damned of any 
positive meaning in their lives, and God’s goodness would not allow this to happen. 
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Chapter Five: Marilyn McCord Adams’ Universalism 
 
Introduction 
Marilyn McCord Adams attempts to define God’s nature and His relationship with His 
human creatures in such a manner conductive to holding that salvation is the inevitable fate 
of  all  His  human  creatures.  She  holds  that  God  loves  human  beings  and  His  love  is 
expressed in His desire not only to enter into personal relationship with them but also to 
unite with them.
301 Like John Hick, she endorses the eschatological conviction that God’s 
love can be vouched safely to every human being, and she argues that every human being 
will eventually achieve union with God and thus salvation. Therefore, there can be no hell 
as  a  place  of  eternal  torment  and  thus  a  doctrine  that  defends  such  a  view  should  be 
rejected. 
Adams bases her account on two distinctive ideas: (i) the category of horrendous evils and 
(ii)  a  particular  theory  of  the  nature  of  God,  the  nature  of  human  beings,  and  their 
relationship. She claims that all human beings are vulnerable to horrendous evils due to 
their limited nature and the environment which they inhabit. Horrendous evils are such that 
they prima facie deprive human lives of the possibility of positive significance and seem to 
make  it  impossible  for  the  horror-participants’  lives  to  be  great  goods  to  them  on  the 
whole. Only God, given the nature of His goodness, can defeat them. Divine love and 
goodness can be guaranteed to each individual only if God defeats horrendous evils not 
only within the context of the world as a whole but also within the framework of each 
individual’s life.
302 Defeating horrendous evil at the individual level would involve God 
compensating  individuals  for  their  participation  in  horrendous  evils  with  positive 
experiences, and a demonstration of how the evils they participated in may be shown to 
have purpose and meaning.
303 Therefore, the eternal horror of hell, if it existed, would be a 
horror that would forever remain undefeated and would frustrate God’s purpose for His 
human creatures. To hold this is contrary to her view of the nature of God as love. The 
latter, she argues compels us to accept that God will save all human beings in the end. 
                                                 
301  Marilyn  McCord  Adams,  Horrendous  Evils  and  the  Goodness  of  God  (Ithaca  and  London:  Cornell 
University Press, 1999), p. 165; Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 39. 
302 Marilyn McCord Adams, ‘The Problem of Hell: A Problem of Evil for Christians’, in Reasoned Faith, 
Eleonore Stump, ed., (Cornell University Press, 1993a), p. 304. 
303 Adams (2006), pp. 44–47. 108 
 
This chapter has two parts. In the first part, I outline Adams’ view of the human condition. 
I focus on explaining her concepts of meaning-making, and impaired freedom as well as 
her account of the category of horrendous evils. The explanation of Adams’ concepts will 
allow  the  elucidation  of  her  account  and  an  understanding  of  its  role  in  rejecting  the 
doctrine  of  hell,  as  well  as  a  proper  examination  of  her  arguments  in  favour  of 
universalism.
304 This prepares the ground for the second part of the chapter where I give 
two  arguments  against  Adams’  universalism.  My  first  argument  will  focus  on  Adams’ 
concept of meaning-making, her concept of empathetic capacity and her account of human 
vulnerability  to  horrors.  I  will  argue  that  the  model  of  curative  punishment  that  she 
proposes does not guarantee that all sinners will be saved. My second argument will focus 
on Adams’ view that all sinners will come to reconcile to God freely. I will show by means 
of a particular case of horrendous evil that participation in post-mortem horrors damages 
decision-making capacity in such a way that free choice is not possible and so there is no 
guarantee that all sinners will be saved in the end. My conclusion will be that Adams fails 
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1. The human condition 
Adams  holds  that  God  loves  all  human  beings  and  that  His  love  is  expressed  in  His 
purpose of creating persons; that is, agents who act according to reason, have free-will, and 
who are capable of entering into a personal relationship and, ultimately, union with God.
 
305 In order for God to achieve His purpose He did not bring human beings into existence 
as perfect beings but rather as finite beings with limited capacities. Moreover, God created 
them in a material world of real and apparent scarcity in which they exercise their given 
nature and search for Him. Adams’ understanding of the human condition develops from 
her view that humans have been created to be ‘meaning-makers’—personal creatures who 
seek  and  find  meaning  in  the  world  around  them  and  in  the  Creator  who  grounds 
existence.
306  Adams  maintains  that  the  capacity  for  ‘meaning-making’  is  personal 
activity.
307  She  argues  that  a  good  life  is  one  that  has  meaning  and  purpose.  An 
individual’s life experiences, on the one hand, can become organized around some goal or 
idea  that  he  aims  at  and,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be  ‘molded  and  expended  by  the 
individual or collective schemes of others’.
308 So an individual’s life can be assessed in 
relation both to his own goals, ideals and choices, and to the ‘aims, tastes, values and 
preferences of others’.
309 The external point of view is not sufficient for an individual’s life 
to be a great good to him on the whole but the individual himself must value, and actually 
enjoy,  ‘his  relations  to  enough  goods  and  to  goods  that  are  great  enough’.
310  An 
individual’s life will have positive value for him if he eventually structures and arranges 
his experiences in life, and recognizes patterns of distribution of goods and ills around self-
transcendent goals or ideals and relationships that he values.
311 In addition, on the basis of 
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that,  he  finds  reasons  to  think  that  his  life  has  positive  meaning.  So,  we  can  say  that 
meaning-making is the  production or  gaining of objective value which is also deemed 
valuable from the perspective of the person producing or gaining the value. Humans use 
this capacity to recognize and appropriate positive meaning and purpose in their lives and 
in  the  world.  The  capacity  for  ‘meaning-making’  is  a  necessary  condition  for  human 
happiness. Since God is the source of human happiness, then the capacity for meaning-
making is necessary for entering into personal relationship with God and union with Him.  
However,  the  difficulty  with  this  goal,  says  Adams,  is  that  is  it  ‘prima  facie  self-
defeating’.
312 Humans’ finite nature and the material world in which this nature evolves 
frustrates and/or destroys our meaning-making capacity. Adams explains the shape of the 
capacity  for  meaning-making  and  human  vulnerability  to  horrors  by  proposing  a 
developmental picture of human agency.  
According to Adams, humans begin their lives in a state of immaturity, weakness and 
ignorance.  Their  development  as  physical  and  psychological  beings  is  the  ‘interactive 
product’ of human nature and its environment. Humans gain knowledge of themselves, of 
others and of the world with difficulty over a long period of time, and through interaction 
with others who are in the same conditions of immaturity, weakness and ignorance as they 
are, as well as through  their living environment which is a place of real and apparent 
scarcity and inhospitality. Thus, human beings, who are allowed to exercise their reasoning 
and will, and thus act according to their nature, are radically vulnerable to evils. From early 
childhood, humans are confronted with certain types of evil that are overwhelming. They 
attempt to understand and make progress with their existence by adopting strategies which 
due  to  their  limitations  are  imperfect  at  best.  As  humans  continue  to  enact  imperfect 
strategies  their  perception  and  behaviour  becomes  distorted  to  such  a  degree  that  they 
arrive in adulthood in a state, which Adams calls: ‘impaired freedom’.
313 Thus, acting with 
the confines of impaired freedom, people inevitably cause suffering to themselves and to 
others. 
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Such suffering, says Adams, comes in small, medium and large doses but always with an 
educational purpose. From toothaches to tears, broken limbs to broken relationships, such 
pain teaches people about themselves and the world. For example, by touching a hot stove 
we are burnt, or by eating too many sweets our teeth are damaged. Likewise, much of the 
suffering and pain that results from natural disasters helps people to discover new ways to 
deals with them and overcome them. Pain and suffering says Adams, ‘are the mother of 
invention  that  discovers  ways  of  protecting  humankind  …  and  of  overcoming  and/or 
working around various harms’.
314 Humans use their capacity for meaning-making to find 
purpose in their lives and to create positive meaning for the evils’ existence. Evils can be 
seen to be productive of a greater good and in many ways, says Adams, they can trigger a 
‘meaningful growth experience’.
315 However, different situations arise from the vulnerable 
state  which  people  are  in  that  may  cause  much  suffering  to  them  and  others  and 
consequently damage or destroy their capacity for meaning-making.
316 
Adams  argues  that  there  are  evils  in  the  world  so  horrendous  that  humans  can  barely 
comprehend  them  and  consequently  cannot  ‘meaningfully  grow’  as  a  result  of 
experiencing them. Some kinds of suffering are so horrific that they decimate human lives 
in a way that makes their occurrence seem impossible to justify, and it certain that no good 
could come of them. Adams calls these evils ‘horrendous evils’ and defines them as:  
Evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which constitutes 
prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant’s life could (given 
their inclusion in it) have positive meaning for him/her on the whole.
317 
In the category of horrendous evils, she includes:  
[T]he  rape  of  a  woman  and  axing  off  of  her  arms,  psycho-physical 
torture  whose  ultimate  goal  is  the  disintegration  of  personality, 
schizophrenia,  or  severe  clinical  depression,  cannibalizing  one’s  own 
offspring, child abuse of the sort described by Ivan Karamazov, parental 
incest, participation in the Nazi death camps, the explosion of nuclear 
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bombs over populated areas, being the accidental and/or unwitting agent 
in the disfigurement or death of those one loves best.
318 
Participation  in  horrendous  evils,  according  to  Adams,  overwhelms  meaning-making 
capacity giving to both participants and onlookers prima facie reason to believe that the 
participant’s life is marred by horrors and thereby deprived of the possibility of positive 
personal meaning.
319  
As I have said, the explanation of Adams’ concepts is necessary in order to examine her 
arguments  in  favour  of  universalism.  Her  arguments  are  based  on  these  concepts  of 
meaning-making,  impaired  freedom  and  the  category  of  horrendous  evils  and  to  these 
arguments I now turn. 
 
2. Two arguments for universalism 
Adams’ first argument focuses on human impaired freedom and  responsibility and her 
second argument focuses on her claim that hell would give conclusive reason that our lives 
have no positive meaning.  
Let us begin with the first argument. Adams argues that humans are not competent enough 
to bear responsibility for their and others’ eternal destiny based on the choices which they 
have made in their earthly life. Her argument centres on her discussion of the extent of the 
humans’ ability to cause horrendous evils relative to their capacity to conceive of such 
evils. She begins by making the following observations.  
First, she maintains that it is obvious that ‘it is comparatively easy for human beings to 
cause (at least be salient members of causal chains leading to) horrendous evils’.
320 To 
illustrate this point, she considers the case of the loving father who accidentally runs over 
his son. Human life, Adams maintains, is full of horrendous evils. Accidents, coincidences 
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and  humanly  unforeseeable  consequences  can  make  even  responsible  behaviour,  never 
mind minor negligence, have horrendous consequences.
321  
Second, she maintains that it is obvious that an individual’s capacity to cause suffering 
(horrendous and otherwise) radically and inevitably exceeds his ability to experience it.
322 
Adams claims that an individual can bring about consequences so devastatingly evil that 
the individual himself cannot experience them, whether this inability is due to the quantity, 
or the intense quality of the evil involved. She writes: 
Many  examples  make  this  clear  as  to  quantity:  for  example,  on  the 
traditional doctrine of the fall, Adam experiences one individual’s worth 
of  ignorance  and  difficulty,  but  his  sin  brought  it  on  his  many 
descendents; Hitler organized a holocaust of millions; small numbers of 
government leaders, scientists, and military personnel brought about the 
atomic explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Likewise for quality, 
it  is  probably  true  that,  for  example,  a  childless  male  soldier  cannot 
experience  anything  like  enough  to  the  suffering  of  a  mother  whose 
child is murdered before her eyes.
323  
Adams argues that where suffering is concerned, the ‘capacity to conceive follows [the] 
capacity to experience, in such a way that we cannot adequately conceive what we cannot 
adequately experience’.
324 Just as a person who has always been blind can have a lot of 
descriptive knowledge of colours, he cannot be directly acquainted with them; he cannot, 
that is, know what it is like to experience colour. Humans who have never experienced 
such  sufferings  are  unable  to  comprehend  what  it  is  like  to  suffer  them.  Only  direct 
experience of horrors is enough to help humans appreciate what it would be like to suffer a 
particular horror. Any theoretical knowledge about horrors is insufficient to explain to 
humans who lack the relevant experience how bad horrors are. Even if, Adams says, Hitler 
had  enough  descriptive  knowledge  to  be  in  a  position  to  know  that  his  actions  had 
horrendous consequences, the lack of those experiences—starving to death, burning, and 
so on—left him unable fully to appreciate just how bad his actions were. Moreover, the 
childless soldier does not have the psychological capacity to experience anything similar 
enough to what a mother experiences seeing, for example, her child decapitated before her 
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eyes. These cases lead Adams to conclude that our ability to cause horrors exceeds our 
ability to understand them.
325 
What  is  important  in  Adams’  argument  is  her  claim  that  lack  of  harmful  experience 
deprives someone ‘of the capacity empathetically to enter into’ what it would be like to 
suffer a particular harm, even if detailed abstract descriptive knowledge of such harm is 
available.
326 The development of this empathetic capacity is crucial for a person in order to 
be able to appreciate the horrendous nature of an evil. This capacity can be developed only 
if the person has direct experience of the suffering that another one undergoes. This is 
important to remember because, as we will see as we proceed, Adams will use this to hold 
that the horror perpetrators will only achieve salvation once they develop this capacity. 
Adams’ approach has some serious problems however, which I examine in part II.  
Adams holds that a person cannot ‘fully grasp’ how bad the evils are of which he has had 
no experience.
327 The capacity to empathize is important not only for a person to assess 
what is bad about suffering but also for the assessment of the degree of the agent’s moral 
responsibility. A person’s responsibility, Adams argues, is diminished in proportion to his 
unavoidable  inability  to  conceive  of  the  relevant  dimensions  of  the  action  and  its 
consequences. Humans cannot be fully to blame for something to the extent that they know 
not what they do.
328 In other words, given human beings’ nature and impaired freedom 
some dimensions of horrendous evil are inevitably inadequately conceivable by human 
beings and so they are not fully responsible for their existence. Human beings cannot be 
held fully responsible for bringing about horrendous evils.  
Adams  argues  that  since  God  created  human  beings  who  are  inevitably  vulnerable  to 
horrors  in  an  environment  of  hostility  and  of  limited  resources  which  consequently, 
increases their vulnerability to horrors, He would not only be primarily responsible, but 
highly  culpable  for  humans’  vulnerability  to  horrors.
329  Given  that  God  is  primarily 
responsible for human vulnerability to horrors, it is His responsibility to make good out of 
it and save all humans in the end. God would be cruel in trusting His human creatures, 
whose nature is limited and freedom is impaired, with their eternal destines. The horrors of 
hell are so horrible that it will be difficult for human beings to conceive clearly. So, God 
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would not make it the consequence of their bad choices. Humans cannot begin to grasp the 
reality of ante-mortem horrors that they have not experienced, so it is impossible for them 
to conceive the torments of hell and everlasting separation from God.
330 As Adams’ states,  
[D]amnation is a horror that exceeds our conceptual powers. For even if 
we could experience for a finite period of time some aspect of hell’s 
torments (e.g., the burning of the fire, deep depression, or consuming 
hatred)  or  heaven’s  bliss  (e.g.,  St.  Teresa’s  joyful  glimpse  of  the 
Godhead),  we  are  unavoidably  unable  to  experience  their  cumulative 
effect  in  advance  and  so  unable  more  than  superficially  to  appreciate 
what is involved in either. It follows that human agents are unavoidably 
unable to exercise their free choice with fully open eyes….
331 
Thus, if those who choose the horrors of hell cannot clearly conceive what is involved in 
choosing hell then God should not hold them responsible for that choice. God would be 
cruel to punish the sinners with hell since they do not know what hell is. This leads Adams 
to conclude that the damned do not really choose hell when they reject God in their earthly 
life, because they do not have a clear idea what hell is like. So in this sense, human beings 
do not choose hell with ‘fully open eyes’. It is, thus, false to assume that God separates the 
blessed from the damned based on their ante-mortem moral performances and choices. 
God  would  be  cruel  in  setting  created  persons  conditions  relative  to  which  they  are 
unlikely to succeed.
332 Therefore, Adams concludes, it is His responsibility to save all in 
the end and let no one perish in hell. 
The  second  argument  which  Adams  offers  is  the  following.  She  holds  that  hell  is  a 
paradigmatic horror which ‘offers not merely prima facie but conclusive reason to believe 
that the life of the damned cannot be a great good to them on the whole’.
333 If earthly 
horrendous evils are such that they deprive humans of the capacity to gain any positive 
meaning and hence lead them to consider their lives as not worth living, then hell, which is 
a place of eternal horror and evil, would be a place within one’s life good is defeated by 
evils forever. An everlasting torment in hell in which the perpetrators of horrendous evils 
get their personal deserts would necessarily intensify the nature of evil and horrors, and 
God’s purpose for His human creatures will be defeated. Eternal punishment in hell would 
be ultimately negative, giving conclusive reason to human beings to doubt whether their 
lives could have any positive meaning overall and would bring about ‘a total dismantling 
                                                 
330 Adams (2006), p. 229. 
331 Adams (1993a), p. 310. 
332 Ibid., p. 311. 
333 Ibid., p. 304. 116 
 
of personality’.
334 Thus, Adams maintains, the eternal horrors of hell would inevitably 
defeat  any  positive  meaning-making  on  behalf  of  the  person  who  suffers  its  infernal 
torment. 
Adams continues by suggesting that God’s love and goodness is shown not only in creating 
persons who can act according to their nature, but also that God’s love requires all humans 
coming into union with him: a state of ultimate happiness. This happiness, however, cannot 
be guaranteed unless God restores the positive meaning within each individual’s life. As 
she states: 
God is good to a created person p iff God guarantees to p a life that is a 
great good to p on the whole, and one in which p’s participation in deep 
and horrendous evils (if any) is defeated within the context of p’s life.
335 
God’s goodness means that He needs to repair the meaning-making capacity and He needs 
to do that by defeating horrors. God’s goodness demands that He makes everything good, 
i.e. individuals and the world as a whole, something inconsistent with an eternal hell. 
Adams argues that many evils challenge the worth of humans as persons but in ways that 
nonetheless can be made good by humans. As she states,  
Failures  in  friendship  can  be  overcome  by  the  offended  party’s 
forgiveness  and/or  by  the  offender’s  showing  deep  and  courageous 
loyalty  thereafter.  Human  courts  can  vindicate  damaged  reputations. 
Work achievements can receive fresh appreciative appraisals. Injured 
athletes  can  sometimes  be  restored  to  health  and  win  gold  medals. 
Heroic others accept permanent disabilities and devote themselves to 
encouraging the differently abled.
336  
These kinds of evils do not destroy the human capacity for meaning-making but are dealt 
with in ways that either preserve or enhance the positive meaning of the lives of those who 
participate in them.
337 Horrendous evils are such that cannot be compensated for in the 
above way because they consume human meaning-making structures to such a degree that 
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they prima facie destroy the positive meaning of the participant’s life; positive meaning 
that can be restored only by the ultimate good—God.
338 
In  summarizing  her  arguments  Adams,  firstly,  argues  that  human  beings  do  not  have 
enough competency to bear responsibility, through their own beliefs and choices, for their 
own  and  others’  destiny.  Horrendous  evils  are  inevitably  inadequately  conceivable  by 
human beings and so they are not fully responsible for bringing them about. Since they are 
not fully responsible, God would not place them in hell to suffer eternally. Secondly, she 
argues that the horrors of hell would give conclusive reason to believe that the life of the 
damned cannot be a great good to them on the whole. If God’s goodness demands the 
restoration of all human beings’ meaning-making capacity by defeating horrors, then God 
will not permit the destruction of the positive meaning of any horror-participant’s life, 
including the worst sinners.  
Redemption from horrors says Adams, involves the recovery and appropriation of positive 
personal meaning from the worst that human beings suffer, be or do. Horror defeating 
power is meaning-restoring power.
339 The horrors experienced in the earthly life are hell 
enough and so the world to come will be horror-free. Humans, says Adams, can hope for 
some  form  of  post-mortem  balancing  of  horrors  suffered  in  the  earthly  life.  God  will 
compensate all His human creatures for what they have undergone with love. He will be 
obvious and present as soon as possible after the horror-participant’s death and will explain 
to  each  individual  that  all  the  suffering  and  pain  that  he  has  experienced  occurred  to 
prepare him for the moment of reconciliation. However, redemption, according to Adams, 
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will come through a long and difficult process similar to earthly psychotherapy.
340 God’s 
horror  defeating  power  will  include  effects  which  lie  outside  and  go  beyond  any  that 
created  powers  could  produce  and  this  will  occur  without  his  actions  interfering  with 
human freedom.
341 Whether someone is a horror perpetrator or sufferer will determine the 
appropriate method of redemption. 
In  the  case  of  the  horror-sufferers,  God  will  place  them  in  new  and  nourishing 
environments where He will help them to recover from horror participation by helping 
them recognizing their horrendous earthly experiences as points of identification with the 
crucified  God.
342  The  horror-sufferers  in  recognizing  that  in  their  suffering  they  have 
shared this experience with Christ will be glad of the experience and so not wish it away. 
In the case of the worst horror perpetrators, God will place them in environments where 
God will help them to recover from horror participation, as well; however, Adams does not 
exclude  the  possibility  of  terrible  suffering  for  the  purposes  of  rehabilitation.
343  The 
process of letting go and the enjoyment of something new can sometimes be a painful 
process, says Adams, and so this will be a process of painful rehabilitation for most of the 
sinners.
  344 Horror perpetrators can only obtain beatitude if they develop an empathetic 
capacity to suffer with those whom they tortured through severe, although curative, post-
mortem trials.  
The process of reconciliation will continue until all human beings come to union with God 
in faith and love. Since God loves all His human beings and His purpose is to bring all to 
His glory, ultimately, Adams maintains, all will be saved 
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Even if Adams’ view seems conceptually coherent at first sight, I will now demonstrate 
that her account is inadequate in convincing us to accept universalism. The main problems 
that  I  scrutinize  focus  on  her  account  of  restorative  punishment  after  death.  To  this 





















Adams, as we have seen, holds that God creates humans in a world in which they can 
experience and discover things and make positive meaning of it all. Humans seek and find 
meaning in the world around them by assigning positive significance to events that occur 
in their lives and the lives of others. However, human nature and the environment in which 
it is set makes humans vulnerable to horrors. This drives them to think that there is no 
future good and no hope in their lives and this damages their meaning-making capacity to 
such an extent that their freedom is impaired. God’s goodness necessarily requires that 
God will be good to each created person by guaranteeing to him a life that is a great good 
to him on the whole, and one in which his participation in deep and horrendous evils is 
defeated within the context of his life. Eternal damnation is a destiny that God will not 
permit since the eternal horrors of hell are of such a nature that they will give conclusive 
reason to believe that the life of the damned cannot be a great good to them. Adams, 
however, permits the occurrence of post-mortem curative punishment. She holds that some 
of the worst horror-perpetrators may have to undergo ‘terrible suffering’ in the course of 
developing  an  empathetic  capacity  to  suffer  with  those  whom  they  tortured.
345In 
developing empathetic capacity, the horror-perpetrators will realize the horrendous nature 
of their actions and that will in turn lead them freely to repent and freely to be reconciled to 
God. In this part of the chapter, I argue that Adams’ account is weak in defending the 
claim that all will be saved in the end because her curative punishment model does not 
guarantee that all horror-perpetrators will achieve reconciliation. I will maintain that: 
1.  The meaning-making of some horror-perpetrators is damaged in such a way that 
it cannot be  guaranteed that the curative punishment which they  will have to 
undergo would help them in reconciling to God; 
2.  Adams’ argument is unsuccessful in showing that the horror-perpetrators will be 
able to make a free choice to accept God’s love and consequently be reconciled to 
him.  
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1. Horrendous evils and meaning-making 
While Adams rejects the eternal punishment of hell, she permits the occurrence of post-
mortem curative punishment for the horror-perpetrators. If understanding horrors requires 
experience in kind, and comprehensive empathetic capacity is a genuine human end, then 
post-mortem suffering would be useful.
346 She holds that 
Since  the  cure  for  horrors  is  the  making  of  positive  meaning,  and  the 
restoration  to  the  horror  participant  of  the  capacity  to  make  positive 
meanings;  and  since  the  process  of  letting  go  of  the  old  and  groping 
towards the new is and can be a painful process, all horror participants can 
expect  to  undergo  painful  rehabilitation.  But  whether  one  is  a  horror 
perpetrator or victim will make a big difference to the concrete steps and 
stages of rehabilitation, as well as to the particular shape of the positive 
meaning that can be made. Can we even begin to imagine the excruciating 
process involved in Hitler’s developing an empathetic capacity to suffer 
with those whom he tortured?
347 
The horror-perpetrators will have to undergo, in Adams’ words, ‘painful rehabilitation’, 
‘terrible suffering’, ‘severe post-mortem trials’, in the course of developing an empathetic 
capacity to suffer with those whom they tortured.
348 In developing empathetic capacity, the 
horror-perpetrators will conceive how horrendous it was to produce evils and this will lead 
them to freely repent  and freely reconcile with God. Adams seems to hold that direct 
experience  of  a  painful  experience  necessarily  generates  empathetic  capacity.  It  is  not 
obvious, however, that the post-mortem pain and suffering which the horror-perpetrators 
will have to experience will generate the empathetic capacity which Adams has in mind. 
The meaning-making of some horror-perpetrators is damaged in such a way that it cannot 
be guaranteed that the curative punishment which they will have to undergo would help 
them in reconciling with God. 
What is interesting in Adams’ account is that the capacity to empathize can be developed 
only if someone has the exact experience of pain as the one who originally suffered it. 
Adams holds that lack of direct experience of a particular horror deprives someone from 
this empathetic capacity. Since the horror-perpetrator does not have a direct experience of 
the horror he inflicts on his victim(s), he is incapable of appreciating the horrendous nature 
of his actions and cannot evaluate horrendous evils as such. It is not enough for the horror-
perpetrator to identify imaginatively with his victim’s painful situation; that is, it is not 
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enough just to have the ability to imagine what it would be like for the other to experience 
pain, sorrow, and so on. Empathetic capacity is necessary for a person to assess what it 
would be like to suffer a particular harm and how bad it would be to produce it. Only by 
directly  experiencing the horrors he inflicted on his victims, can the horror-perpetrator 
develop an empathetic capacity and so appreciate the horrendous nature of his actions.
349 
Once  this  capacity  is  developed,  the  horror-perpetrator  will  appreciate  the  horrendous 
nature of his actions and this will lead him to repent for his actions and ask for union with 
God. So, for example, Hitler would have to directly experience the horrors he inflicted on 
his victims in order to fully conceive the horrendous nature of his actions, empathize with 
his victims and so come to union with God.  
It is worth noting that Adams does not explain what it would be for someone to have, in 
this case Hitler, a direct experience of the horrors he inflicted. Following Adams’ claim, if 
Hitler was to appreciate the horrors which he has afflicted and develop the empathetic 
capacity it may require that he experiences the scale of these evils, the quantity and the 
quality of these evils. We can say that there are two ways in which Hitler could experience 
the evils he inflicted. Firstly, we could say that Hitler will have to experience each and 
every person’s experience. So for example, it may require that he had the background 
experience of his victims—e.g. had grown up in a Jewish community, been persecuted for 
years, etc., and then shipped off to a concentration camp to be tortured and then executed. 
Secondly, she can say that Hitler may need to experience the holocaust in a holistic way. 
Both approaches however, face problems. In the first case, Hitler by experiencing the evils 
which  each  individual  suffered  would  be  unable  to  get  the  whole  experience  of  the 
holocaust, that is, he would not conceive the scale of the horror of the holocaust on the 
whole.  In  the  second  case,  we  can  say  that  only  God  is  capable  of  having  a  holistic 
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experience of the holocaust. It would seem impossible by definition that Hitler would be 
capable of having this kind of experience. Adams remains silent on how exactly a horror-
perpetrator such as Hitler will experience the horrors he inflicted. 
Setting this aside, the main difficulty with Adams’ account is that it is not obvious that 
directly  experiencing  pain  generates  empathetic  feelings.  The  vulnerability  of  Adams’ 
account lies in the fact that she does not distinguish between having an empathetic capacity 
from having the actual experience of empathy or empathetic concern. Let us explain these 
two.  Human  beings  have  the  capacity  for  empathy.  That  is,  they  have  the  capacity  to 
understand the emotional state of another person who is in pain, distress and so on, they 
have  the  capacity  to  understand  the  perspective  of  another’s  feelings.  To  have  an 
empathetic concern is to respond to a person’s perceived emotional state of sorrow, pain, 
distress  etc  by  experiencing  feelings  of  similar  sort.  To  develop  the  full  capacity  of 
empathy and empathetic concern suggests that you do not only understand that someone is 
in pain, distress and the like, but also you have empathetic feelings for this person and you 
act on these feelings.
 350  
Adams  seems  to  endorse  this  approach  as  to  what  it  means  to  develop  an  empathetic 
capacity.  It  is  not  enough  for  the  horror-perpetrator  to  identify  imaginatively  with  his 
victim’s  painful  situation;  rather,  the  horror-perpetrator  needs  to  develop  an  empathic 
concern. The empathic concern cannot be produced only by the ability to imagine what it 
would be like for the other to experience pain, sorrow, and so on, but it can be developed 
only  if  the  horror-perpetrator  has  the  exact  same  experience  of  that  pain.  This  direct 
experience  would  lead  the  horror-perpetrators,  according  to  Adams,  to  experience 
empathetic feelings. That is, it will lead them  to exercise empathetic feelings, such  as 
compassion,  tenderness  and  the  like.  Once  this  capacity  is  developed,  the  horror-
perpetrator would understand how horrendous his actions were and how they affected his 
victim(s) and he will want to repent and come to reconciliation with God.  
The flaw in Adams’ account lies in the fact that she takes for granted that direct experience 
of  pain  necessarily  generates  empathetic  feelings  or  empathetic  concern.  This  direct 
experience  would  lead,  Adams  claims,  the  horror-perpetrators  to  develop  feelings  of 
compassion,  tenderness  and  the  like.  Moreover,  she  assumes  that  if  they  have  these 
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feelings they will act on them in such a way that they would repent for their actions and 
ask for union with God. I argue that direct experience of pain does not necessarily generate 
empathetic feelings. We can say that people may have the capacity to empathize but they 
still do not develop empathetic feelings, nor do they experience empathy. In the case of the 
horror-perpetrators  it  is  not  obvious  that  they  will  develop  this  empathetic  capacity 
because, as I am about to argue, they have their capacity for meaning-making damaged in a 
way that prevents this development. Adams seems to ignore two categories of meaning-
makers.  Those  who  use  meaning-making  for  their  evils  ends  and  those  who  have  a 
genuinely evil nature. I argue that the people who belong to these two categories have their 
meaning-making  damaged  or  corrupted  in  way  that  prevents  them  from  developing 
empathetic feelings. 
Adams claims that direct participation in horrors severely damages or even destroys the 
capacity for meaning-making. Those who experience directly horrendous evils have their 
capacity  for  meaning-making  either  severely  damaged  in  such  a  way  that  they  cannot 
conceive how these evils can be overcome; or destroyed in a way that they are no longer 
capable of finding any positive meaning in their life and in the world in which they live.
351 
From this we can say that since the horror-perpetrator does not have a direct experience of 
the horror he inflicts on his victim(s), he is incapable of appreciating the horrendous nature 
of his actions and cannot evaluate horrendous evils as such Therefore, we can say that his 
meaning-making  is  affected  differently  than  that  of  the  victim.  So  in  what  way  is  his 
meaning-making corrupted?  
Firstly, we can say that the meaning-making of some of the horror-perpetrators is damaged 
because of their life choices and desires. Some horror-perpetrators use meaning-making to 
justify their evil acts in a way that damages their capacity for meaning-making. Consider 
the following case: Alex knows that killing or torturing Ben is bad. His aim in killing or 
torturing Ben is to silence him. In doing so, he would prevent him from giving information 
about him to others who want to harm him. His goal is to save himself and he reasons that 
the best way to do that is by making sure that Ben will not give him up. Here we have a 
case in which the horror-perpetrator has specific goals and acts to fulfil them. He judges 
that the best way to save his own life is by silencing his victim at any cost. Contrary to that 
of the horror-victims, a horror-perpetrator’s capacity for meaning-making is damaged or 
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corrupted (as Adams would probably agree) because of the choices he makes, the values he 
has and his unwillingness to abandon his false beliefs.
352 What he takes to be valuable and 
the reasons he uses to justify this, is what leads to a kind of twisted and corrupted meaning-
making. If the horror-perpetrator’s meaning-making is corrupted by acting in evil ways, 
then he will continue making bad meaning. In continuing to make bad meaning he cannot 
conceive of the suffering he inflicts on his victim in the right way. If he cannot experience 
the suffering and pain which he inflicts in the right way, then he cannot accept that he has 
done wrong properly. And since he cannot accept that he has done wrong properly he will 
continue having corrupted meaning-making. 
Secondly, Adams does not consider cases where horror-perpetrators are genuinely evil. In 
the chapter on Talbott, I argued that Talbott ignores the category which consists of people 
who are genuinely evil. It seems that Adams ignores this category as well. I argued that 
some people act in evil ways and persist in their evil actions out of mere wickedness. They 
act in evil ways just for the sake of acting in evil ways or just because they enjoy acting in 
evil ways. They know that what they do is wrong and that their victims experience pain 
and suffering, nevertheless, they continue doing it. For example, consider cases in which 
someone enjoys bullying and psychologically manipulating others for his own amusement. 
People who belong to this category take pleasure in the pain and suffering of others or they 
are gratified through the infliction of pain and humiliation. Or there are cases where the 
horror-perpetrator knows that his victim is in pain and suffering, nevertheless, he continues 
to inflict pain just for the sake of inflicting pain. Adams will have to accept that it is 
conceivable that some people are genuinely evil and they act in evil ways just for the sake 
of acting in evil ways.  
With the help of these two categories I will argue that even if the horror-perpetrators have 
the capacity to empathize by experiencing directly the horrendous evils which they have 
inflicted on their victims this, however, does not entail that they will experience empathy. 
If some horror-perpetrators’ nature carries this kind of twisted meaning-making or if some 
horror-perpetrators’ nature is genuinely evil it is not obvious that they will develop the 
capacity to empathize. If they do not develop this capacity, it is difficult to see how they 
would repent for their actions and ask for forgiveness. If they do not develop this capacity 
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then they cannot reconcile to God. If some of the horror-perpetrators do not reconcile to 
God, Adams’ universalism fails.  
From what we said above about Adams’ view of empathetic capacity, recall that on her 
view it is required that the horror-perpetrator have an actual experience of empathy in 
order to repent. He has to have empathetic feelings of compassion, tenderness and the like. 
These feelings, I argue cannot be simply generated by direct experience of horrors. In the 
case  of  the  first  category  of  horror-perpetrators  their  corrupted  meaning-making  may 
prevent this development because they have various and conflicting desires. As I have said 
these people are ones who continue to make wrong meaning because they have already 
corrupted their meaning-making through their choices and desires. If they carry this kind of 
nature in the afterlife, it is not obvious that they will abandon their beliefs and not resist 
experiencing empathy. For example, in order to understand what his victim suffered Alex 
would have to be tortured and maybe killed in similar circumstances. However, if Alex 
thinks that what he did during his earthy life was justified and that acting differently would 
have cost him his life, he may not develop empathetic feelings for his victims. He may not 
be willing to abandon his beliefs even if he can understand that his victim went through 
excruciating pain. He will interpret the suffering in his own maladapted way and so it need 
not lead to empathy. Since his beliefs and desires are severely corrupted we may say that 
there is no guarantee that he will empathize with his victim. In the case of the horror-
perpetrators who have a genuinely evil nature, it is even more difficult to see how they 
would develop empathetic feelings for their victims. It seems quite possible that a horror-
perpetrator who inflicted pain on his victim just for the sake of inflicting pain or because it 
amused him would not develop feelings of compassion.  
Having empathetic feelings, and acting upon them, requires that a person already has his 
capacity for meaning-making in a working order. The meaning-making capacity of the 
horror-perpetrators is not enabled in a way that will permit the exercise of these feelings. 
Actual experience of empathy can be prevented by the horror-perpetrators’ damaged or 
corrupted meaning-making. For a person to be able to feel compassion requires that the 
person who acts in such a manner has already attained a level of morality and spirituality 
that will permit this. This would imply, in Adams’ account, that the person has his capacity 
for meaning-making already restored to some extent. A horror-perpetrator whose meaning-
making capacity has been restored and feels permanent compassion for his victims will 
allow  us  to  say,  and  probably  Adams  will  agree,  that  it  will  be  conceptually  and 
psychologically  impossible  for  him  to  continue  acting  in  evil  ways  and  not  repent. 127 
 
Repentance will be assured. However, if some horror-perpetrators retain this nature and 
their twisted meaning-making into the life to come then there is no guarantee that they will 
develop the capacity to empathize. Their insistence on their evil choices and corrupted 
desires and beliefs prevents the development of empathic capacity. The horror-perpetrators 
are in such a state of damaged meaning-making which it prevents them from exercising 
their empathetic capacity. If they do not develop this capacity, which is essential in the 
case of the horror-perpetrators for reconciliation they will not be reconciled to God, and if 
they do not, then Adams’ universalism fails. 
Adams could reply to the above criticism by claiming that, at the moment of death, God 
makes Himself present to all human beings and informs them that He loves them. She 
argues that one may think that God would have to make sure that His human creatures 
know that He loves them and that ‘many misunderstandings of Divine intentions will have 
to be cleared up’.
353 She holds that we should expect nothing less than that God would 
make sure to ‘break through’ as soon as possible after the horror-participants’ death and be 
so  obvious  and  present  as  to  convince  at  least  some  fragments  of  themselves  of  the 
following general truths: 
That love is, was, and always will be God’s meaning; that beloved by 
God is who we are, have been, and always will be; that horrors never 
were and never will be final; that God was never aloof from our horror-
participation, neither was, is, nor ever shall be aloof in relation to us, 
because  we  are  created  for  mutual  indwelling;  that  God  is  powerful 
enough  and  resourceful  enough  to  make  the  plots  resolve,  so  that 
everything will be right.
354 
She furthermore maintains that: 
Even the horror-perpetrators will be able to forgive themselves knowing 
that their evil acts did not separate them from the love of a God who 
identified  with  them  on  the  cross.  They  will  also  be  assured  by  the 
knowledge that God has compensated their victims….Finally they will 
be amazed and comforted by Divine resourcefulness…to force horrors 
to make positive contributions to God’s redemptive plan.
355 
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The horror-perpetrators thus, having cognitive contact with the Divine love would assist 
them in thinking that suffering horrendous evils has an objective good-making aspect.
356 
That is, the horror-perpetrators will know the reasons for their punishment and that God 
has a place for all in His kingdom. Adams maintains that once the horror-perpetrators 
accept these truths and the reasons for their punishment then the process of enabling and 
healing their meaning-making capacity will begin and so, consequently, will the process of 
reconciliation to God. However, even with this reply Adams’ account does not escape my 
criticism.  
Even if God informs the horror-perpetrators of the aforementioned truths and reasons for 
their  experience  of  punishment,  that  does  not  guarantee  the  salvation  of  all  horror-
perpetrators. I do not deny that if God informs the horror-perpetrators of His existence and 
His purpose for them that this would affect some of them, and assist in their first steps 
towards the healing process and to reconciliation. Nevertheless, the problem with Adams’ 
reply lies in this: the fact that God informs the horror-perpetrators about His presence and 
His purposes does not necessarily entail that they will accept these truths and the reasons 
for their punishment and consequently accept God’s love.  
Firstly, in the case of the worst villains who are genuinely evil it is not obvious that God 
would successfully convince some fragments (whatever this may be) of themselves of the 
aforementioned general truths. It may be the case that even if they know that God loves 
them  and  it  is  best  for  them  to  be  reconciled  to  Him,  the  character  which  they  have 
acquired for themselves may be such that they will want to refuse God just for the sake of 
refusing  Him.  Adams  claims  that  the  horror-perpetrators  will  forgive  themselves  for 
committing horrendous evils. But this can only happen if the horror-perpetrators accept 
that they did something really bad. In the case of those who are evil it may be the case that 
they will persevere in their evil nature and find no reasons to forgive themselves because in 
their view they are fine as they are and they can live with the evils they have committed in 
their  earthly  life.  In  short,  it  is—to  say  at  least—unlikely  that  an  individual  who  is 
genuinely  evil  would  be  impressed  by  God’s  presence  and  so  begin  the  rehabilitation 
process.  It  may  well  be  that  some  of  the  horror-perpetrators  have  all  the  relevant 
information they need about the source of their supreme happiness and they may also be 
aware of the consequences of their actions. However, they may still continue to refuse God 
and act in evil ways just so that they can frustrate God’s plans. So the fact that their victims 
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are compensated or that God has ways to redeem horrors would be of no importance to 
them. 
Moreover, at least in the case of the horror-perpetrators, it seems clear that information is 
not meant to be what does the work in Adams’ curative punishment model; this is the role 
played  by  experiences  of  horrors.  In  the  case  of  the  worst  sinners,  the  ones  who  are 
genuinely evil, we can say that if, on the one hand, God’s presence does not affect them 
and if, on the other hand, their meaning-making prevents the development of empathetic 
feelings then it is not obvious how these horror-perpetrators would come to repent and be 
reconciled to God.  
Secondly,  if  some  of  the  horror-perpetrators  have  a  severely  damaged  capacity  for 
meaning-making, and if direct experience of horrors damages or destroys meaning-making, 
then  it  is  not  obvious  how  the  horror-perpetrators  will  accept  the  reasons  for  their 
punishment and come to make positive meaning from their suffering.  Consequently, it 
seems legitimate to ask: how can they accept God? Direct experience of horrendous evils 
destroys  the  meaning-making  of  the  one  who  suffers  them.  In  the  case  of  the  horror-
perpetrator this would suggest that it would destroy his meaning-making in the same way 
as it destroyed the capacity of meaning-making of his victim(s). Moreover, as we have 
seen, Adams holds that direct experience of horrendous evils destroys meaning-making 
capacities in such a way as to lead the victim to question whether his life is worth living. 
So  the  horror-perpetrator  through  experiencing  horrors  may  question  whether  his 
punishment  has  any  positive  meaning  because  direct  experience  of  horrors  destroys 
meaning-making.  
The horror-perpetrators may not accept the reasons for their punishment, or they may not 
understand the reasons for their punishment. Someone can realize that the suffering he 
undergoes is for his own good if he already has his meaning-making capacity restored, let 
us say, in some fashion. To enjoy a meaningful experience of the divine love through the 
medium of punishment, an individual’s meaning-making capacities need to be in good 
working order. That is, they must be able to accept and understand the reasons behind their 
experience of pain and suffering and also they must be able to value their experiences in 
such a way as to find it good. The fact that the horror-perpetrators, firstly, will not have 
their capacity for meaning-making healed and enabled and secondly, will have to undergo 
excruciating  punishment  in  order  to  empathize  with  their  victims’  suffering,  makes  it 
difficult to see how they will have a meaningful experience of God and thus accept the 130 
 
reasons for their punishment and be convinced that God loves them. The horror-perpetrator 
not only has to conceive the full extent of the horrendous nature of his evil acts and their 
seriousness by directly experiencing these evils but also he has to recognize the reasons for 
his punishment and through it the experience of the ultimate good—God. If the worst of 
the horror-perpetrators have their meaning-making severely damaged or destroyed, and if 
infliction of horror destroys meaning-making, then it is not obvious how they would come 
to recognize God as a loving Creator, accept their punishment and reconcile with Him. It 
seems that they will not accept or understand the reasons for their punishment. If they do 
not accept the reasons for their punishment due to their corrupted nature and the experience 
of pain, they may experience their suffering as an unjust and hateful thing. If the wicked do 
not have their meaning-making capacity enabled and healed, then there is no guarantee that 
they will be convinced of God’s love.  
Thus, there is an inconsistency in Adams position. The horror-perpetrators would have to 
have  their  meaning-making  capacities  in  good  working  order  to  be  able  to  have  a 
meaningful experience of the divine love but also experience of divine love is required for 
the healing of meaning-making. Damaged or destroyed meaning-making, on the one hand, 
and participation in horrendous evils, on the other hand, are supposed to prevent this sort 
of experience of the divine. If the horror-perpetrators do not have this kind of experience 
which is required for enabling and healing meaning-making and also have to experience 
the  pain  and  suffering  which  they  have  caused,  then  there  is  no  guarantee  that  their 
meaning-making capacity will not remain damaged or destroyed. If their meaning-making 
capacity is severely damaged or destroyed, then the horror-perpetrators may not accept the 
reasons for their punishment and would experience the horrendous evils and pain as an 
unjust and hateful thing. This may lead to even more damaging of human meaning-making 
in such a way that it seems plausible that some of the sinners will be driven away from 
God and thus not be saved in the end. 
Adams could reply to this criticism in two ways. She could maintain, firstly, that God 
would  repair  severely  damaged  or  destroyed  meaning-making  capacities.  God  could 
restore the horror-perpetrators’ meaning-making capacities in such that they could become 
convinced of the aforementioned truths and be able to feel compassion and thus be able to 
repent for their evil actions. However, the question is not whether God could do this, but 
whether he could do so without altering their personalities by miraculous transformation. 
Secondly,  she  could  maintain  that  God  can  continue  offering  many  opportunities  for 131 
 
restoration and reconciliation in many lives to come and so there will be a time in the 
distant future when all will be saved. 
Let us begin with the first approach. Let us remember that Adams’ universalism is based 
on her confidence in the restoration of sinners’ meaning-making capacities. This kind of 
restoration is a personal task; that is, it is up to the individual to recognize and assign 
positive meaning to his sufferings and to his life. Meaning-making is a process which 
begins from ‘inside’ the individual and it is not something which can be achieved through 
instant transformation of character. As we have seen in part I, Adams holds that the horror-
perpetrators’  meaning-making  capacity  will  be  enabled  and  healed  through  a  long  and 
difficult process, not instantaneously. The damned cannot accept and receive forgiveness 
unless they take responsibility for their evil acts, recognize God as their only source of 
happiness and ask for forgiveness. The process of reconciliation can begin, first, if the 
horror-perpetrators  develop  their  empathetic  capacity,  and  second,  if  they  make  a 
conscious choice to accept the reasons for their punishment and recognize God as the 
ultimate good. From this we can say that Adams cannot consistently hold that God would 
alter the worst sinners’ personalities by miraculous transformation. I argued that the worst 
sinners not only display a critically damaged meaning-making capacity but also that their 
nature is fixed in such a way that they cannot act otherwise. If the horror-perpetrators 
display the kind of character which damages or destroys the capacity for meaning-making, 
and if God cannot achieve this restoration without radically changing their personality, 
then we can maintain that it is not guaranteed that the horror-perpetrators (at least the worst 
kind) will be saved. However, if Adams resorts to the claim that for some there will be a 
mysterious instant transformation, then she would also be required to explain why this 
transformation did not take place earlier (probably during the horror-perpetrators’ earthly 
lives) or why God created evil people who cannot have their meaning-making capacity 
restored without divine intervention in the first place.  
Moreover, as we have seen, Adams holds that vulnerability to horrendous evils impairs 
human freedom. An individual’s freedom can be restored once his capacity for meaning-
making is enabled and healed through a meaningful experience of God. Nevertheless, the 
horror-perpetrators will have to directly experience the horrors which they have inflicted 
on their victims in order to develop an empathetic capacity, which in turn will enable their 
meaning-making and lead them to request reconciliation with God. Reconciliation with 
God will be the outcome of free surrender to God’s will and love. The horror-perpetrator 
chooses God freely after recognizing and assigning the positive meaning of his curative 132 
 
punishment and accepting God’s love. From this again we can see that Adams cannot 
consistently accept the possibility of instant transformation of character because she would 
thereby be diminishing the importance of freedom of choice in her account of what is 
involved in accepting God.  
Alternatively, Adams could reply to my criticism and hold that the future lives of the 
horror-perpetrators  will  be  as  many  as  are  required  for  the  restoration  of  their  horror-
perpetrators’  meaning-making  capacities.  She  maintains,  as  we  have  seen,  that  God  in 
reconstituting the fragmented self of the horror-perpetrators would engage in a long and 
arduous process rather than to complete the task in a twinkling of-an-eye.
357 Such a reply 
would be unsatisfactory, however, because Adams also holds that horrors on earth are hell 
enough so God will not prolong these in the lives to come. If some horror-perpetrators’ 
meaning-making is severely damaged or destroyed, then God would have to prolong their 
residence in the afterlives until they become children of God. However, if continuation and 
meaning-making restoration requires the direct experience of the horrors which the horror-
perpetrators  have  inflicted  on  their  victims,  and  if  the  horror-perpetrators  capacity  for 
meaning-making  is  destroyed,  then  it  would  suggest  that  the  afterlives  of  the  horror-
participants would consist of more horror than their earthly lives. If the wicked have their 
meaning-making capacities damaged or destroyed and if the suffering they undergo is of 
an excruciating nature, then it may be the case that instead of developing an empathetic 
capacity and accepting God’s love they would become angry and would not easily, or at 
all, develop regret for the things that they have done. And if more horror experience leads 
to greater damage of human meaning-making capacity then there is no guarantee that some 
of the wicked will never come to God.  
In the following section I return to the subject of free will. I argue that experience of 
horrendous  evils  diminishes  human  free  will  in  such  a  way  that  the  victim  of  horrors 
cannot freely come to God. I examine a particular type of horrendous evil—depression—
which is especially relevant to my argument for it demonstrates that, in at least some cases, 
suffering  diminishes  free  will.  I  support  this  claim  by  introducing  the  concepts  of 
decisional  capacity  and  consent  and  also  by  focusing  on  a  particular  view  of  mental 
disorders taken from Carl Elliot.  
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2. Human freedom and reconciliation  
In  this  section,  I  argue  against  Adams’  claim  that  all  horror-perpetrators  will  come  to 
reconcile to God freely. Adams, as we have seen, holds that reconciliation with God will 
be the outcome of free surrender to God’s will and love. The horror-perpetrator chooses 
God freely after recognizing the positive meaning of his curative punishment and accepting 
God’s  love.  I  examine  a  type  of  horrendous  evil—depression—and  I  show  that  direct 
experiences of such an evil impairs its victims competence and decisional capacity and so 
diminishes his free will. This example of something many people experience should cause 
us to view Adams’ claims with extreme scepticism. 
Let  us  begin  with  defining  decisional  capacity.  Typically,  decisional  capacity  can  be 
defined as the ability to make decisions. For the purposes of our discussion in this section, 
the notion of decisional capacity will be limited to health care contexts and particularly 
those  cases  of  depression  where  decisions  to  consent  to  or  refuse  treatment  are 
concerned.
358 So, in this case, decisional capacity can be defined ‘the ability of health care 
subjects to make their  own health  care decisions’.
359  I will use Elliott’s argument that 
severely depressed patients may not be competent to consent and so cannot be considered 
accountable for their decisions, to argue that some horror-perpetrators lack the competence 
to consent and so cannot make a free choice to reconcile to God. 
Three conditions are typically said to determine the validity of an individual’s consent. It 
must be properly informed, free of coercion and the individual must have the ability to 
make the particular decision. The latter condition is sometimes referred to as ‘competence’ 
on the ground that what is at issue is ‘the ability to perform a task’. And it is sometimes 
referred  to  as  ‘capacity’  since  the  task  in  question  involves  the  capacity  to  make  a 
decision.
360 What one counts, however, as competence to consent depends on what one 
counts  as  the  capacities  relevant  to  the  task  in  question.  Decisional  capacity  is  often 
divided  into  four  or  five  sub-capacities.  These  are  (1)  understanding:  the  ability  to 
understand the facts involved in the decision that is about to be made; (2) appreciation: the 
ability to appreciate the nature and significance of the decision that one is faced with; (3) 
reasoning:  the  ability  to  reason  and  manipulate  information  rationally  is  crucial  for 
                                                 
358 Questions of this kind of capacity often extend to other contexts such as the capacity to stand trial, or 
make  decisions  related  to  finances.  See  Louis  Charland,  ‘Decision-Making  Capacity’,  The  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta, ed. (Fall 2008 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid.  134 
 
understanding and appreciating the issue in a decision; (4) choice: the ability to express or 
communicate an intended decision; and (5) the possession of values and goals: decisional 
capacity requires ‘a conception of what is good’ because weighing the risks and benefits of 
various alternative choices requires values.
 361 
Adams  holds  that  humans  have  impaired  freedom  because  of  their  nature  and  the 
environment in which they  live, and as such cannot be  fully  responsible for their evil 
actions. She holds that someone can choose God with ‘fully open eyes’ once his freedom is 
repaired and he knows all the relevant information about his actions and its consequences. 
Taking into consideration the above conditions for decisional capacity we can say that an 
individual makes an informed decision once he has taken in all the relevant information 
and  weighed  it  according  to  his  goals.
362  Let  us  see  how  Adams’  approach  of  freely 
choosing  God  looks  when  set  alongside  the  above  claims.  Firstly,  we  can  say  that  an 
individual  takes  in  the  relevant  information  in  knowing  that  God  is  love  and  that  his 
punishment is necessary in order to develop into a child of God. Secondly, he weighs this 
information according to his goals and values; in this case, he would value God’s love and 
the good from his punishment to be the best possible outcome for him. Finally, knowing all 
the relevant information and recognizing what is ultimately best for him he would make a 
free choice to accept God.  
Adams,  as  we  have  seen,  holds  that  experiencing  horrendous  evils  damages  meaning-
making. An individual’s freedom can be restored once his capacity for meaning-making is 
enabled and healed through a meaningful experience with God. Nevertheless, the horror-
perpetrators will have to directly experience the horrors which they have inflicted on their 
victims in order to develop an empathetic capacity. For example, if someone manipulated 
his partner into such a degree that it led him/her to depression, then the horror-perpetrator 
will have to have direct experience of that pain and suffering and consequently he will 
have to become depressed to be able to evaluate properly the horrendous nature of his 
actions and their consequences. Adams classifies depression as a horrendous evil. As a 
horrendous  evil  depression  will  have  to  be  directly  experienced  by  those  who  have 
produced it in their victims. In my view, this presents a serious obstacle to Adams’ account 
of  free  response  to  God’s  love  and  of  the  process  of  rehabilitating  punishment.  The 
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problem is that in cases where the horror-perpetrator has to suffer depression he will be 
incompetent to consent to the process of restoration and so cannot choose God freely. 
Elliott’s work on severely depressed patients’ competence in consenting to or  refusing 
treatment will assist me in showing that the horror-perpetrators who directly experience 
depression are incapable of making a free choice to accept God for which they can be held 
accountable for. Elliott challenges the claim that depression leaves intact the ability to 
reason, to deliberate, to compare and evaluate and holds that depression may well impair 
someone’s competence to consent to treatment, and most importantly, it can impair his 
ability ‘to evaluate risks and benefits’.
363 From this he argues that depression is a disorder 
that  impairs  an  individual’s  mental  abilities  such  that  ‘he  is  not  a  morally  responsible 
agent’ even if he shows competence.
364 A person who suffers from depression can make 
decisions but usually we would not hold him accountable for his actions. Why is that? 
Elliot thinks that an individual’s intellectual ability is not the only thing that is relevant to 
decision-making: his emotional state can also affect his decision. For example, the criminal 
law in some jurisdictions recognizes so-called ‘crimes of passion’. Those who perform 
crimes  under  severe  emotional  stress  and  mental  illnesses  such  as  schizophrenia  or 
multiple personality syndrome usually are not judged fully accountable for their actions. 
Moreover, it is not hard to see that when we are angry or sad or in despair, we act in ways 
which do not reflect our character. Elliot says that:  
In  emotional  extremes,  we  value,  think,  and  behave  differently-
sometimes so differently that we might later believe that the decisions 
we have made are not decisions for which we can be held completely 
and unproblematically responsible.
365 
The important part of this is that he holds that in assessments of competence one must take 
into account the emotional factors surrounding a decision. He argues that there are cases in 
which  the  patient  understands  the  effects  of  treatment,  nevertheless  may  ‘still  fail  to 
appreciate fully just how the treatment would affect his health’.
366 As we have seen earlier, 
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decisional capacity involves the capacity to be able to appreciate the consequences of your 
choices, it ‘involves a deeper comprehension of how the decisions will affect’ your life.
 367 
A depressed person, may have his cognitive, rational decision-making abilities so disrupted 
that, for example, he can convince himself that his situation will never change and may 
refuse treatment on the ‘unrealistic belief that it will not help him’.
368 On the other hand, 
there are patients whose cognitive reasoning powers are intact but their ability to weigh 
risks and benefits is compromised. As Elliot states, this is, 
the depressed patient who is capable of understanding all the facts about 
his illness and the research protocol in which he is enrolling, and who 
appreciates the risks and the broader implications of the protocol on his 
life, but who, as a result of his illness, is not motivated to take those 
risks into account in the same way as the rest of us.
369 
Severely depressed patients are not in the best position to make important decisions about 
their  welfare,  particularly  ‘given  the  sense  of  hopelessness  and  worthlessness’  that 
characterizes  them.
370  It  seems  reasonable,  says  Elliott,  to  worry  about  their  decision-
making.  
Elliott concludes that, firstly, an individual who suffers from depression has values, beliefs, 
desires, and dispositions that are dramatically different from when he is healthy to the 
extent  that  it  is  unclear  whether  the  decisions  he  makes  are  ‘authentically’  his.
371  The 
individual who suffers from depression is in such a mental state that his behaviour and 
choices do not seem to be truly his. Secondly, severely depressed patients do not display 
the minimal degree of self-interest (concern for their own well-being) that is ordinarily 
found in other people and are not best positioned to judge their own interests. A severely 
depressed person would fail to consider his interests in deciding whether to consent to 
treatment, and so we cannot really say that this person is accountable for consenting to it. 
In the light of these, consider again Adams’ claim that all horror-perpetrators will freely 
accept God’s love. Adams argues that the horror-perpetrators can only begin to appreciate 
the horrors which they have inflicted on their victims if they have direct experience of 
these horrors. In having both direct experience of the horrors and knowledge of God’s 
purposes for them, they would be able to understand and fully appreciate the significance 
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of the decisions that they are faced with, and using their reasoning they will value what is 
good and pursue it. However, in cases in which horror-perpetrators have to experience 
depression  in  order  to  empathize  with  their  victims,  two  problems  arise  for  Adams’ 
account. 
Firstly,  since  the  horror-perpetrators  will  experience  depression  their  meaning-making 
might be damaged in such a way that they cannot recognize anything good from their 
experience. I have argued earlier that in the case of the horror-perpetrators, their meaning-
making will not only be damaged from the horrors which they will have to experience 
(post-mortem) but also it is already damaged from their deployment of evil for meaning-
making  in  their  earthly  lives.  If  they  cannot  accept  God’s  love  and  their  punishment 
because of their evil nature, and if being a victim of depression can lead someone to fail to 
appreciate how God’s ways would affect his life, it is not then obvious how the horror-
perpetrator’s  meaning-making  can  be  healed  and  enabled.  As  seen  above,  the  horror-
perpetrator may  convince himself that his situation will never  change,  and may  refuse 
God’s love on the false belief that nothing that God can do can help with his situation.  
Secondly, and most importantly, we have seen that what is involved in reasoning about a 
particular  course  of  action  and  reaching  a  decision  is  weighing  the  risks,  benefits  and 
consequences of proposed options.
372 Patients who suffer from depression are not able to 
value risks and benefits in the way people who do not suffer from this mental disorder can. 
If depression impairs an individual’s capacity to take into consideration his own welfare 
and so value his experience, it is not obvious how the horror-perpetrator would come to 
value the experience given by God. The horror-perpetrator may be able to understand all 
the facts about his illness, that is, the horrendous nature of this evil and the purpose of 
suffering this horror. He may also be able to appreciate the benefits, the risks, and the 
broader implications of suffering this evil. That is, he may be able to appreciate the risk of 
not choosing God—misery and pain and he may be able to appreciate the benefit of the 
curative  punishment  and  God’s  love.  However,  as  a  result  of  suffering  depression,  he 
would not be motivated to take those risks and benefits into account in the same way the 
rest of us would. Since the horror-perpetrator would be in some cases severely depressed, 
he would fail to consider his interests given the sense of hopelessness and worthlessness 
that would characterize him.  
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Depression, in the case of horror-perpetrators can alter their values, desires and beliefs and 
thereby impair their decision-making capacity in such a way that we cannot hold that they 
freely accept God. When a person finds himself in a state of depression he cannot see any 
positive meaning in his life. He ceases to have goals and he can no longer imagine himself 
being in a better state than the one he already finds himself. Consequently, this affects his 
perception  of  future  possibilities.  Since  he  has  no  future  goals  and  sees  no  positive 
meaning in his life, all possibilities cease to be significant. The most important aspect of 
depression is not only that the subject does not see any future good in his life but that he is 
unable  to  do  so.  This  aspect  of  depression  diminishes  free  will.  The  question  which 
inevitably arises is whether he  can be considered accountable for his decision, that is, 
whether ‘his’ decision is truly his. Since the evaluations which inform decision-making are 
caused and imposed by the disease, they will not be authentically chosen by the victim.
373 
If the decisions the horror-perpetrator makes are not truly his, then Adams cannot hold that 
the horror-perpetrators will make a free choice to reconcile to God for which he can be 
held accountable. Moreover, if severely depressed horror-perpetrators are incompetent to 
consent and are placed in a situation in which their decisional capacity remains impaired, 
there is no guarantee that they will not become worse than they already are. Exposure to a 
situation in which they are incompetent to recognize the horrendous nature of their actions 
and God’s love would give them more reasons to question the latter. 
If God permits this kind of horrendous evil to be experienced by some of the horror-
perpetrators then it is not clear how the wicked person’s meaning-making capacities can be 
restored since experience of depression diminishes any possibility of finding any positive 
meaning  in  one’s  life.  If  the  horror-perpetrators  meaning-making  capacity  is  distorted 
because of the infliction of this particular horrendous evil, then not only he will be unable 
to find some good in his suffering, but also his free will would be diminished because he 
does not have the kind of meaning-making capacity which will allow him to decide how to 
respond well to this suffering. It may be the case that there will be some cases in which the 
horror-perpetrators not only have their meaning-making capacities severely damaged but 
also have their free will diminished in such a degree that it is not clear how some of them 
will make positive meaning of their suffering and come to reconcile to God freely. And if 
some of the damned are not capable of exercising their free will then we can say that not 
all will achieve salvation through free response, and so Adams’ universalism fails. 
 
                                                 




In this chapter, I argued that Adams’ arguments in favour of universalism fail to show how 
salvation can be guaranteed to each individual person. I argued that her account of curative 
post-mortem punishment does not guarantee that all horror-perpetrators will be saved. I 
defended this claim, firstly, by arguing that direct experience of pain does not necessarily 
generate  the  empathetic  capacity  that  Adams  defends  and  so  it  is  not  obvious  that  all 
horror-perpetrators  will  develop  such  a  capacity  during  the  rehabilitation  process. 
Moreover,  I  argued  that  if,  on  the  one  hand,  the  horror-perpetrators’  meaning-making 
capacity is damaged or destroyed and, on the other hand, the suffering of horrors destroys 
meaning-making, then it is not guaranteed that they will recognize the curative nature of 
their punishment and God’s love. From these, I concluded that it is not obvious that all 
horror-perpetrators will achieve salvation. Secondly, I focused on Adams’ view that all 
horror-perpetrators  will  reconcile  with  God  freely.  I  argued  using  the  key  example  of 
depression that the model of curative punishment that she proposes does not guarantee that 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
1. The thesis in summary 
I began this thesis with a discussion of the nature of the doctrine of hell and an explanation 
of the problem which hell creates for the Christian religion. I focused particularly on the 
claim that the doctrine is morally indefensible. The problem of hell arises once someone 
affirms a traditional conception of God, a being who is omnipotent and all loving, together 
with a commitment to an eschatological picture of human lives and history. The problem 
of hell creates a dilemma for the Christian theist who would have to either accept that the 
doctrine  of  hell  is  morally  indefensible  or  reject  the  teachings  of  Christ  in  the  New 
Testament.  
Attempts to avoid undermining Christianity itself led Christians to respond to the above 
dilemma in two main ways: on the one hand, some have argued that the doctrine is morally 
defensible  and  have  offered  various  alternative  accounts  of  hell’s  nature  and  different 
interpretations of what it is involved in someone choosing hell. On the other hand, others 
have argued that Christ did not in fact teach the doctrine of hell, at least in its traditional 
form. In order to show this, a persuasive alternative interpretation of the key texts in the 
New  Testament  is  required  to  show  that  those  texts  which  appear  to  speak  of  eternal 
damnation in hell do not in fact do so. As I have explained, this is one strategy deployed in 
defence of universalism. 
In the second chapter of the thesis, I provided a brief historical background of the doctrine 
of hell in order to trace its development in the last few centuries and to identify the main 
problems and criticisms against it. From there  I mapped out the key arguments which 
universalists  offer  against  the  doctrine.  These  are  founded  in  an  understanding  of  the 
doctrine of God and of God’s nature, in particular, the idea that God is a God of love. I 
considered the universalist accounts of John Hick, Thomas Talbott and Marilyn McCord 
Adams because I take these to be the most interesting contemporary approaches to the 
doctrine  of  hell  and  to  the  problem  of  hell.  However,  I  argue  that  even  if  universal 
salvation  is  an  idea  that  most  of  us  would  want  to  endorse,  the  arguments  that  these 
philosophers offer in supporting their accounts do not show that salvation is the fate of all 
human  beings.  Our  examination  of  the  problem  of  universalism  has  yielded  some 141 
 
important conclusions with respect to the accounts considered—it is now time to review 
these conclusions.  
John Hick rejects the doctrine of hell in favour of Christian universalism, at least, this is his 
approach in his early writings. He defines God’s nature as love and argues that the ultimate 
purpose  for  humanity  is  to  be  saved.  The  relationship  that  God  has  with  His  human 
creatures is such that God will be able to fulfil His purpose. His universalism is defended 
by  an  appeal  to  a  theodicy  which  is  eschatological  in  character.  All  earthly  evil  and 
suffering can be justified if God reconciles all to Himself. In chapter three, we saw that 
Hick’s theodicy is characterized by two central themes: ‘soul-making’ and ‘progressive 
lives’ after death. Each individual’s salvation depends on its voluntary response to God’s 
love.  God’s  purpose  cannot  be  achieved  without  the  voluntary  co-operation  of  human 
creatures. Hick argues that most human beings are not ready to follow God by the time of 
their  death  and,  in  order  for  God  to  fulfil  His  purpose,  He  has  to  give  them  further 
opportunities  for  development.  If  God’s  plan  to  create  fully  developed  persons  is  to 
succeed, then He will have to guarantee its success. If there is a continuous life after death 
that provides possibilities for reformation and continuing transformation for all those who 
have not yet attained God, it follows that God will eventually succeed in His purpose of 
winning all humans to Himself in faith and love. The important part of Hick’s account is 
that all humans will be saved in the end, without God having to override the significant 
freedom which He has given them.  
In chapter three, I argued that Hick’s arguments in favour of universalism fail to convince 
us in accepting that all will be saved in the end. The problems that his account faces focus 
mainly on his view that humans have genuine freedom, and on his notion of progressive 
afterlives. For Hick freedom does not only consist in humans being free to act in evil ways 
but also that they are autonomous in such a way that their actions affect their lives and the 
environment in which they live. In response to Hick, firstly, I argued that if he wishes to 
maintain that human beings have genuine freedom, he will have to permit their eternal fate 
to be based on the choices they make and the character which they cultivate for themselves 
during  their  earthly  lives  and  later  on  in  their  afterlives.  If  he  does  so,  then  he  must 
concede that there is no guarantee that all people will come to God in faith and trust. 
Secondly, I argued that his notion of progressive lives does not guarantee that all will be 
saved in the end. The nature of the future worlds and environments, as he has described 
them,  gives  us  good  reasons  to  hold  that  it  is  possible  that  some  of  the  sinners  will 
deliberately continue either to sin or choose salvation for reasons which are not compatible 142 
 
with God’s plan for salvation. Thirdly, since the environments in the afterlives are similar 
to the earthly one there should be opportunities of dismissal and refusal similar to these 
available in the earthly life. If a person can exercise his freedom of choice in such an 
environment then there is no guarantee that he might choose not to be reconciled to God in 
any life, so Hick’s afterlives are not necessarily progressive. Finally, I  argued that the 
notions of ‘epistemic distance’ and ‘God’s hiddenness’ which Hick deploys in an attempt 
to secure human freedom are both compromised in his view of the progressive afterlives.  
The following chapter focused on Thomas Talbott’s account. Talbott rejects the doctrine of 
eternal hell in favour of Christian universalism or necessary universalism. He argues that it 
is not only true but it is necessarily true that every human being will end up in heaven; it is 
impossible that any of God’s human creatures will be damned. No one, despite God’s best 
efforts,  could  freely  and  irrevocably  reject  God  and  thus  separate  himself  from  God 
forever.  Talbott’s  account,  as  we  have  seen,  hinges  on  three  important  ideas:  (i)  the 
identification of God’s nature with love; (ii) an understanding of what constitutes a ‘fully 
informed’ and free choice in accepting or rejecting God; and (iii) the notion of restorative 
punishment after death  as ‘forcibly imposed punishment’. Human creation is, firstly, a 
process whereby God brings all human beings into being as independent rational agents 
who  can  exercise  their  moral  freedom  and  choose  freely  one-way  or  another  in  the 
environment in which they are set. Secondly, it is a process whereby God transforms His 
human creatures into children of God and reconciles all to Himself and to each other. Since 
God is love, and also the source of human happiness, He will seek to promote this kind of 
happiness  in  every  human  being  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  voluntarily  and  joyfully 
submit their wills to Him. Talbott’s thesis gains force with three arguments. Firstly, he 
argues  that  it  is  incoherent  and  logically  impossible  for  someone  to  make  a  free  and 
irrevocable choice to reject God. There is no coherent motive to reject God. Someone who 
has the best motive to embrace God’s love, but nevertheless rejects Him, exhibits the kind 
of irrational act which is incompatible with free choice. If a person is not ‘fully informed’ 
then  he  is  no  position  to  reject  the  true  God,  and  if  he  is  ‘fully  informed’  then  he  is 
incapable of rejecting God. Secondly, God would not permit the damned to be lost forever 
because the happiness of the blessed depends on the happiness of the damned. Thirdly, he 
argues that the kind of punishment that sinners will have to experience in temporary hell 
will be such that it will help them to repent for their sins and be reconciled to God. 
The main problems in Talbott’s account are centred on his view of restorative punishment 
and what it means to make a free choice to accept or reject God. Against Talbott I argued 143 
 
that  his  account  of  unbearable  suffering  as  ‘forcibly  imposed  punishment’  does  not 
guarantee that the damned will repent and accept God’s love. Either he would have to 
modify his account of ‘forcibly imposed punishment’ or he would have to give up his 
claim that all sinners must eventually reach a point where they can resist God no further. If 
he modifies his account in a way that permits him to claim that the intense misery the 
damned undergo is truly unbearable, he will then be endorsing the sort of compulsion—
threat with a sword—he has rejected as inappropriate. Moreover, if he accepts that ‘threat 
with a sword’ may be the kind of punishment which sinners will experience, he would then 
undermine his claim that repentance and reconciliation with God is not determined in any 
way. Secondly, I have argued against his claim that no one can make a free choice to reject 
God. I proposed a case widely accepted by Christian tradition—Satan’s rebellion—to show 
that, even if a sinner has full disclosure of truth, it is nevertheless not obvious that he will 
be reconciled to God. Talbott’s argument becomes even more problematic because he does 
not sufficiently explain what ‘fully-informed’ means. He also fails to explain his notion of 
‘a minimal degree of rationality’. These omissions permit us to ask Talbott to reconsider 
the  force  of  his  objection  to  the  claim  that  the  rejection  of  God  may  be  freely  made. 
Finally, I have argued that his account encounters the same problem as Hick’s account; 
that  is,  human  autonomy  is  diminished  and  consequently  free  choice  does  not  play  a 
significant role in human salvation. 
The third universalist account I examined, in chapter five, was that of Marilyn McCord 
Adams. Adams rejects the doctrine of eternal hell in favour of Christian universalism. In 
endorsing the eschatological conviction that God’s love can be guaranteed safely to every 
human being, she argues that every individual will eventually achieve union with God and 
thus salvation. She bases her account on two distinctive ideas: the category of horrendous 
evils, and, an account of God’s nature and human nature. She argues that all human beings 
are vulnerable to horrendous evils and that this is an obvious fact. Horrendous evils are 
such that those who experience them have their meaning-making capacity destroyed and 
their  lives  are  thus  deprived  from  any  positive  meaning.  The  recovery  from  such 
horrendous evil can be achieved only by something supremely good, and this supreme 
good is God. Divine love and goodness can be guaranteed to each individual only if God 
defeats horrendous evils, not only within the context of the world as a whole but also 
within the framework of the individual participant’s life.
374 The latter defeat would involve 
God giving to horror-participants lives that were great good to them on the whole and 
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within which horrors were made meaningful.
375 God would not permit some of His human 
beings to be eternally damned in hell since the eternal horror of hell would be a horror that 
would  remain  undefeated.  Since  God  loves  His  human  creatures,  He  would  not  create 
persons within whose lives horrendous evils remain undefeated, whether in the earthly life 
or the future life. Therefore, God will save all human beings in the end. 
In my analysis of Adams’ view, I argued that she fails to convince us accept her arguments 
in favor of universalism because her account of curative post-mortem punishment does not 
guarantee  that  all  horror-perpetrators  will  be  saved.  Firstly,  I  held  that  the  horror-
perpetrators’ meaning-making capacities are damaged in a different way than are those of 
the horror-sufferers. The distinction between these two groups of meaning-makers, and my 
explanation of how the horrendous evils affect the horror-perpetrators, led me to argue that 
is  not  obvious  that  the  excruciating  pain  that  the  horror-perpetrators  would  have  to 
experience  will  help  them  to  develop  the  capacity  to  empathize.  In  some  cases,  the 
meaning-making capacities of the worst of the sinners are so damaged that it would be 
difficult to see how they could even make sense of their suffering. Secondly, her view that 
reconciliation  with  God  will  come  about  freely  after  the  worst  of  the  sinners  have 
experienced the same pain and suffering that they have inflicted on their victims is not well 
defended. I maintained that there is no guarantee that all sinners will freely choose God 
given that some of them will not be able to do so since their meaning-making capacities 
will be too severely damaged. I argued using the key example of depression that the model 
of curative punishment that she proposes does not guarantee that all horror-perpetrators 
will freely reconcile to God. 
As we have seen, the three accounts of universalism considered here face similar problems. 
They  raise  questions  about  divine  and  human  nature,  the  nature  of  human  freedom  in 
relation to God’s omnipotent love, and the nature and success of post-mortem punishment. 
Hick and Talbott have to explain how human autonomy is preserved in the lives to come in 
order to show that libertarian human freedom is important for each individual’s salvation. 
Adams, on the other hand, has to show that the damned in hell will be able, despite the 
horrendous evils which they will experience, freely to accept God’s love. Moreover, the 
accounts which all three philosophers propose of the afterlife punishment do not guarantee 
either that all will choose to reconcile to God or that their choice for reconciliation will be 
the product of love, faith and trust.  
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The result of my analysis of these universalist accounts in the last three chapters is to 
reveal  the  key  weaknesses  at  their  heart.  The  weaknesses  began  to  emerge  when  I 
examined the positions of each individual philosopher. Now I argue that these weaknesses 
are problems for all defenders of universalism. They fatally undermine the plausibility of 
all universalist views. In the following section, I consider again some of the most serious 
problems for universalism. I then suggest an alternative approach to the doctrine of hell—
one which might be able to avoid the problems surveyed in this thesis—but only at the cost 
of giving up universalism’s key claim: that all will be saved in the end. 
 
2. Problems universalism must solve 
The main problems that universalists must resolve concern: (a) the notion of libertarian 
freedom; (b) the nature of the afterlife worlds; (c) the notion of curative punishment; (d) 
interpretation and translation of key scriptural texts; and (e) the nature of God as love. 
 
a. Libertarian view 
Most universalists, if not all, affirm a kind of libertarian freedom of choice. Libertarian 
freedom is thought to be important not only for morally significant choices but also for 
genuine personal relationships. Taking libertarian freedom seriously universalists hold that 
all will reconcile with God freely in trust, faith and love. I have argued throughout the 
three core chapters of the thesis that universalists cannot consistently hold this view of 
freedom and at the same time affirm universal salvation. In supporting universal salvation 
they are committed to the claim that whatever human beings do, they will, nevertheless, 
enjoy fellowship with God. Universalists will have to find a way to argue that God does 
not  rob  His  human  creatures  of  their  freedom  while  He  attempts  to  reconcile  them  to 
Himself. 
It might seem that one way for the universalist to avoid this difficulty would be to hold that 
people do not have libertarian freedom but compatibilist freedom. Compatibilism holds 
that  free  will  is  compatible  with  some  degree  of  causal  determinism.  However,  if 
libertarian freedom were to be denied, and universalists were to hold that freedom and 146 
 
determinism  are  compatible,  then  things  would  not  be  entirely  trouble  free  for 
universalism. If God has given human beings compatibilist freedom then, following John 
Mackie, one could ask: why did God not create humans in such a way as to always choose 
good in their earthly lives? Moreover, if it were in God’s power to create a world in which 
human beings are free to choose the good in their earthly life and consequently are free to 
choose God instead of hell then someone would wonder why God did not create all human 
beings in heaven in the first place. Furthermore, in explaining why God did not create all in 
a heavenly state from the beginning, a universalist might say that it is because it is more 
important  for  humans  to  develop  a  good  character  for  themselves  through  overcoming 
difficulties and challenges. For these reasons, universalism cannot support a compatibilist 
view of freedom but require a libertarian view. 
There is a tension if not a contradiction in affirming both the certainty of universalism, on 
the one hand, and a libertarian view of freedom, on the other. A clear commitment to 
libertarian freedom leaves open the possibility that not all will be saved. If universalists 
hold onto a libertarian view of freedom, then they will be forced to admit the possibility 
that some of the damned will continue refusing God’s love.  
 
b. Nature of the afterlife and intermediate worlds 
Universalists hold that God will not cease helping people and guiding them in the life to 
come. Most human beings die without ever knowing God. If God’s plan is to save all then 
He  will  give  to  sinners  more  opportunities  in  further  lives  to  continue  their  moral 
development and find and love God. Of the universalists considered in this thesis, only 
Hick attempts to give a detailed account of what the next worlds will consists in. Other 
universalists, may shy away from providing details about this in order to avoid further 
questions which would inevitably arise about memory and personal identity.
376 They affirm 
that the environments in the next worlds will be such that they will compel the sinners 
freely to join God through some kind of curative punishment for the sins which they have 
committed in their earthly lives. Moreover, the environments of the future lives will be 
designed to nourish all humans and help them transform into children of God.  
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The main problem with this characterization of the next worlds is that it portrays them as 
far too similar to the current earthly environment. These future environments will be places 
with  challenges  to  overcome  through  pain  and  suffering.  If  this  is  the  nature  of  the 
environments in the afterlives, and if humans have the kind of libertarian freedom which 
universalists affirm, then universalists will have to accept that there is the possibility that 
salvation will not be every single person’s eternal fate. There are two reasons for this: 
Firstly, there is no guarantee that some sinners will refrain from committing evils acts. 
Knowing that they can continue existing and knowing that whatever they do they will 
eventually be saved might give them more reasons to continue doing what they are doing, 
acting in ways contrary to God’s will. Secondly, although it may be the case that in the 
presence of severe punishment and challenges to overcome some of the sinners would 
decide to join God, their decision would be based on their wish to escape punishment and 
not on feelings of trust and love towards God. 
The universalist would have to give a better account of what would be different in the 
afterlife environments which would lead even the worst sinners to act in good ways, repent 
and be reconciled to God. They would have to explain what element the next worlds have 
that would necessarily lead sinners to come to God. One suggestion could be that God 
would be obvious in the afterlives thus making sure that all humans know that He exists 
and that it is best for them to follow Him. However, this reply would create a problem for 
universalists as we have seen in Hick’s account. If they want to hold onto a libertarian 
view of human freedom then they cannot claim that God will be obvious. The only way 
that humans can make free and autonomous choices is if God and His purpose for creation 
are not obvious to them.
377 Moreover, a question that inevitably emerges if someone claims 
that God would be obvious in the post-mortem lives would be why God has been hidden in 
this current life. Why did God wait until the occurrence of the post-mortem lives to reveal 
himself? If human freedom is essential in the earthly life, and if it remains essential in the 
lives to come, God would have to remain hidden from His human beings in their future 
lives, in the same way as He has been hidden from them in their earthly life.  
On the other hand, if universalists hold that God is hidden in the lives to come another 
problem comes up. I have argued that the worst of the sinners would not have a different 
nature in the afterlives than the one which they have in their earthly lives. Their perception 
of what is good would be twisted, and if instant transformation of character is off the table 
for universalists, this distorted nature would be carried into the immediate future life. If 
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their nature is severely corrupted, and if the environment in which they would have to 
exercise this nature is similar to the earthly one, and if God remains hidden, it is difficult to 
see how the worst kind of sinners would come to understand God’s love and thus repent 
for their crimes. So it is not obvious how the worst of the sinners would ever begin the 
process of restoration and achieve salvation. 
Another task for universalist positions then would be to give a more detailed or careful 
presentation of the nature of the afterlives. To do so they may have to give arguments 
regarding  human  memory  and  personal  identity.  However,  offering  and  examining 
arguments of that sort may well lead to problems that are even more difficult to solve 
because arguments about human memory and personal identity after death are themselves 
highly contentious. Another approach, that some have tried, is to give some detail about 
what kind of experiences the damned would have in the lives to come and to explain the 
kind of punishment that would take place. Nevertheless, as we see in the next section, this 
strategy also fails. 
 
c. Curative punishment   
As we have seen, universalists do not deny that there might be some kind of punishment in 
the afterlife and some of them have argued that the punishment might be as severe as the 
pains and suffering someone would have been afflicted with on the traditional view of hell. 
What makes the universalist’s view different from the traditional account of punishment in 
hell is that they hold that the punishment inflicted is not retributive in nature but curative. 
Pain they argue, following Origen, cures. The main problem with this view is that it is not 
obvious that pain cures and if pain does not cure then universal salvation is not guaranteed. 
There must be some arguments or evidence which would establish the curative efficacy of 
pain and punishment. Here I suggest the more obvious things that universalists would have 
to show if their arguments are to guarantee salvation for all human beings. Firstly, they 
will have to explain how the worst sinners will come to realize that their punishment is for 
their own good. Secondly, it has to be shown that severe physical and mental punishment 
lead to moral amendment. Thirdly, universalists have to show that the character which 
emerges from severe punishment can be legitimately called virtuous.  149 
 
Let us begin with the first point. It seems that universalists fail to show how the villain in 
the lives to come is in a mental state such that would permit him to understand the reasons 
behind his punishment. The sinners, as I have said above, carry their evil nature with them 
into the next lives. If they did not recognize what was good for them and which actions it 
would have been good to perform during their earthly life, and also, have a twisted idea of 
what is good and what is bad then it seems likely that they would not understand the 
reasons behind their punishment and so experience it as a hateful thing. But perhaps a more 
important  point  relevant  to  the  whole  process  of  restorative  punishment  is  that  the 
legislator  who  aims  to  cure  the  worst  villains,  in  this  case  God,  would  have  to  be 
recognized as such. The sinner has to have some idea of the nature of the person or entity 
that inflicts the pain and suffering. That is, God has to be recognized as the appropriate 
distributor of punishment. The curative process of punishment would only begin if the 
sinner accepts the punishment which is inflicted on him by accepting firstly, the reasons 
for him been punished and realizing the wrongness of his actions and, secondly, that the 
person who punishes him is the appropriate distributor of punishment. Universalists then 
will have to give a better account of what makes it the case that the sinners will realize that 
their punishment is for their own good and that God loves them. 
Secondly, even if we did agree that it is generally necessary, and so acceptable, to inflict 
cruel punishment on the worst kind of villains, it would still be difficult to argue or affirm 
that severe physical pain and/or the mental sufferings of remorse and of feelings of guilt in 
themselves  lead  to  moral  amendment.  There  is  little  doubt  that  prolonged  suffering 
interferes  with  a  person’s  life-in-action.  If  the  punishment  in  the  afterlives  will  be 
excruciating and its duration will last according to the needs of each sinner, we may argue 
that the punishment might be harsh and in such a degree that would produce a neurotic 
state in which the person who experiences the pain and suffering can no longer see any 
future  possibilities  for  change.
378  In  short,  the  case  that  severe  physical  or  mental 
punishment leads to moral amendment is yet to be made. 
Thirdly, another more radical method of attacking the value of curative punishment as a 
punishment which deters the damned from continuing to sin and compels them to repent is 
to argue that the resultant behaviour may not legitimately be called good or virtuous. An 
attitude that is arrived at through the coercion of excruciating punishment would not be as 
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worthwhile as an attitude which has been formed willingly. So virtue induced as a result of 
such excruciating punishment would seem to be unworthy of the name. I have argued in all 
three chapters that even if the curative punishment which the damned will have to undergo 
may bring about repentance, their repentance would be unlikely to be genuine. Fear or 
boredom  might  be  the  reasons  behind  the  sinners’  repentance,  and  if  this  is  the  case, 
repentance is not made through love, faith and trust in God. If the reasons for obeying God 
are fear of punishment or hope for reward and the wish to evade punishment, I argue that it 
adds nothing to the moral value of good conduct; on the contrary the damned have been 
put in a position in which it is even more difficult to attain a pure love and submission to 
God’s will.
379 
Even granted that the damned must be reformed, is such excruciating suffering necessary 
and inevitable? To answer this question positively universalists have to demonstrate that 
the  kind  of  punishment  which  they  envisage  would  have  the  required  curative  effects. 
Unless  they  provide  substantial  grounds  to  convince  us  that  punishment  remedies  the 
sinners’ disorder of the character, then there is no good reason to accept a curative theory 
of punishment. 
 
d. The interpretation and translation of particular texts in the scriptures  
In the second chapter of the thesis, I pointed out that one of the main reasons why the 
doctrine of hell remained unchallenged for so long and why a Christian could not easily 
refrain  from  believing  it  is  the  hard-to-deny  fact  that  the  doctrine  is  preached  in  the 
scriptures. Someone could, of course, say that what is in the scriptures should have no 
bearing on the philosophical debate about the fate of sinners. But this arguments cuts both 
ways.  We  have  seen  that  those  who  support  universalism  do  base  their  arguments  on 
particular interpretations of the scriptures. For example, one of the main arguments which 
they proposed in favour of universalism is based on the interpretation of the Greek word 
αιώνιος. They argue that the Greek adjective αιώνιος, that is translated in English Bibles as 
‘eternal’ or ‘everlasting’, literally means ‘age enduring’. It has been claimed that this word 
need not mean eternal or unending and, in fact, there are passages in the scriptures which 
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speak of a mystery which is ‘age enduring’ and which can come to an end. So punishment 
in hell can be taken to be ‘age enduring’ and not eternal.
380 
I  suggest  that  a  further  investigation  into  the  translation  and  interpretation  of  these 
passages  may  be  promising  in  shedding  light  on  whether  universalism  is  definitively 
preached in the scriptures. Defenders of universalism would have to demonstrate that the 
claim that all will be saved in the end is clearly there in the text. This seems unpromising 
though as the evidence so far available in favour of universalism is not as strong as the 
evidence in favour of a doctrine of hell. Future research will also have to investigate why 
the  early  Christian  fathers  did  not  include  the Testament  of  Paul  and other  testaments 
(which are categorized as, what is known as, apocrypha) in the main teaching of Christian 
religion.
381 The Testament of Paul, for example, provides the greater amount of passages 
which  support  universal  salvation.  If  this  investigation  into  the  translation  and 
interpretation of the Christian texts is ultimately unfruitful then defenders of universalism 
will  have  to  support  their  position  by  arguments  which  reject  the  doctrine  of  hell  on 
philosophical and moral grounds; such an approach, as I have argued in previous chapters, 
does not succeed. 
 
e. Is universal salvation necessarily an expression of God’s love? 
Universalism maintains that God’s love for His creation is inconsistent with the claim that 
God does not wish to save all of it. The argument focuses on two claims: that if God truly 
loves a human being then He desires to save it; and if God truly loves all human beings 
then His desire will be to save them all. If God is by His nature love, then God must love 
all humans and desire their salvation. Universalism cannot begin to support the salvation of 
all human beings unless it defines God’s love in these terms. If God’s nature is not in fact 
the one that universalists propose then their argument does not hold.  
There  has  been  a  sustained  attempt  throughout  the  centuries  from  many  Christian 
philosophers  and  theologians  to  reconcile  a  doctrine  of  hell  with  God’s  loving  nature. 
Aquinas has made one of the most well known attempts to reconcile God’s love with a 
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doctrine of hell, and it has been recently modified and developed by Eleonore Stump.
382 
Philosophers in this tradition argue that hell flows from God’s love. Stump, for example, 
holds that by properly defining God’s goodness we can reconcile it with the doctrine of 
hell. The key point is that God’s loving nature can be defined in such a way that would not 
be inconsistent with a doctrine of hell. So the universalist would have to not only define 
God’s love in such a way as to exclude the possibility of eternal hell but also give better 
accounts of the nature of curative punishment and human freedom, as well as of God’s 
omnipotent love. 
 
3. A different approach to the doctrine of hell 
Up  to  this  point,  this  final  chapter  has  focused  on  a  brief  summary  of  what  has  been 
discussed in the earlier chapters of this thesis. In particular, I have summarized the main 
positions of John Hick, Thomas Talbott and Marilyn McCord Adams. I sketched out the 
main difficulties that their accounts present and pointed out that they each face similar 
problems; these problems focus for the most part on their accounts of the nature of curative 
punishment and human freedom. From there I argued that these are problems which all 
universalist positions have to deal with. Above, I distinguished five problems which, in my 
view, make universalism a weak position to defend and I have considered and rejected 
several ways in which the universalist could defend his position. The possible approaches 
which the universalist might adopt to solve the problems reviewed here cannot be endorsed 
without  compromising  further  other  claims  to  which  universalists  are  committed.  To 
conclude this thesis, I do not attempt to offer an argument in favour of the doctrine of hell. 
To do so would require a thesis on its own. Instead, I indicate how one might defend the 
claim that hell is compatible with a loving God and the further claim that it is a self-chosen 
condition.  In  doing  this,  while  drawing  on  the  support  of  other  non-universalists,  I 
introduce  some  of  my  own  ideas  about  the  nature  of  the  suffering  in  hell  and  human 
freedom. 
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Any understanding of hell must begin with an understanding of the nature of God and 
show how hell issues from God’s nature. On this point, I agree among others with Jonathan 
Kvanvig, Eleonore Stump, C. S. Lewis and Jerry Walls. Christianity holds that God created 
the world and human beings out of love. Creation was not something that God had to do, 
but was the result of His goodness. So when discussing the relationship of God with His 
human creatures the most important thing we have to consider, as most theists claim, is His 
goodness. His love and goodness are the characteristics on the basis of which Christian 
tradition explains why God created human beings. God’s goodness and His love towards 
human beings are displayed not only in creation but also in salvation. Christianity hopes 
for the salvation of all humans and the ultimate triumph of God’s purpose. However, the 
hope of the salvation of all people combined with a doctrine of eternal hell inevitably 
compromises God’s goodness and love. I would like to hold that God’s attitude towards 
human beings is that of love and that hell is an expression of God’s love. I am inclined to 
say that the doctrine of hell is concerned with the ultimate nature and consequences of an 
individual’s actions and decisions and the relation of those actions and decisions to the 
nature and the purposes of God.
383 We might say that those who defend a doctrine of hell 
are really defending something else: namely, a robust view of human freedom.  
I follow the Biblical and theological conviction that God freely creates persons in His own 
image so that one day they may freely choose a life of fellowship and love with Him.
384 
God loves human beings by allowing them to be independent and rational agents who can 
choose to unite with God using their given freedom. Since humans have such a nature, they 
have the capacity to enjoy, as Talbott puts it, supreme happiness through a relationship 
with God. A life apart from God would deprive any human being of access to this kind of 
happiness. Nevertheless, the fact that God has given human beings the freedom of choice 
does not guarantee that they will all choose reconciliation with God. Human freedom can 
only be  fulfilled in love and obedience in God. However, within the finite nature and 
environment in which humans have been set by God, they can also resist and cling to the 
bondage of unhealthy desires. Thus, an individual who chooses a life apart from God and 
denies the personhood that has been given to him by God also denies God. Those who 
support universal salvation and those who support the Christian dogma of hell hold that 
salvation is a personal and ‘relational phenomenon’.
385 If love is understood in terms of the 
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relationship between God and His human creatures then God’s omnipotent love cannot 
only not force a person to be reconciled to Him but also it cannot guarantee the success of 
the  relationship.  Loss  of  heaven  and  the  absence  of  God  would  be  the  inevitable 
consequence of the willed rejection of God’s love. 
If human freedom was not important and autonomy was insignificant in the interactions 
between God and human beings, then we could hold that God would have a good reason to 
override His human creatures’ freedom if what awaits them without this intervention is 
eternal damnation. In the course of examining Hick and Talbott’s accounts on freedom, I 
have argued that God cannot override human freedom and so we cannot conclude that 
freedom and autonomy are of little significance. What remains then is to give an account of 
hell  that  not  only  shows  God’s  love  towards  the  sinners  but  also  recognizes  the 
significance of human freedom. Since the capacity of freedom and autonomy is important, 
we should accept that an individual could choose damnation. 
In the introduction of the thesis, I said that hell is traditionally conceived as a place of 
excruciating physical punishment. It has been pictured as a place of unending fire ‘where 
there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth’.
386 By giving a different account of the misery 
in hell, we could perhaps avoid the criticism that hell is a place of retributive punishment 
and arbitrary torture. I will do so with the help of the views of other philosophers such as 
Lewis, Stump, Walls and Kvanvig while trying to stay as close as possible to the doctrine 
of hell which traditional Christianity— both Eastern and Western—preaches. 
Hell was portrayed through the writings of St Augustine and St Aquinas as a place of 
excruciating physical suffering. However, in later times, hell was also portrayed as a place 
or state of spiritual misery. Several writers, such as Dante and Milton, depicted hell as a 
fire which burns on the inside rather than the outside of all sinners’ souls.
387 Virgil, for 
example, in Dante’s Hell says to one of the blasphemers:  
“O Capaneus, since thy proud insolence  
Will not be quenched, thy pains shall be the 
more; 
No torment save thine own hot rage could be 
A fitting cautery to thy rabid sore.”
388 
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Since the misery of hell is presented as something which begins from the human heart or 
character, Walls and Lewis argued that the misery of hell stands in clear continuity with 
our earthly experiences. We can thus hold that the kind of misery experienced in hell is the 
natural consequences of living a life of wickedness and evil and allowing vicious feelings 
and emotions to shape one’s character.
389 C. S. Lewis endorses and defends this view. 
Lewis believes that every moral choice human beings make moves them one-step closer to 
heaven or hell. Hell and heaven begin on earth through the free choices that humans make. 
Hell is only a state of mind. By ‘state of mind’, he means that hell is experienced from 
within. It is not just a place, but it is something that sinners create for themselves. The 
wicked person does not wish to surrender himself to God’s will but to something else. 
Lewis characterizes this as ‘self-absorption’, a state in which the damned makes the best of 
what he finds there, and what he finds outside the system of self-giving is hell.
390 For 
example, when Lewis describes hell in The Great Divorce he says that the sinners create 
for themselves houses and cities to protect them from the constant rain (in Hell) just by 
thinking about them. However, they never find peace because the houses cannot keep the 
rain out.
391 
In addition to this notion of hell as the natural consequence of human evil actions, hell is 
also sometimes taken to be a place where the misery and pain that sinners suffer is the 
result of the actions of the other damned. Stump makes a case for this, holding that hell is a 
place provided by God for the damned in which they can still act and will in accordance 
with their evil nature. On this view, hell is not a place of punishment inflicted by God but it 
is ‘the condition to which the soul reduces itself by a stubborn determination to evil, and in 
which it suffers the torment of its own perversions’.
392 The pains and suffering imposed on 
the damned are not imposed by God, but are the result of those who surround them in hell 
and  what  they  do  to  themselves.  Moreover,  Walls  holds  that  the  damned  will  inflict 
physical pain on one another. He writes that ‘those whose characters have been shaped by 
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violence  may  continue  to  feed  on  violence  in  hell.  Again  it  is  simply  the  natural 
consequence of violence to engender further violence’.
393 
However, as we have seen, hell is not only widely regarded as a place of poena sensus; it is 
also thought to be a place of poena damni. Hell is a place where God is absent. It seems 
that  the  real  unutterable  horror  is  that  the  damned  are  left  alone.  Lewis,  for  instance, 
describes hell as like the cold and dark of outmost space. It is a place where in a final and 
total separation people are eternally starved of God’s presence.
394  
We might say that hell results from human self-centeredness and the interaction of the 
damned with each other. By interaction I mean the sinners’ dealings with other sinners 
who have more or less the same character as they have. Maybe the harm that they would 
undergo would be mental rather than physical. Interaction with others who have the same 
nature as them would make them realize that there is no future good and, at the same time, 
provide  them  with  the  false  belief  that  they  cannot  change  their  hellish  situation.  The 
misery  that  they  suffer  is  one  that  emerges  from  the  damned’s  incapacity  to  open 
themselves  to  God’s  love.
395  The  damned  are  in  eternal  misery  because  they  are  still 
covetous, proud, and loveless.
 God does not inflict hell on the damned but it is in part the 
absence of any action by God. In N. Berdyaev’s words, hell is a state in which the wicked 
are powerless ‘to come out of’ themselves; it is a state of ‘absolute self-centredness, dark 
and evil isolation, i.e. final inability to love’.
396 Hell is eternal misery due to the nature that 
sinners  have  freely  shaped  for  themselves.  I  agree  with  Lewis  that  hell  is  creaturely 
rebellion against God. The damned have the opportunity to escape hell but no one ever 
does because there is always something which they prefer to joy and reality and they insist 
on pursuing it even at the price of misery. Lewis holds that the damned are, in one sense, 
successful rebels to the end; the doors of hell are locked on the inside.
397 They are not even 
close  to  self-abandonment  and  they  enjoy  forever  the  horrible  freedom  they  have 
demanded, and are therefore self-enslaved.
398  
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We might conjecture that the damned have been so long involved in their state of self-
deception that they have become evil or self-deceived by nature.
399 Since the damned in 
hell act contrary to the nature which God has planned for them, and God is absent from 
their lives, we might say that the damned are nothing more than what Dante and Lewis 
describe as ‘shades’. In hell the damned are nothing more than a ‘shade’ or a ‘ghost’. Each 
lacks noteworthy substance. Lewis says: 
To enter Heaven is to become more human than you ever succeeded in 
being on earth; to enter hell is to be banished from humanity. What is 
cast  (or  casts  itself)  into  hell  is  not  a  man:  it  is  ‘remains’.  To  be  a 
complete man means to have the passions obedient to the will and the 
will offered to God: to have been a man—to be an ex-man or ‘damned 
ghost’—would presumably mean to consist of will utterly centred in its 
self and passions utterly uncontrolled by the will.
400  
On this view, a damned soul is nearly nothing: It is the ultimate unreality of being. The 
wicked are not persons; they have become the sin which they have chosen. Hell is a place 
where human potential is dried up, there are only ghosts. Their ghostly nature is the result 
of their self-absorption. Heaven is the real world and hell is the ‘shadowlands’, as Lewis 
says, where everything is immaterial and in flux. The shades which are in hell are self-
obsessed and self-referential.
401 By rejecting God, the damned come to the place where 
they no longer have a self to give, and this place is hell. Stepping away from God, and a 
community with God, their humanity is drastically dismissed. They have surrendered their 
will completely to their base desires and chosen decisively against union with God. As 
Lewis  says,  the  characteristic  of  lost  souls  is  ‘their  rejection  of  everything  that  is  not 
simply themselves’.
402  
We might further conjecture that God’s love is shown to sinners by permitting them to act 
according  to  their  nature.  If  human  freedom  and  autonomy  are  significant,  God  will 
consider  the  sinners’  freely  chosen  actions  and  thus  permit  them  to  damn  themselves. 
Violating their freedom and bringing them to his glory without their consent, would be to 
                                                 
399 J. Walls (1992) and J. Kvanvig (1993) argue that pride is what motivates the damned to reject God. Also 
see Charles Seymour, A Theodicy of Hell (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), C. Seymour, ‘On Choosing 
Hell’, Religious Studies 33, no. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 249–266. C. Seymour,  ‘Hell, Justice and Freedom’, 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43, no. 2 (April, 1998), pp. 69–86. 
400 Ibid., p. 127–128. 
401 In most of Lewis’s literary work, we see that the wicked are always presented in the same way. They have 
a tendency to set aside morality for the sake of utility, they have no respect for the sanctity of human life, and 
they  do  not  accept  reality  as  they  find  it  but  prefer  remaining  undeveloped,  remaining  shadows.  The 
unredeemed characters are self-centred and selfish and they have always an excuse by which they attempt to 
cover the truth about themselves. See Lewis (1946), pp. 39–41. 
402 Lewis (2002), p. 125. 158 
 
violate  the  personhood  which  He  gave  them  in  the  first  place.  The  damned  would  be 
deceived in hell but this self-deception is something which is self-inflicted. And if the 
damned are self-deceived they can only begin the process of restoration by deciding for 
themselves to change their mind and follow God. I do not deny that there may be the 
possibility that some sinners after a long period of time would come to repent for their sins 
if they still have freedom in hell. However, for the worst sinners this may be something 
that would never occur since their views of good may be so severely damaged that they 
would not be able to act in any other way than the way they are already acting. 
I do not claim to have argued for the view of hell outlined here. I have merely given some 
indication of how a doctrine of hell could be made compatible with belief in an all-loving 
God. Of course, I think that a doctrine of hell can be better defended if its proponents 
assume that all humans have libertarian freedom of choice that God would never override. 
A  full  defence  of  the  doctrine  would  require  strong  arguments  as  to  why  most  of  the 
sinners would rather remain in hell than choose to be reconciled to God.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this thesis, I have attempted to show that universalist accounts do not give us adequate 
grounds to reject a traditional Christian doctrine of hell. I began by setting out the doctrine 
of hell and examined briefly its development through the centuries. I then identified the 
main reasons behind the move for its abandonment. In chapters three, four and five, I 
presented and examined three universalists positions. There, I have shown that each fails 
adequately to defend the claim that God will save all human beings. I have also shown that 
each fails to give us compelling grounds to reject the view that some people will reject 
God’s love for eternity. I argued that the main problems faced by universalist accounts of 
John Hick, Thomas Talbott and Marilyn McCord Adams lie in their views of post-mortem 
curative punishment and human freedom. In this final chapter, I have summarized five 
main problems that every universalist would have to have to respond to while defending 
his  account.  As  I  have  shown,  the  three  accounts  examined  here  all  fail  to  respond 
adequately to these problems. 
The  debate  between  universalists  and  defenders  of  the  traditional  doctrine  of  hell  has 
recently heated up again after centuries of inactivity. Nevertheless, many issues demand 159 
 
further scrutiny—particularly, issues around the ideas of curative punishment and human 
freedom. Accepting a doctrine of universal salvation amounts to a denial of the seriousness 
of human choices. We cannot affirm the seriousness of human choices and at the same 
time consistently hope for the salvation of all human beings and the fulfilment of God’s 
purposes. The Christian God wills the salvation of all His human creatures, and Christians 
rightly  hope  for  everyone’s  salvation.  However,  as  I  have  demonstrated,  universalist 
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